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Foreword
Eligibility for unemployment insurance benefits is determined hi part
by compliance to a set of nonmonetary requirements having to do with
initial separation issues and continuing eligibility. The ability of states to
ensure that claimants comply with these regulations and that those who
do not are denied benefits depends on a number of legislative, regulatory
and administrative factors. This study examines the various state laws
and practices regarding nonmonetary regulations and assesses their ef
fect on the ability of states to identify and reject unemployment in
surance claimants who fail to meet the requirements. According to the
authors, "the patterns observed in the analysis may suggest how certain
practices can help state agencies (1) minimize the extent to which
claimants violate nonmonetary eligibility rules, and (2) maximize the
ability of agencies to detect violations when they occur and to reduce or
deny benefits accordingly." This is essential to the equitable and efficient
operation of the program.
Facts and observations expressed in the study are the sole responsibili
ty of the authors. Their viewpoints do not necessarily represent positions
of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Robert G. Spiegelman
Executive Director
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and
Acknowledgments
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criteria: initial monetary and nonmonetary qualification requirements
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labor market). Much of the burden for the equitable and efficient opera
tion of the system rests on the nonmonetary standards for both initial
(i.e., separation) and continuing (i.e., nonseparation) eligibility, yet, as
they are applied, these standards do not easily lend themselves to review
or understanding.
This monograph investigates the influence of state laws, regulations,
and procedures on nonmonetary eligibility. Our objective is to identify
practices that are particularly effective in detecting ineligible claimants,
given the variation in the definitions of ineligibility. To the extent that we
succeed hi establishing these "best practices," agencies might be able to
monitor their procedures more effectively and possibly modify them to
meet their own objectives. More specifically, the patterns observed in the
analysis may suggest how certain practices can help state agencies
(1) minimize the extent to which claimants violate nonmonetary eligibili
ty rules, and (2) maximize the ability of agencies to detect violations
when they occur and to reduce or deny benefits accordingly.
The research underlying the monograph represents a truly col
laborative effort between program administrators and researchers. The
research would not have been possible without the considerable coopera
tion both of UI directors in the states we visited and of their staff hi state
and local offices. Many people in the Department of Labor provided in
valuable assistance during the study operations, as well as useful com
ments on our work. They include William McGarrity (the study project
officer), Wayne Zajac, Joseph Hight, Gene Biglin, and the late Edwin
Kerley.
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shared in the analytical effort. Wichita designed most of the process
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an earlier draft of the monograph.
As always, the contents of this monograph represent only the views
and interpretations of the authors, and do not necessarily represent the
views of the people or organizations who made its preparation possible.
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Executive Summary
This study focuses on the nonmonetary eligibility rules and their effect
on the rates at which UI benefits are denied. It examines the variety of
state laws and practices on nonmonetary requirements and their effect on
the ability of states to identify and reject UI claimants who fail to meet
the requirements. The rates at which claimants are denied benefits based
on nonmonetary eligibility rules are used as a measure of the effec
tiveness with which states are enforcing adherence to the rules.
STUDY DESIGN
This study was designed hi recognition that administering the UI pro
gram is a complex undertaking: a wide range of legislative, regulatory,
administrative, and personnel factors can potentially affect the ability of
a state to ensure that UI claimants comply with the nonmonetary re
quirements in order to receive benefits, and that those who do not are
denied benefits. Several actions or inactions could lead to the violation of
nonmonetary requirements and, hence, to benefit denial. They include
voluntary quit, discharge for misconduct, inability to work or
unavailability for work, and refusal of a job offer or referral. The study
considers each of these issues individually.
Our approach for studying how various features of state programs af
fect nonmonetary eligibility first entailed using the data sets that were
already available hi published form to evaluate statistically the relation
ship between each major category of nonmonetary eligibility (as
measured by denial rates) and a set of variables that reflect easily iden
tifiable provisions of state UI laws, quantifiable descriptors of the ad
ministration of nonmonetary eligibility rules, indicators of the generosity
of state programs, and descriptors of the economy and various other
aspects of each state. This regression analysis, based on quarterly state
data covering the period from 1964 to 1981, pointed out several
systematic relationships between the policy variables that describe the
state UI programs and the rates at which claimants are disqualified for
nonmonetary reasons. Nevertheless, the statistical analysis based on
these published data left many questions unanswered, and thus
underscored the necessity of collecting primary data that would enable us
to evaluate the relationship between program characteristics and nonmonetary eligibility in greater detail.
ix

Our response was to conduct an "administrative," or "process,"
analysis in selected states. Its objective was to investigate state policies
and practices in greater detail than was possible with published data, so
as to (1) differentiate more clearly and precisely the variation in policies
and administration that exists across states, and (2) discover how the
laws, regulations, and administrative practices that create "effective
policy" affect patterns of nonmonetary eligibility.
To conduct the process analysis, project staff selected six states for in
tensive site visits, and collected data from relevant documents and
through interviews with key state and local program officials. State selec
tion was guided by the statistical analysis to ensure that the study states
represented an appropriate range of denial rates for each issue.
FINDINGS
Several specific patterns emerged from the analysis that should be of
interest to those who are responsible for monitoring nonmonetary
eligibility. They are summarized below under five key topic headings. Of
course, all conclusions must remain somewhat tentative because of
(1) the nature of what can and cannot be observed (e.g., we can observe
denial rates but not the rate at which ineligible individuals are deterred
from applying), (2) an inability to demonstrate causality clearly through
a process analysis, and (3) the relatively modest scale of this study.
1. The Importance of Issue Detection Relative to Fact-Finding and
Adjudication
Given the set of eligibility requirements, the study found that the abili
ty of a state to deny benefits to the ineligible population depends on the
effectiveness with which it detects determination issues, rather than on
the consistency with which its determinations lead to denials. The fre
quency with which issues are detected is affected not only by eligibility
policy, but also by a wide range of administrative guidelines and pro
cedures that may vary from office to office hi terms of how they are ap
plied, and that may be adhered to closely or loosely depending upon
available staff resources, the pressure of claimant traffic, and the level of
agency management control. For a variety of reasons, the process of
fact-finding and adjudication is much more administratively confined;
hence, the rate at which determinations lead to denials exhibits much less
variation among the states than does the determination rate itself. By im
plication, there is considerably more room for policy and management
initiatives to improve the detection of determination issues than there is
for such initiatives to improve the adjudication process.

2. Factors That Affect Success in Detecting Potential Eligibility Issues
In terms of detecting separation issues, the study found two important
practices that seem to contribute to high determination rates. The first is
the initiation of the determination process on the basis of information
from several actors claimants, employers, or the agency itself rather
than on a restricted set of acceptable sources for identifying particular
issues. Low determination rates for separation issues are often associated
with rules that restrict which party may raise an issue. The second prac
tice, which clearly pertains to the first, is an insistence upon obtaining
simple factual information from employers on the reasons for separa
tion. This practice would imply that (1) employers' responses about the
separation reasons be obtained before the initial claims are processed,
and (2) employers be asked for a factual statement about the cir
cumstances surrounding separation, rather than whether they had any
reason to question a claimant's eligibility. Where persistent follow-up is
undertaken to obtain an employer's response, procedures should
recognize the principle that it is the agency and not the employer which
bears responsibility for protecting the integrity of the eligibility process.
In terms of detecting nonseparation issues, three general factors that
vary from state to state seem to affect determination rates. First, it seems
clear that a formal requirement which stipulates that claimants engage in
then- own active work search is a necessary foundation for effectively
assessing then* exposure to the labor market hi terms of their work
availability. However, although a formal work-search requirement is
necessary, it is not sufficient to ensure that availability and refusal issues
will be identified. Thus, the procedural definitions of evidence required
to document adequate work search also seem to have an affect on the
determination rate. Second, determination rates and, hence, denial rates
also seem to depend on the purposefulness and frequency with which
claimants' ongoing eligibility is questioned. One important aspect of this
practice is that questions on claims cards should request simple factual
statements from claimants, rather than to allow them to form subjective
judgments about whether then* behavior is within eligibility norms and to
incorporate them in then* answers. The other important aspect is the
Eligibility Review Process (ERP). After the initial claim has been filed,
ERP interviews often present the only routine opportunity for the agency
to have personal contact with claimants. The ERP interviews should be
scheduled relatively frequently, and they should entail a careful review of
the extent to which a claimant is meeting the state's eligibility standards.
Finally, the manner hi which ongoing claims reports are reviewed by UI
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staff also seems to be an important factor in the ability of states to detect
nonseparation issues. Ongoing claims reports should be reviewed
rigorously and consistently in accordance with each state's rules on
claimant behavior.
3. Significance of the Severity ofPenalties Imposed for Denials
More severe penalties seem to affect the behavior of claimants and
potential claimants. We know, for example, that the denial of benefits
for the duration of the unemployment spell has a negative impact on
denial rates for most issues. These penalties may deter individuals from
such actions as quitting a job or refusing a job offer. Moreover, more
severe penalties may also be more likely to discourage individuals from
applying if they suspect that their actions will render them ineligible for
benefits.
The severity of penalties can also affect the UI program by influencing
administrative behavior hi the determination process: some evidence sug
gests that the option of milder penalties may increase the frequency with
which agency staff deny benefits. However, although less severe
penalties may lead to more denials, we do not recommend milder
penalties as sound policy. First, they may simply encourage a greater
number of applications from ineligible individuals. Second, at least to
the extent that an agency has different degrees of violations (and
penalties) to choose from, issues which warrant denial under more
demanding standards may be pursued inadequately.
4. The Importance of Clear Policies and Procedures
In states that have more comprehensive and detailed written policies
and procedures, the staffs understanding of state policy tends to be
more accurate and consistent. Detailed and specific policies tend to
restrict the amount of discretion that can be exercised by claims staff
when considering each claimant's case. To the extent that the clarity of
defined policy is effectively communicated to line staff, its effect should
be to increase the consistency with which similar cases are treated in the
determination process.
5. Organization of the Fact-Finding and Adjudication Process
As expressed previously, the study found that a broad view should be
taken of the types of information that justify inquiry and some form of
determination. Identifying a greater number of issues, rather than simply
trying to justify only those issues that stand a good chance of leading to
denial, seems more likely to lead to the effective denial of a high percentxii

age of truly ineligible cases. However, casting the broad net of potential
issues certainly increases the workload imposed on staff who are respon
sible for conducting fact-finding and determinations.
Thus, a related observation is that agencies must obviously find some
way to work effectively under the workload burdens imposed by the
greater frequency with which issues are detected in the determination
process. The study noted two different approaches for doing so. First, by
conducting some informal clarification and fact-finding before the for
mal determination process, some states were able to eliminate some
issues before reaching the point at which a formal written decision and
notification were necessary.This approach reduced the workload to some
extent by avoiding part of the work required hi a formal determination.
In terms of the second approach, some states simply improved the effi
ciency with which they conducted the determination process. The former
approach often seemed to be associated with other practices that
prevented valid issues from being identified. Thus, improving the effi
ciency of the determination process seems to represent a sounder course
for dealing with resource problems than would efforts to avoid for
malities of the determination procedure.
Finally, our observations in the states underscore the importance of
maximizing the information available to the adjudicator who is responsi
ble for making termination decisions. This factor is important for the
sake of rendering informed decisions that promote confidence hi the
thoroughness an equitability of the determination process, and of
avoiding frequent recourse to the appeals process.
Some tension obviously exists between the goals of conducting deter
minations efficiently and maximizing the information that is developed
through fact-finding. Insisting that employers and claimants be present
for all fact-finding interviews hi which both are relevant not only is infeasible but would also substantially increase the costs of the process in
many cases unnecessarily. Some states conduct fact-finding hearings by
telephone or perform separate contacts to gather information from the
parties involved. No extreme solutions are suggested. However, two con
cluding recommendations are offered. First, determination decisionmaking by staff who are not involved hi fact-finding, using primarily written
summaries of facts and without personal contact with the parties, may be
counterproductive, leading to an increased number of appeals. Second,
states should encourage relevant parties to participate in a determination
whenever it appears that their interests are at stake, and that there is
some chance that they have further information or rebuttals to offer.
xiii

Contents
1

Introduction .......................................... 1
A. Approaches to Nonmonetary Eligibility: State
Variation........................................ 3
B. Pressures to Tighten Nonmonetary Eligibility.......... 6
C. Nonmonetary Eligibility Rules ...................... 9
D. Overview of the Study ............................. 10
Notes ........................................... 13

2.

Statistical Evidence on the Determinants of Denial Rates.....
A. StateDenialRates.................................
B. Determinants of Denial Rates .......................
Characteristics of State Laws .....................
Administrative Process ..........................
Generosity of UI Benefits ........................
Characteristics of the Economy ...................
General Attitudes Toward UI Claimants............
C. TheData ........................................
D. Econometric Results...............................
Notes ...........................................

15
15
22
23
26
27
28
29
29
32
35

3.

Process Analysis Methodology...........................
A. Site Selection.....................................
Site Selection Criteria and Site Recommendation.....
Revision of Recommended Site List
and Characteristics of Selected States...............
Selection of Local Sites ..........................
B. Description of Research Data .......................
Regulatory Context .............................
Characteristics of the Operational System...........
Personnel......................................
External Factors ................................
Process Analysis Data Priorities...................
C. DataCollectionMethods...........................
D. Strengths and Limitations with the Process
Analysis Methodology.............................
Notes ...........................................

41
43
44

xv

46
48
48
49
50
51
51
52
52
55
57

4.

The Determination Process: State Characteristics ...........
A. Eligibility Requirements............................
Separation Issues ...............................
Nonseparation Issues............................
B. Detection and Identification of Determination Issues ...
Separation Issues ...............................
Nonseparation Issues............................
C. Fact-Finding and Decisionmaking ...................
D. Agency Characteristics.............................
Notes ...........................................

59
62
62
68
77
77
81
86
93
96

5.

Interpretation of State Characteristics and Denial Rates......
A. Analytical Approach ..............................
B. State-By-State Analyses............................
State 1.........................................
State2.........................................
StateS.........................................
State4.........................................
State5.........................................
State6.........................................
C. General Conclusions About the Nonmonetary
Determination Process.............................
"Finding Issues" vs. "Deciding Issues" ............
Factors That Affect Determination Rates ...........
Importance of Denial Penalties....................
Clear Policies and Standards......................
Organization of Fact-Finding and Adjudication......
Notes ...........................................

97
98
100
101
105
107
110
114
117

xvi

120
121
125
131
133
135
138

List of Tables
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4

4.1
5.1

Nonmonetary Denial Rates by State, 1982 ...............
Determination and Denial Rates by State, 1982...........
Expected Effects of State Laws on Denial Rates ..........
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used
in the UI Nonmonetary Denial Rate Analysis ............
Chapter 2, Appendix Table 1: Denial Rate
Econometric Estimates, 1964 1981....................
Components of 1982 Nonmonetary Denial Rates .........
Variability of Rates of Determination
and Denials/Determinations ..........................

xvii

17
19
26
31
36
60
122

1
Introduction
Unemployment insurance programs offer financial
assistance to insured workers who have recently been
separated from their jobs usually involuntarily and who
have a continuing attachment to the labor market.
Unemployment insurance (UI) is meant to provide income to
workers deprived of then: jobs through no fault of their own,
and who would be employed if they were able to secure a
suitable job. To ensure that benefits are paid only to
claimants who have substantive attachment to the labor
market and who are unemployed through no fault of their
own, state UI programs specify both monetary eligibility re
quirements, pertaining to past employment and wages, and
nonmonetary eligibility requirements, pertaining to the cir
cumstances of job separation, claimants' continuing
availability for work, and their willingness to accept it. Past
employment and continuing availability for work are viewed
as evidence that an individual has been and continues to be
attached to the labor market and, if out of work, should be
considered unemployed.
This study focuses on nonmonetary eligibility rules and
their effect on the rates at which UI benefits are denied. It
examines the variety of state laws and practices concerning
nonmonetary requirements, and the effect of these laws and
practices on the ability of states to identify and reject UI
claimants who fail to meet the requirements. The rates at
which claimants are denied benefits based on nonmonetary
eligibility rules are used as a measure of the performance of
states in enforcing adherence to the rules. Claimants may be
1
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denied benefits under these rules due to "separation issues"
(the circumstances under which they left their last job) or to
"continuing eligibility" issues (their availability for work,
willingness to accept work, and search for employment).
Nonmonetary denial rates are one measure of the effec
tiveness of the UI program in minimizing payments to in
dividuals who do not meet nonmonetary eligibility stan
dards, but they are not a perfect measure. Denial rates are
certainly influenced by the effectiveness of a state agency in
detecting claimants whose circumstances or actions make
them ineligible. However, the frequency of payments to ineligibles may also be affected by factors whose impacts are
not reflected in denial rates, such as policies which
discourage individuals from applying for benefits at all when
they doubt their own eligibility. Thus, low denial rates do
not necessarily indicate a failure to deny payments to ineligibles, nor do high denial rates indicate success. They are,
however, the major source of information on the outcomes
of agency efforts to bar payments to ineligibles. Moreover,
available data can be broken down into the separate rates at
which issues are detected and at which benefits are actually
denied, and are available for each reason for denial. They
can thus be examined in detail and compared with quite
specific characteristics of state policy and administration.
The motivation for this study lies in the wide variation in
the states' nonmonetary denial rates and a corresponding
diversity in state laws, regulations, and procedures that deal
with nonmonetary eligibility. Our aim has been to identify
aspects of state UI laws and regulations, and approaches for
enforcing nonmonetary eligibility requirements ad
ministratively, that seem to affect the rate at which claimants
are denied benefits. Establishing relationships between
methods for applying nonmonetary rules and denial rates
may offer some help to states in their efforts to respond to
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fiscal pressures and concerns about the accuracy of program
eligibility decisions.
This introductory chapter points out some of the variety hi
state laws and practices that deal with nonmonetary eligibili
ty, and the way in which this diversity reflects continuing
debate about the appropriate goals of the UI program.
Despite this diversity, all states have had to address concerns
about the accuracy of program administration, particularly
given the severe fiscal drains on program funds in recent
years. The ways in which these demands have been felt and
met are briefly described. Finally, as background to the
detailed analysis presented later, this chapter explains the
structure of nonmonetary eligibility rules.

A. Approaches to Nonmonetary Eligibility: State Variation
Like most aspects of unemployment insurance, nonmonetary eligibility rules and their administration reflect the
policy decisions, political attitudes, and economic conditions
of the individual states. Despite the general framework of
federal law on unemployment insurance, the variety of ap
proaches adopted by states demonstrates a continuing lack
of consensus on the appropriate strictness of UI eligibility
decisions.
Because state UI programs are part of the federal-state
system, they are constrained by federal standards, but they
do retain wide discretion over their laws and practices.
Federal law on nonmonetary eligibility deals primarily with
two concerns: it defines and protects the substantive rights of
claimants when a UI agency questions their availability or
ability to work or then* refusal of job offers, and it defines
their procedural rights in determinations or fair hearings. 1 In
other respects, federal standards allow the states wide
latitude.
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The variety of state approaches to nonmonetary eligibility
rules and their enforcement illustrates the persistent tension
between two competing views of the program: as a benefit
program to protect employees, and as an employment
stabilization program, paid for by employers to respond to
their needs. Of course, all state UI programs hi fact respond
to both views, but differences in UI law and administration
suggest that patterns of public attitudes and political in
fluences vary from state to state.
Much of the diversity among state programs is revealed
only by a detailed examination of administrative practices
and regulations, because on the surface the states' UI laws
sound similar themes. One purpose of this study was to un
cover these differences; for the sample of states included in
this study, the variety of regulations and administrative en
forcement will be explained hi later chapters. However, some
brief examples of the divergences among state programs at
this point can demonstrate why the inquiry into the effects of
administrative variation on denial rates is of interest.
In their UI laws, the states adopt different approaches for
defining the circumstances under which claimants should be
denied benefits. For example, hi some states, claimants who
leave a job voluntarily can immediately receive benefits only
if they left with a "good cause" that was directly related to
the conditions of employment (e.g., dangerous work condi
tions). In other states, a variety of "compelling personal
reasons" are considered good cause for leaving a job, in
cluding such reasons as following one's spouse to a new loca
tion or caring for an ill household member. The strictness
with which states insist that an individual be able to work
also varies. Some states base benefit denial on whether the
worker is able to perform any type of gainful work that ex
ists in the job market, while other states base benefit denial
on whether claimants are in adequate health to work at oc-
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cupations for which their past experience and skills suit
them. Penalties for quitting or refusing a job also vary wide
ly among states, from relatively brief delays of as little as five
weeks in benefits to disqualification for the duration of
unemployment, to requirements for a subsequent period of
new employment before a new spell of benefits can be claim
ed.
Beyond differences in their laws, the states adopt quite dif
ferent approaches for detecting noncompliance with eligibili
ty requirements. Consequently, the effective strictness of
nonmonetary requirements differs even between those states
whose UI laws are similar. Some states, for instance, require
claimants to search for jobs on then* own and to report their
contacts with employers, and disqualify claimants who fail
to report a sufficient number of contacts. In other states, ac
tive job search may be required, but little effort is made to
monitor claimants' efforts. Some states adhere to clear
schedules for conducting personal eligibility review inter
views, at which agency staff examine in detail the job
demands set by claimants and their efforts to find work;
other states conduct these interviews only sporadically and
selectively.
The net effect of differences in laws and administration is
that some states appear "liberal" and others "strict" in ap
plying nonmonetary eligibility standards to claimants. Some
states appear to tolerate paying benefits to individuals whose
reasons for unemployment are not clearly involuntary, and
whose continued attachment to the labor force might appear
tenuous. In other states, the concerns of employers who pay
for UI benefits appear to have led to stricter standards and
closer attention to enforcement.
Nonetheless, states do not typically resolve UI policy
issues once and for all. In most states, the definition of UI
program rules and thus the balance between competing in-

6
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terests in the program is a matter of continuing debate.
Revisions to UI law are a frequent subject of legislative bills
debated each year. As political attitudes, economic
pressures, and the composition of a state's industrial base
and workforce change, new issues emerge that appear to call
for program adjustments. The definition and enforcement of
nonmonetary eligibility standards are part of this continuing
debate.

B. Pressures to Tighten Nonmonetary Eligibility
Whatever the normal balance that is struck in various
states between employers' and employees' interests in the UI
program, all UI agencies are faced with shifting financial
and political pressures on then* programs which can lead to
changes in the definition and enforcement of eligibility rules.
Economic conditions change for better or for worse, reliev
ing or aggravating concerns about the balance between UI
tax revenues and benefit disbursements. Evolving public at
titudes about relying on government assistance programs
may modify the balance of political pressures on state
legislatures. Attention to the general administrative integrity
of governmental programs, and their ability to carry out the
intent of the legislature accurately, intensifies at times, par
ticularly when administrative problems appear to contribute
to a deterioration in the financial stability of a benefit pro
gram.
The condition of the economy is clearly the primary exter
nal factor that affects UI trust funds and can focus attention
on ways to make the eligibility process more restrictive. In
times of recession, more unemployed workers draw benefits
from the trust fund, and declines in employer payrolls reduce
tax payments into the trust funds. In response to trust fund
problems, states can raise UI taxes, curtail benefit levels, and
tighten both monetary and nonmonetary eligibility stan
dards.
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Severe strains have been placed on UI trust funds by the
recessions of the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. These
strains are starkly depicted by the relationship between trust
fund reserves and benefit payout rates. At the end of 1969,
the "reserve ratio multiple" the ratio of trust fund reserves
as a percentage of covered payrolls to total benefits paid as a
percentage of covered payrolls exceeded 1.5 in 34 states
and exceeded 1.0 in 16 other states. Ten years later, 38 states
had reserve ratio multiples of less than 1.0. During the reces
sions of 1980 and 1981-1982, 32 states saw then* trust funds
go into the red at some point and were forced to borrow
from the federal UI trust fund.2
The precarious condition of UI trust funds that resulted
from the recent recessions stemmed at least in part from
benefit eligibility policies and employer tax policies that
combined to deplete trust funds far more rapidly than they
could be replenished. Trust fund problems have been exacer
bated hi some states by past trends towards liberalizing
benefit levels and eligibility conditions and narrowing the
definitions of employer tax liabilities. Although reserve
balances are expected to be drawn down in recessions, the
plunges in fund balances that occurred in these recent reces
sions were unprecedented. The deterioration of state trust
fund reserves has prompted state legislatures, UI agencies,
and the federal government to focus renewed attention on
the financing of the UI program, the monetary and nonmonetary rules under which claimants qualify for benefits,
and the integrity and rigor with which eligibility standards
are administered.
One indication of the heightened concern about program
integrity is the attention that has been focused on ways to im
prove the accuracy of UI claim actions. State UI programs
routinely conduct their own efforts to detect levels and pat
terns of overpayments that are caused by erroneous decisions
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about or inaccurate information on monetary or nonmonetary eligibility rules. In recent years, the U.S. Depart
ment of Labor initiated the Random Audit program, a pilot
program to improve the monitoring of error rates and the
sources of error in eligibility decisions. Federal concern for
ensuring accurate measures of program errors has subse
quently led to preliminary preparations for an expanded
quality assurance program designed by the Department of
Labor, which is scheduled to be implemented in 1986.
Another example of recent attention to program administra
tion, and specifically to nonmonetary eligibility, is the South
Carolina Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstra
tion.3 This demonstration, funded by the Department of
Labor, was designed to reduce UI payments by strengthening
the UI work test, increasing job placements for UI
claimants, helping claimants search for jobs, and improving
the exchange of information between the Job Service and UI
offices concerning claimant eligibility issues.
Federal incentives for improving state trust fund balances
have also been strengthened, encouraging states to reexamine not only then* nonmonetary eligibility rules but also
their tax rules, benefit levels, and monetary eligibility re
quirements. Under recent legislation, loans from the federal
UI trust fund to debtor states now carry interest charges.
States that enact legislation to improve their trust fund
solvency, either through benefit reductions or tax increases,
can limit federal penalty taxes, defer interest payments, and
receive reductions in interest charges on outstanding debts.
States, particularly those with the most severe trust fund
deficits, have responded with program changes. All eight
states with the largest debts hi 1982 passed important legisla
tion between 1982 and 1984 to deal with solvency.4
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C. Nonmonetary Eligibility Rules
Qualification for UI benefits is based in all states on two
sets of criteria monetary and nonmonetary. Monetary re
quirements are imposed as part of the initial eligibility pro
cess when individuals request benefits, and pertain to their
record of past employment and wages. Nonmonetary re
quirements are imposed for both initial and continuing
eligibility. Monetary qualification issues are not within the
scope of this study; they are discussed in this report only in
connection with disqualification penalties for nonmonetary
issues that require reestablishing monetary qualification.
Initial nonmonetary eligibility rules are codified in each
state's definition of "negative disqualifying actions" those
actions or behavior by claimants which, if found to be the
cause of job separation, would be cause for benefit denial.
These include voluntary quits, misconduct, involvement in
labor disputes, and fraudulent misrepresentation. Claimants
disqualified under these rules may not receive benefits during
a defined nonentitlement period, whose length is fixed for
some issues in some states and is subject to some ad
ministrative discretion in others.
Continuing eligibility rules require two positive condi
tions the availability for and the ability to work and the
absence of one negative action a refusal to accept available
and suitable work. Failure to satisfy either of the first two
conditions makes claimants ineligible only as long as they re
main "unavailable" or "unable" (with a one-week
minimum period of ineligibility). Unwillingness to accept
available suitable work leads to disqualification for a
specified period defined hi each state's statutes. Compliance
with all of these conditions is required for continuing benefit
entitlement.
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The process of identifying noncompliance with either in
itial (i.e., separation) or continuing (i.e., nonseparation)
eligibility standards is called "eligibility determination."
The first step of the determination process is
"fact-finding" collecting information from the claimant
and other interested parties. Fact-finding is followed by a
formal review or hearing and a decision about whether or
not to deny benefits, depending upon the merits of the case
and the interpretation of the rules. In some instances, infor
mal fact-finding may precede this process, but claimants
cannot be denied benefits without undergoing a formal
determination. Determination decisions can be appealed to
separate appeals units within the state UI agency. In most
states, there are actually two levels of appeals possible,
although most appeals go no further than the first level (or
"lower authority").
Although all state programs share these basic elements of
nonmonetary eligibility policy, wide variation exists in the
details of their eligibility rules, the level of detail and preci
sion achieved in then* legislation and regulations, the rigor
and consistency with which they enforce rules, the methods
they use to detect nonmonetary issues, and the procedures
they use for fact-finding and for formulating determination
decisions. The wide diversity among the state programs in
nonmonetary eligibility rules and practices is evidence of the
relatively modest role of federal legislation in this aspect of
unemployment insurance, the wide latitude granted to the
states, and the variety of political, economic, and managerial
factors that help define and implement the program.

D. Overview of the Study
We approached this study on the influences of state laws,
regulations, and procedures on nonmonetary denial rates in
two ways. The first was to use available published data to
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analyze the statistical relationships between denial rates and
the characteristics of state laws. Two sets of variables were
used for this analysis. One set consists of denial rates for the
four standard denial reasons voluntary leaves or quits,
misconduct, not able or available, and refusal of suitable
work. These rates were used as outcome variables. The other
set used as explanatory variables in the statistical
model consists of easily identifiable provisions of state UI
laws, quantifiable descriptors of the administration of nonmonetary eligibility rules, measures of the generosity of state
UI programs, and descriptors of the economy and other
characteristics of each state. As described in chapter 2, a
regression analysis based on quarterly state data covering the
period from 1964 through 1981 revealed certain relationships
between these explanatory variables and denial rates. Never
theless, this statistical analysis inevitably left many questions
unanswered, and served primarily to point out the necessity
for (and direction of) further investigation. In particular,
our limited ability to characterize state programs with
available published data meant that a great deal of the varia
tion in denial rates remained unexplained by the equations
estimated with our model.
Thus, the second approach taken in the study was an "ad
ministrative," or "process," analysis in selected states. Our
objective was to investigate state policies and practices in
greater detail than was possible with published data, in order
to (1) differentiate more clearly and precisely the variation in
policies and administrative practices across states, and
(2) discover how the laws, regulations, and administrative
practices that create the "effective policy" influence patterns
of nonmonetary eligibility and denial rates.
To conduct the process analysis, project staff selected six
states for intensive site visits, and collected data from rele
vant documents and in-person interviews with key in-
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dividuals in state UI agency offices and field offices. This ef
fort was designed to gather information about the full range
of factors that determine actual policy as implemented in the
states, and to do so by examining the UI program in each
state from a variety of perspectives. Chapter 3 describes the
process analysis methodology.
Generalizing from a study with only six judgmentally
selected states is difficult at best, although the states were
selected carefully to ensure that a range of program models
was represented. Nevertheless, this portion of the study did
produce a rich body of information that enables us to
distinguish among different approaches to administering UI
programs, including then* major statutory, regulatory, and
procedural features. Although identifying relationships be
tween these features and the differences in nonmonetary
eligibility rates requires a high degree of judgment, we feel
that we have identified several key relationships and have ob
tained some evidence to suggest others. Chapter 4 presents a
basic description of state program characteristics which con
stitute the "raw" data of the process analysis. Chapter 5
then returns to the main focus of this study to evaluate what
we have learned from the process analysis about the effects
of state policies and procedures on nonmonetary eligibility.
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NOTES
1. For a description of federal standards, see U.S. Department of Labor,
Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, Employment and
Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Service,
Washington, DC, 1978, and the series of semiannual revisions to 1983.
2. For a discussion of these issues, see Saul J. Blaustein, "State
Unemployment Insurance Fund Adequacy: Past and Present Perspec
tives," paper presented at the Industrial Relations Research Association
Annual Meeting hi Dallas, TX, December 28-30,1984; and Gary Burtless
and Wayne Vroman, "The Performance of Unemployment Insurance
Since 1979," paper presented at the Industrial Relations Research
Association Annual Meeting in Dallas, TX, December 28-30, 1984.
3. For a description of the demonstration, see Terry Johnson et al.,
"Design and Implementation of the Claimant Placement and Work Test
Demonstration," Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, May 1984. An
evaluation of the demonstration can be found in Walter Corson et al.,
"Evaluation of the Charleston Claimant Placement and Work Test
Demonstration," Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research,
September 1984.
4. For a discussion of these issues, see Wayne Vroman, The Funding
Crisis in State Unemployment Insurance (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Up
john Institute for Employment Research).

Statistical Evidence
on the Determinants
of Denial Rates
The first part of this study on UI nonmonetary eligibility
rules attempted to identify how state rules and program en
vironments relate statistically to denial rates for separation
and nonseparation issues. This chapter explains the
statistical analysis in four steps. First, we present data that il
lustrate the considerable range of denial rates across states.
We then discuss the variables that could potentially influence
denial rates, and their anticipated effects. In the third section
of the chapter, we describe the data for the statistical
analysis and the analytical methodologies. In the final sec
tion, we report the results of the analysis and then: limita
tions.

A. State Denial Rates
The nonmonetary denial rates reported by the states to the
Employment and Training Administration consist of two
different types of details. First, rates are broken down into
the two key stages of the nonmonetary eligibility decision
process: determination and denial. Determination rates
represent the number of nonmonetary issues detected and in
vestigated per 1,000 spells of insured unemployment for
separation issues, or per 1,000 claimant contacts (weekly
claims) for nonseparation issues. Net denial rates indicate
the number of claimants who are actually denied benefits per
1,000 spells or contacts. The net denial rate can be divided by
15
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the determination rate to compute the percentage of deter
minations that lead to denials.
Second, the two key stages of the nonmonetary eligibility
process (determination and net denial rates) are also broken
down separately into quits and misconduct that is, separa
tion issues and "able and available" and job refusal that
is, nonseparation issues.
As shown in table 2.1, net denial rates vary widely from
state to state. For example, while the average state denial
rate for voluntary quits was 54.9 per 1,000 new spells of in
sured unemployment in 1982, the rate ranged from a high of
224.5 in Nebraska to a low of 12.9 in Pennsylvania. The
voluntary quit denial rates of the 10 states with the highest
rates were more than twice the national average. The denial
rates of states also exhibit a wide range of variation in terms
of misconduct issues, from 103.1 to 7.9. The denial rates of
states vary to a slightly lesser degree in terms of nonsepara
tion issues: 21.9 to 0.6 for able and available issues, and 0.7
to 0.0 for refusal of suitable work.
When the net denial rate and the determination rate are
compared (see table 2.2), it is clear that some states rank
quite differently in terms of detecting issues and denying
benefits based on determinations. For example, the deter
mination rate of South Dakota ranks 22nd in terms of
separation issues, but its denial rate ranks 43rd because of
the extremely low proportion of determinations that lead to
denials. In Nevada, the opposite is true for nonseparation
issues; the determination rate of Nevada ranks 31st, but its
overall denial rate ranks 17th. Why some states appear to
detect issues at a very high or low rate while others seem to
deny benefits in a high or low percentage of cases is an im
portant research issue, as is the significance of these
measures as indicators of the ability of a state to preserve
program integrity.
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Table 2.1
Nonmonetary Denial Rates by State, 1982a
(State rank in parentheses)

Separation issues
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

Quit
24.9
93.7
68.0
187.1
42.5
139.2
42.1
24.1
78.0
97.2
39.2
52.3
42.1
40.0
37.2
49.1
53.1
31.1
88.9
39.4
54.9
30.9
35.0
38.7
40.4
49.9
69.6
224.5
89.2
50.9
39.4
80.7
30.3
15.0
74.0
23.5
86.5
36.6
12.9
27.4

Misconduct
(44)
(5)
(14)
(2)
(24)
(3)
(27)
(45)
(11)
(4)
(32)
(17)
(26)
(29)
(36)
(21)
(16)
(39)
(7)
(3D
(15)
(40)
(38)
(34)
(28)
(20)
(13)
(1)
(6)
(18)
(30)
(10)
(41)
(50)
(12)
(46)
(8)
(37)
(51)
(42)

22.9
22.3
42.2
27.2
22.7
66.6
14.2
25.5
103.1
65.7
41.4
23.5
20.2
23.4
22.0
22.0
32.4
19.3
52.5
12.0
46.1
17.9
15.7
22.0
35.6
42.6
19.9
75.4
61.1
19.9
30.0
51.0
22.1
11.8
19.5
24.9
63.0
17.4
10.0
15.1

(23)
(25)
(12)
(18)
(24)
(4)
(44)
(19)
(1)
(5)
(13)
(21)
(30)
(22)
(28)
(28)
(15)
(35)
(8)
(47)
(10)
(38)
(40)
(27)
(14)
(11)
(32)
(2)
(7)
(31)
(16)
(9)
(26)
(48)
(33)
(20)
(6)
(39)
(50)
(42)

Nonseparation issues
Able and
Refusal of
available
suitable work
3.6
5.3
10.2
5.7
6.4
7.4
4.6
1.9
1.1
9.0
5.2
6.1
5.3
4.5
1.6
6.8
14.5
3.8
3.2
7.0
2.3
2.2
4.0
6.9
2.8
9.5
6.0
15.3
6.0
5.0
6.9
2.8
7.8
1.8
3.1
4.7
1.9
4.9
2.2
4.3

(34)
(22)
(4)
(21)
(16)
(10)
(28)
(44)
(50)
(6)
(24)
(17)
(23)
(30)
(48)
(15)
(3)
(33)
(35)
(12)
(41)
(43)
(32)
(14)
(38)
(5)
(18)
(2)
(18)
(25)
(13)
(39)
(7)
(46)
(36)
(27)
(44)
(26)
(42)
(3D

0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.3
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.2
0.3
0.1
0.4
0.3
0.1
0.3

(46)
(16)
(20)
(20)
(27)
(20)
(6)
(35)
(50)
(9)
(44)
(7)
(9)
(33)
(28)
(23)
(15)
(43)
(36)
(2)
(13)
(48)
(36)
(30)
(30)
(17)
(28)
(12)
(4)
(8)
(25)
(39)
(9)
(34)
(13)
(41)
(4)
(17)
(45)
(17)
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Separation issues
State
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
National average
per state
(Standard deviation)

Quit
16.7
39.1
15.7
82.1
44.9
50.5
26.0
37.9
42.3
16.6
46.9
54.9
(40.1)

(47)
(33)
(49)
(9)
(23)
(19)
(43)
(35)
(25)
(48)
(22)

Misconduct
27.9
7.9
15.4
70.6
15.0
18.6
19.1
11.7
19.3
13.8
13.6
30.1
(20.3)

(17)
(51)
(41)
(3)
(43)
(37)
(36)
(49)
(34)
(45)
(46)

Nonseparation issues
Able and
Refusal of
available
suitable work
3.0
21.9
0.6
7.6
7.7
1.8
7.1
4.6
2.5
1.4
5.8
5.4
(3.9)

(37)
( 1)
(51)
(9)
(8)
(46)
(11)
(29)
(40)
(49)
(20)

0.1
0.7
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.2
0.5
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.0

(46)
(1)
(41)
(25)
(36)
(23)
(3)
(49)
(39)
(30)
(51)

0.2
(0.1)

SOURCE: Unpublished tables provided by the Unemployment Insurance Service, Employ
ment and Training Administration.
a. Separation issue rates are reported per 1,000 new spells of insured unemployment, and
nonseparation issue rates are reported per 1,000 claimant contacts.

Table 2.2
Determination and Denial Rates by State, 1982*
(State rank in parentheses)

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

Determination
rate
62.5
196.9
221.3
253.5
141.6
264.3
125.6
74.2
341.0
294.4
149.2
162.4
93.9
120.6
103.0
127.8
159.4
81.4
256.5
93.9
129.6
103.9

(47)
(13)
(10)
(9)
(21)
(6)
(27)
(45)
(2)
(3)
(20)
(16)
(38)
(29)
(33)
(25)
(17)
(42)
(8)
(38)
(24)
(32)

Separation issues
Denials as % of
determinations
76.7
61.2
49.8
84.5
46.0
77.9
46.0
72.7
53.7
55.3
54.0
46.7
66.4
52.6
57.8
55.6
54.4
61.9
55.1
54.8
78.7
47.0

(4)
(18)
(39)
( 1)
(42)
(3)
(43)
(7)
(35)
(28)
(33)
(41)
(")
(37)
(22)
(27)
(31)
(17)
(29)
(30)
(2)
(40)

Nonseparation issues

Denial
rate
47.9
120.5
110.2
214.3
65.2
205.8
57.8
53.9
183.2
162.9
80.6
75.9
62.4
63.4
59.6
71.1
86.7
50.4
141.4
51.4
102.0
48.8

(44)
01)
(12)
(2)
(25)
(3)
(33)
(36)
(4)
(5)
(18)
(20)
(27)
(26)
(32)
(22)
(17)
(39)
(9)
(37)
(13)
(41)

Determination
rate
25.9
15.6
39.6
13.6
19.7
38.0
26.8
5.9
7.0
37.0
16.8
25.2
16.6
23.9
8.7
14.3
22.3
7.2
10.3
29.1
7.1
22.9

(15)
(29)
(3)
(35)
(24)
(4)
(13)
(49)
(45)
(5)
(26)
(16)
(27)
(17)
(40)
(33)
(19)
(42)
(38)
(12)
(43)
(18)

Denials as % of
determinations
93.5
78.4
58.0
76.4
56.6
77.3
53.9
81.9
36.9
43.7
40.9
54.7
84.2
43.2
75.7
85.4
71.2
56.2
67.3
64.6
83.2
31.0

( 1)
(12)
(27)
(14)
(29)
(13)
(33)
(7)
(46)
(42)
(45)
(32)
(5)
(44)
(16)
(4)
(19)
(3D
(23)
(25)
(6)
(50)

Denial
rate
24.2
12.2
23.0
10.4
11.2
29.4
14.5
4.8
2.6
16.2
6.9
13.8
14.0
10.3
6.6
12.2
15.9
4.0
6.9
18.8
5.9
7.1

(4)
(19)
(5)
(26)
(22)
(3)
(13)
(42)
(51)
(10)
(37)
(16)
(15)
(27)
(38)
(20)
(11)
(48)
(36)
(7)
(39)
(34)
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Table 2.2 (continued)

State
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah

Determination
rate

Separation issues
Denials as % of
determinations

89.1 (41)
132.9 (23)
99.7 (34)

57.6 (24)
45.7 (44)
76.2 (5)

157.3
202.0
434.3
279.9
116.6
120.3
209.3
124.8
49.S
166.7
77.7
257.3
126.6
33.8
93.2
66.2
137.7
49.8
287.7
175.0

58.8
44.3
69.1
53.7
61.0
57.7
62.9
44.1
54.2
56.1
62.4
58.1
42.7
67.8
45.6
67.3
35.0
62.6
53.2
34.5

(18)
(12)
(1)
(5)
(3D
(30)
(ID
(28)
(49)
(15)
(44)
(7)
(26)
(51)
(40)
(46)
(22)
(48)
(4)
(14)

(20)
(46)
(8)
(34)
(19)
(23)
(14)
(47)
(32)
(25)
(16)
(21)
(48)
(9)
(45)
(10)
(50)
(15)
(36)
(51)

Denial
rate
51.3 (38)
60.7 (29)
76.0 (19)
92.5
89.5
300.0
150.4
71.1
69.4
131.7
55.0
26.8
93.5
48.5
149.6
54.1
22.9
42.4
44.6
48.2
31.2
153.2
60.3

(15)
(16)
( 1)
(7)
(21)
(23)
(10)
(34)
(50)
(14)
(42)
(8)
(35)
(51)
(47)
(46)
(43)
(48)
(6)
(3D

Nonseparation issues
Determination Denials as % of
determinations
rate
20.1
30.8
14.4
19.1
9.7
67.4
14.6
13.1
29.8
6.8
57.8
4.1
15.5
26.3
6.7
32.6
30.0
20.7
7.0
37.0
5.8
22.3
32.9

(23)
( 9)
(32)
(25)
(39)
( 1)
(31)
(36)
(11)
(46)
( 2)
(51)
(30)
(14)
(47)
( 8)
(10)
(22)
(44)
(6)
(50)
(20)
( 7)

48.9
61.7
51.5
85.8
74.6
56.7
91.2
80.7
35.6
81.3
31.5
68.2
45.3
37.9
68.5
43.3
15.6
44.0
67.7
81.1
75.8
56.4
47.2

(37)
(26)
(34)
(3)
(18)
(28)
(2)
(10)
(48)
(8)
(49)
(21)
(40)
(46)
(20)
(43)
(51)
(41)
(22)
(9)
(15)
(30)
(39)

1

Denial
rate
9.8
19.0
7.4
16.4
7.3
38.2
13.3
10.6
10.6
5.5
18.2
2.8
7.0
10.0
4.6
14.1
4.7
9.1
4.8
30.0
4.4
12.6
15.5

(30)
(6)
(32)
(9)
(33)
( 1)
(17)
(25)
(24)
(40)
(8)
(50)
(35)
(29)
(45)
(14)
(44)
(3D
(43)
(2)
(46)
(18)
(12)

<

Vermont
95.0 (36)
72.7 ( 6)
65.6 (24)
69.1 (24)
6.5 (48)
4.3 (47)
Virginia
80.7 (43)
55.8 (26)
79.5 (11)
45.1 (45)
13.9 (34)
11.0 (23)
Washington
97.9 (35)
50.7 (38)
49.6 (40)
49.0 (36)
20.9 (21)
10.3 (28)
West Virginia
95.0 (37)
65.1 (13)
51.5 (35)
61.8 (28)
7.5 (41)
3.9 (49)
Wisconsin
46.1 (50)
30.4 (49)
66.0 (12)
47.3 (38)
11.5 (37)
5.5 (41)
Wyoming
155.1 (19)
74.8 (17)
39.0 (49)
60.5 (30)
15.6 (28)
11.7 (21)
National average
per state
149.3
57.4
61.4
85.4
11.6
20.3
(Standard deviation)
(83.6)
(11.3)
(18.2)
(55.0)
(7.4)
03.1)
SOURCE: Unpublished tables provided by the Unemployment Insurance Service, Employment and Training Administration,
a. Separation issue rates are reported per 1,000 new spells of insured unemployment, and nonseparation issue rates are reported per 1,000 claim
ant contacts.
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In general, however, states with high or low denial rates
for separation or nonseparation issues have correspondingly
high or low determination rates. For example, in terms of
separation issues, nine of the top ten states whose determina
tion rate is among the highest also rank in the top ten in
terms of the denial rate. For nonseparation issues, the cor
responding figure is seven of ten, with two of the three re
maining states ranking within the top fifteen. Similarly,
states whose determination rate ranks among the lowest also
rank among the lowest in denial rates. This pattern suggests
that, in explaining denial rates, it is just as important to ex
amine the factors that affect the number of determinations
that are made as it is to consider the factors that affect how
often determinations lead to denials. Some factors may of
course affect both rates. For example, state laws that ex
plicitly define reasons for benefit denial for able and
available issues will probably lead to relatively high rates at
which determinations lead to denials, but they will probably
also increase the number of determinations made, because
potential issues will be more apparent to UI staff.

B. Determinants of Denial Rates
Nonmonetary denial rates can potentially be affected by a
variety of factors some are internal to the UI system, while
others are external to the UI system, such as characteristics
of the economy. Within the constraints of available data, the
statistical analysis was designed to estimate the effect of five
internal or external factors on denial rates: (1) the
characteristics of state laws; (2) the thoroughness of the ad
ministrative process in UI determinations; (3) the generosity
of UI benefits; (4) the state of the economy; and (5) the
general philosophy of the state towards UI claimants.
Although only limited information on these factors could be
incorporated into the statistical analysis, it is important to
distinguish among the expected effects of each on denial
rates.
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Characteristics of State Laws
Two types of variation that are readily discernible in state
laws can be viewed as potential influences on denial rates:
the severity of disqualification penalties, and the stringency
of the rules that must be satisfied by claimants to qualify for
benefits. Based on the information on state laws compiled in
the U.S. Department of Labor's Comparison of State
Unemployment Insurance Laws, three variables that
describe penalties and four that describe the stringency of
eligibility requirements were identified for the analysis. Each
was defined as a "yes" or "no" variable (1 or 0, respective
ly, for purposes of the statistical analysis). These variables
are as follows:
Duration of Disqualification for Voluntary Quit. If
claimants who have quit without good cause are dis
qualified for the duration of the spell of unemploy
ment, the variable has a value of "1." If the dis
qualification is less severe and is set for some specific
term, the variable is set to "0."
Duration of Disqualification for Misconduct.
Similarly, disqualification for the full period of
unemployment sets this variable to "1," and a
specific term of disqualification sets it to "0."
Duration of Disqualification for Refusal of Suitable
Work. Claimants who refuse a job offer may be dis
qualified for the full period of unemployment, hi
which case the variable is set to "1." If shorter dis
qualification periods are imposed, the variable is
"0."
Good Cause Restricted to Employment-Related
Reasons. If state law limits acceptable reasons for a
voluntary quit to reasons that pertain to the condi
tions of employment, this variable is set to "1." If
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state law does not restrict acceptable reasons in this
manner and allows compelling personal reasons or
other nonemployment-related reasons, the law is
viewed as less stringent, and the variable is set to "0."
Suitable Work. This variable is set to "1" if the state
requires that the claimant be able and available only
for work deemed suitable. A more stringent require
ment, at least in theory, is an unqualified require
ment, without reference to the suitability of work.
This variable is set to "0" for states with such un
qualified requirements.
Usual Occupation. This variable is set equal to "1" if
the state requires that the individual be able and
available for work only in the usual occupation or for
an occupation in which the individual is reasonably
suited by prior training or experience, and "0" other
wise. Requiring availability for "usual" work is
another way to qualify the able and available rule to
make it more lenient. This variable and the suitable
work variable are thus mutually exclusive.
Actively Seeking Work. This variable is set equal to
"1" if the state requires that the individual engage in
active work search as evidence of his/her availability.
It is set to "0" if no such requirement is stated in the
law.
Disqualification penalties can be expected to affect denial
rates in several ways. First, we expect that more severe dis
qualification penalties will discourage UI application by in
dividuals who have quit their jobs, because they will perceive
a lower likelihood of receiving benefits. In addition, we ex
pect that more severe disqualification penalties would reduce
the overall number of individuals who quit their jobs,
because the chances of being able to fall back on UI benefits
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to replace employment income are perceived as lower than if
a limited disqualification period were anticipated. We
assume, however, that the severity of the disqualification
penalty will not affect agency denial decisions in any given
determination. Given these assumptions, we concluded that
more severe disqualification penalties are likely to reduce
denial rates by deterring claimants from quitting and apply
ing for benefits. We thus expected that disqualification for
the duration of unemployment (for voluntary quits, miscon
duct, or refusal of suitable work) would have a negative ef
fect on denial rates for each of those respective reasons.
For the four state law variables that indicate the relative
stringency of requirements imposed on claimants, we
hypothesized that more restrictive definitions of acceptable
reasons for leaving a job, seeking work, or responding to of
fers would increase the likelihood that agencies would find
claimants ineligible. This hypothesis reflects the assumption
that more stringent requirements for accepting work or being
available for jobs and for conditions of voluntary quit will
not have substantial effects on individuals' behavior. Thus,
with a fixed pattern of claimant behavior, more stringent re
quirements will increase the percentage of claimants who fall
outside defined eligibility standards, are detected as being
potentially ineligible, and are denied benefits as a result of a
determination. This hypothesis contrasts with our expecta
tions about the effect of disqualification penalties, which we
hypothesized would affect primarily the decisions of
employees and potential claimants. In this case, more strin
gent requirements are hypothesized to affect agency detec
tion and decisions, rather than the rate at which persons
leave jobs voluntarily, the definitions they formulate of the
work they will accept, and their responses to job offers.
Therefore, for the state law variables that pertain to good
cause restriction, suitable work and usual occupation provi-
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sions, and active work search requirements, we anticipated
that greater stringency would be associated with higher
denial rates. However, since we defined these four variables
differently, some of the variables can be expected to have
negative effects and others positive effects. Because the
"good cause" and the "active work search" variables are
defined so that a value of "1" implies greater stringency,
their effect on denial rates was expected to be positive.
However, provisions pertaining to suitable work and usual
occupation are defined so that "1" indicates a more lenient
policy; thus, these variables are expected to have a negative
effect on denial rates. The hypothesized effects of state law
provisions are summarized in table 2.3.
Table 23
Expected Effects of State Laws on Denial Rates

State law variable
Disqualification for quitting
is for duration
Disqualification for misconduct
is for duration
Disqualification for refusing
suitable work is for duration
Good cause restricted
Suitable work
Usual work
Actively seeking

Quits

Denial fon
Not able
Refusal of
Misconduct & available suitable work
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.
+
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.
n.a.

n.a.

+

n.a.

n.a.=not applicable.

Administrative Process
We also considered another set of internal UI variables
that may affect denial rates namely, variables that describe
the administration of nonmonetary eligibility determina
tions. For this analysis, we used variables that describe both
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the amount of time devoted to completing each determina
tion and the timeliness and quality of these determinations.
Data available from the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Ser
vice provide measures of these variables for separation and
nonseparation issues: (1) minutes per unit (a measure of time
devoted to each determination); (2) the percentage of deter
minations completed within a federally defined time stan
dard; and (3) the percentage of determinations found correct
in quality control audits.
We had no specific expectations about the overall effect of
these administrative variables, because equally plausible
hypotheses suggest opposite effects on denial rates. For ex
ample, states that devote a greater amount of time to each
determination might uncover additional issues or more
evidence to support denials, which could of course raise
denial rates. On the other hand, devoting more time to deter
minations could increase the chances that extenuating cir
cumstances to support the claimant's actions are fully ex
plored, which could of course tend to lower denial rates.
Generosity of UI Benefits
Several variables that are included in our analysis describe
the level of UI benefits and the interaction between benefits
and external economic factors that affect the relative attrac
tiveness of the UI program. These variables are the average
wage-replacement rate (average weekly benefits divided by
average weekly earnings), the average potential duration of
benefits, and a binary variable that indicates periods in
which federal extended benefits (EBs) are available. Higher
values of each of these variables indicate more generous UI
benefits or benefits that compare more favorably to lost
wages. We hypothesized that these factors would make the
receipt of UI more attractive, and thus increase the propor
tion of "truly ineligible" individuals who would attempt to
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collect UI benefits. Thus, we expected these variables to have
a positive effect on denial rates pertaining to all of the denial
reasons.
Characteristics of the Economy
Another set of variables included in our statistical analysis
describes the state of the economy (based on the insured
unemployment rate) and the composition of the unemployed
population (based on the percent in construction, the percent
in manufacturing, the percent male, and the percent age 25
and under and age 55 and over). We hypothesized that a
higher unemployment rate would reduce denial rates because
workers would be less likely to quit jobs and because fewer
job offers would exist that could be refused.
We also expected that the proportion of claimants in con
struction and manufacturing would have a negative effect on
denial rates because of the high rates of unionization and the
high proportion of temporary layoffs followed by recall, as
are characteristic of these industries. In many states,
claimants in unions are exempt from UI work-search re
quirements if they normally obtain work through the union
(this exception is particularly true in the construction in
dustry). A high incidence of temporary layoffs would
presumably also reduce the proportion of job separations
which are caused by quits. We also considered unionization
more directly by using the percentage of each state's
workforce that is unionized as an independent variable that
could explain variations in denial rates.
For the demographic variables, we expected that the pro
portion of the unemployed who are male would have a
negative impact on denials, but that higher proportions of
both younger and older claimants would raise denial rates.
These hypotheses were based on the assumption that groups
which are usually considered to have more marginal at-
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tachments to the labor force than do other groups would be
more likely to be denied benefits.
General Attitudes Toward UI Claimants
A final factor that may influence denial rates is the general
philosophy of each state toward UI claimants. For example,
states may differ in the degree to which they emphasize either
the claimants' or the employers' rights in issues pertaining to
voluntary quits. They might also differ in the degree to
which they believe that monitoring work-search activities
carefully is a necessary and appropriate activity of the UI
agency. No direct measures of such general attitudes were
available, but we included as a proxy variable the average
score of each state's congressional delegation on the AFLCIO index that rates voting records. It was expected that
higher ratings (indicating greater support of labor interests)
would be associated with lower denial rates.
C The Data
The primary data used to examine the impact of the fac
tors discussed above on denial rates were quarterly data by
state (50 states and the District of Columbia) for the period
from 1964 through 1981. The bulk of the data were derived
from reports on claims activities submitted by the states to
the Department of Labor. The variables that describe state
laws were constructed from tables describing state laws
which were published continuously in the Comparison of
State UI Laws throughout the observation period. Thus,
these variables describe not only current state laws but also
how they have changed over time.
Several data items were not available for the entire tune
period. For example, data on the ages of claimants were
available only for 1969 through 1981; they were used only
when the models were estimated over this shorter time
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period. The data on program administration, the degree of
workforce unionization, and the AFL-CIO rating of the con
gressional delegation were collected for a single year (1981).
Thus, they were used only in a secondary analysis which ex
amined the state-by-state differences that remained after the
analysis based on the full 18-year data set was completed.
Several comments on the data summarized hi table 2.4 are
of interest. Comparing the four denial rates presented in
table 2.4 with the data in table 2.1 shows that denial rates
were generally lower in 1982 than for the 1964-1981 period.
This finding applied particularly to the quit denial rate
(which in 1982 was about 65 percent of the 1964-1981
average) and to the refusal-of-suitable-work denial rate
(which was 0.8 for the entire period and 0.2 for 1982). l These
differences may be due to the high unemployment experienc
ed hi 1982, since more detailed annual data show that the
1982 decrease in denial rates was a recent phenomenon that
did not show up as part of a trend in the 1964-1981 data used
for our analysis.
An examination of the detailed year-by-year data that
underlie table 2.4 revealed that state laws on nonmonetary
eligibility became stricter over the period from 1964 to 1981.
For example, at the beginning of this period, about half of
the states disqualified for the full duration of the unemploy
ment spell those claimants who had quit jobs voluntarily. At
the end of the period, 80 percent of the states imposed dis
qualification for the full duration. Similar changes occurred
in penalties for misconduct separation and refusal of suitable
work; the proportion of states that disqualify the claimant
for the duration of unemployment increased over this
period. Similarly, the proportion of states that restrict good
cause for voluntary quit to job-related reasons and that re
quire active work search also increased. However, little
change occurred in the number of states whose laws qualified
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Table 2.4
Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Used in the UI Nonmonetary Denial Rate Analysis8
Variable
Dependent variables
Quit denial rate
Misconduct denial rate
Not able or available denial rate
Refusal of suitable work denial rate
Independent variables
Denial for voluntary leaving is for duration
Good cause restricted
Denial for misconduct is for duration
Suitable work
Usual work
Actively seeking
Denial for refusing suitable work is for duration
Wage replacement rate
Average potential duration
Extended benefits dummy variable
Insured unemployment rate
Percent insured unemployed in construction
Percent insured unemployed in manufacturing
Percent insured unemployed who are men
Percent insured unemployed age 55 and over"
Percent insured unemployed age 25 and under"
Minutes per unit for separation issue administration0
Minutes per unit for nonseparation issue administration0
Percent of separation issue determinations
done within time standard6
Percent of nonseparation issue determinations
done within time standard6
Percent of separation issue determinations
judged to be of acceptable quality6
Percent of nonseparation issue determinations
judged to be of acceptable quality0
Percent of labor force unionized0
Mean congressional AFL-CIO rating0

Mean

Standard
deviation

86.21
30.09
8.19
0.80

65.29
22.06
5.31
0.67

0.61
0.53
0.48
0.19
0.16
0.62
0.43
0.35
23.90
0.33
3.50
18.35
36.51
59.22
16.53
20.04
67.61
38.94

0.49
0.50
0.50
0.39
0.37
0.48
0.50
0.05
2.67
0.47
2.08
10.13
16.21
10.78
6.46
5.36
15.44
5.24

67.88

19.93

78.73

14.81

86.52

10.76

90.98
21.36
45.35

10.14
8.51
19.89

SOURCE: Most variables were collected from reports filed by the states with DOL on the
operation of the UI system and published in UI Statistics. Data on recent time periods have
not been published, and they were collected directly from the Unemployment Insurance
Service. The data on administrative time and on the timeliness and quality of determina
tions were also collected from the UIS. Finally, the AFL-CIO rating variable was con
structed from data reported in Michael Barone and Grant Ujifusa, "The Almanac of
American Politics, 1984," National Journal. Washington, DC, 1983.
a. Unless npted, the means and standard deviations are for 51 states for the 1964-1981
period.
b. Variables available for the 1969-1981 period.
c. Variables available for 1981.

32

Determinants of Denial Rates

"able and available" requirements by restricting them to
"suitable" or "usual" work.

D. Econometric Results
We tested the hypotheses on the determinants of nonmonetary denial rates by estimating models in which the four
denial rates represented dependent variables, and in which
state laws, other UI characteristics, and external economic
factors represented independent variables.2 The models were
estimated with quarterly data by state for the 1964-1981
period for variables for which data were available for this en
tire period.3 Models were also estimated to examine the in
fluence of variables for which more limited data were
available (see below). The estimation of these models sup
ports the hypotheses on the effects of some of the factors
used as independent variables, but also underscores the
limitations of the data available for the analysis.
In the estimated model, some of the state law provisions
on disqualifications and the stringency of requirements have
the anticipated effects on denial rates. Denial for the dura
tion of employment based on voluntary quit, job refusal, or
misconduct has a negative effect on the denial rate, as an
ticipated. The effects of disqualification for the duration on
the first two rates (for quit and job refusal) were statistically
significant and sizeable in both cases about 20 percent of
the mean value for the respective denial rates. Limiting the
definition of good cause for voluntary quits to employmentrelated reasons has the anticipated positive effect on the
related denial rate and is significant. The other state law
characteristics, which pertain to the use of "suitable" and
"usual" as qualifiers of the able and available requirements
and to work-search requirements, do not have significant ef
fects.
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Results of an analysis of the demographic characteristics
of the unemployed population provided support for some of
our hypotheses on the determinants of denial rates. The in
sured unemployment rate has a negative impact on denial
rates, as expected, and has a particularly large impact on the
refusal-of-suitable-work denial rate, as one might expect.
Certain characteristics of claimants, such as the percentage
of the insured unemployed in construction and manufactur
ing and the percentage who are male, have significant
negative effects on denial rates.
However, the effects of the age structure of the
unemployed population did not support our expectations.
Higher percentages of younger workers (under age 25) tend
ed to decrease denial rates for nonseparation issues, which
was contrary to our hypothesis, and had no significant effect
on denial rates for separation issues. Higher proportions of
older workers had mixed effects, reducing misconduct denial
rates and increasing the refusal-of-suitable-work denial
rates.
The effects of variables that describe the generosity of UI
benefits (average potential duration, the EB binary, and the
wage-replacement ratio) are inconsistent hi the estimated
models. All three have statistically significant effects on at
least some denial rates, but the signs of the coefficients are
not always in the expected direction. In some instances, more
generous programs appear to have a negative, rather than a
positive, effect on denial rates.
Although the statistical analysis described in this chapter
generally confirmed some of our hypotheses, the results re
main somewhat inconsistent and suggest that other impor
tant factors are at work in the state UI programs and their
environments which are not fully captured by the variables
we defined or by the data available. One indication of the
importance of those factors that are not included or not well
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represented hi the analysis is the fact that the coefficients
estimated for the state binary variables that were included in
the models were statistically significant as a group, and that
many individual state coefficients were also statistically
significant. Thus, while other variables explain some of the
cross-state variation hi denial states, much of the variation
can still be viewed as state-specific, or at least cannot be ex
plained by the variables included in the regressions that used
the data available for the entire 1964-1981 period.
In an attempt to enhance our ability to explain variations
in state denial rates further, we undertook a secondary
analysis of the state binary variable coefficients, using addi
tional independent variables that were not included in the
main analysis (again, because they were not available for the
entire analysis period). The coefficients of the state binary
variables are essentially a measure of the average residual
variation for each state as compared with the excluded state.
In the secondary analysis, these residual coefficients were
used as the outcome variables. They were regressed against
several variables that described UI administrative factors,
the degree of labor force unionization, and the state congres
sional delegations' average ranking on the AFL-CIO rating
of legislative votes. These variables were available only for
one year, 1981. None of the administrative variables showed
any significant effect on denial rates in this analysis.
However,the level of unionization and the AFL-CIO rank
ing, when used separately in regression equations, did have
some effect. The extent of unionization had a significant
negative effect on denial rate residuals for separation and
nonseparation issues, and the AFL-CIO rating had a signifi
cant negative effect for separation issues. These effects sug
gest that the political climate of the states can in some way
affect denial rates.
The significant effects of state binary variables in explain
ing denial rate variation, as well as the limited ability of
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other variables to explain denial rates, confirm the impor
tance of looking beyond the readily available published
characteristics of the state UI programs and the state
economies. In effect, we would like to be able to "measure**
both the stringency of requirements imposed on claimants
and the severity of disqualification penalties with greater
subtlety than was possible based on simple distinctions of
language hi state laws. Moreover, we would like to gauge the
importance of effective nonmonetary rules as they are ap
plied, rather than as they are delineated by legislative intent.
Thus, to carry out this type of analysis, we shifted from a
quantitative analysis of data for all states to an intensive ex
amination of how nonmonetary rules are administered in a
small sample of states. The following chapters explain how
we conducted this analysis and its conclusions.

NOTES
1. The 1964-1981 data set represents the average per quarter, while the
1982 set represents the average over an entire year. Averages based on
quarterly versus annual data account for some differences among the
rates, but they do not account for all of the differences.
2. In addition to the basic set of independent variables discussed above,
we included both quarterly binary variables to control for several effects
and state binary variables to control for any remaining state effects and
to provide a convenient way to compare states. We also controlled for
autocorrelation hi the error term by state.
3. The estimated coefficients are reported hi the tables appended to this
chapter.
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Chapter 2, Appendix Table 1
Denial Rate Econometric Estimates
1964*1981
(t-statistics in parentheses)
Voluntary
leaving
Constant
Denial for voluntary leaving
is for duration
Good cause
Denial for misconduct
is for duration
Suitable work
Usual occupation
Actively seeking
Denial for refusal of suitable
work is for duration
Average potential duration
Wage replacement ratio
Extended benefits
Insured unemployment rate
Percent insured unemployed
in construction
Percent insured unemployed
in manufacturing
Percent men
January-March
April-June
July-September

179.26*
(9.46)

-15.97*
(-4.46)
24.55*
(4.51)
—
—
—
—
~
~
—
—
—
-2.25*
(-4.37)
-21.11
(-0.90)
7.11*
(4.42)
-1.08*
(-2.35)
-0.00
(-0.04)
-0.72
(-10.37)
-0.67*
(-7.59)
5.72*
(3.80)
17.18*
(15.92)
19.99*
(19.85)

Dependent variable
Able and Refusal of
Misconduct available suitable work
67.86*
(10.82)
—
-0.86
(-0.79)
—
~
—
—
—
-0.84*
(-4.89)
-35.54*
(-4.55)
2.59*
(4.81)
0.12
(0.74)
-0.10*
(-2.97)
-0.33*
(-14.14)
-0.10*
(-3.34)
2.18*
(4.25)
8.22*
(22.17)
6.96*
(20.11)

17.16*

(6.93)
—
—
—
1.19
(0.71)
-0.61
(-0.49)
-0.32
(-0.59)
—
—
-0.01
(0.14)
-6.97*
(-3.46)
-0.03
(0.22)
-0.29*
(-7.47)
-0.03*
(-4.34)
-0.03*
(-5.02)
-0.07*
(-10.42)
0.49*
(3.99)
0.75*
(8.77)
1.41*
(17.63)

1.708*
(4.95)
—
—
—
0.152
(0.71)
-0.123
(-0.80)
—
-0.173*
(-3.42)
0.007
(0.99)
-0.766*
(-2.41)
0.023
(1.05)
-0.073*
(-11.72)
-0.004*
(-3.18)
0.001
(1.32)
-0.011*
(-9.35)
0.090*
(4.39)
0.208*
(14.24)
0.091*
(6.68)
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Chapter 2, Appendix Table 1 (continued)
Dependent variable

Alabama3
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts

Voluntary
leaving

Misconduct

14.15
(1.07)
-14.81
(-1.12)
23.92
(1.76)
3.56
(0.27)
10.47
(0.87)
107.06*
(7.82)
-19.23
(-1.43)
-28.43*
(-2.16)
14.43
(1.13)
0.76
(0.06)
74.29*
(5.31)
27.43*
(2.22)
1.66
(0.13)
-5.81
(-0.48)
18.10
(1.33)
74.23*
(5.59)
7.40
(0.58)
10.17
(0.84)
10.42
(0.79)
-12.03
(-0.89)
47.57*
(4.01)
-10.01
(-0.79)

6.76
(1.71)
-17.93*
(-4.32)
10.62*
(2.67)
7.52
(1.95)
-0.74
(-0.20)
52.39*
(13.34)
-1.01
(-0.27)
6.97
(1.86)
35.63*
(9.03)
7.56
(1.89)
38.48*
(9.41)
4.98
(1.29)
-3.05
(-0.76)
2.82
(0.75)
4.50
(1.11)
15.48*
(3.96)
18.30*
(4.75)
6.47
(1.69)
15.96*
(4.20)
-6.22
(-1.61)
22.16*
(5.95)
-0.36
(-0.10)

Able and Refusal of
available suitable work
-3.84

(-1.47)
-0.63
(-0.39)
6.53*
(2.83)
-3.35*
(-2.09)
2.67
(1.16)
-0.08
(-0.05)
0.42
(0.18)
-4.94*
(-2.14)
0.75
(0.33)
-1.14
(-0.49)
-1.51
(-0.65)
1.80
(0.78)
1.27
(0.77)
5.26*
(2.27)
-4.35
(-1.85)
-0.08
(-0.04)
7.69*
(3.16)
-4.32*
(-2.70)
-3.66
(-1.59)
1.43
(0.55)
-1.80
(-0.78)
-4.41
(-1.70)

-0.477

(-1.46)
0.183
(-0.98)
0.166
(0.59)
-0.223
(-1.24)
-0.056
(0.19)
0.128
(0.72)
0.073
(0.26)
-0.016
(-0.06)
-0.437
(-1.51)
-0.043
(-0.15)
-0.388
(-1.36)
0.318
(1.12)
0.720*
(4.01)
-0.048
(-0.17)
-0.098
(-0.35)
0.112
(0.41)
0.169
(0.55)
-0.198
(-1.12)
0.015
(0.05)
0.704*
(2.22)
1.274*
(4.55)
-0.346
(-1.07)
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Voluntary
leaving

Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

25.73
(1.84)
63.84*
(4.66)
-0.76
(-0.06)
15.52
(1.16)
36.23*
(2.63)
233.99*
(18.29)
7.41
(0.58)
-4.24
(-0.33)
-24.05
(-1.82)
31.74
(2.61)
-2.57
(-0.22)
-15.58
(-1.15)
24.74*
(2.03)
16.65
(1.40)
98.30*
(7.15)
19.74
(1.65)
-6.61
(-0.54)
85.61*
(6.88)
4.91
(0.38)
-20.02
(-1.51)
77.69*
(5.45)

Dependent variable
Able and
Refusal of
Misconduct available suitable work
2.42
(0.60)
10.43*
(2.73)
15.22*
(3.86)
17.46*
(4.38)
-6.93
(-1.70)
39.89*
(9.94)
6.51
(1.63)
4.35
(1.18)
0.47
(0.12)
28.45*
(7.56)
-8.33*
(-2.27)
6.12
(1.59)
-9.14*
(-2.39)
16.89*
(4.53)
31.01*
(7.90)
-3.92
(-1.05)
-4.27
(-1.09)
36.89*
(9.24)
-12.53*
(-3.12)
9.85*
(2.61)
62.68*
(15.33)

2.48
(0.95)
1.53
(0.66)
-2.88
(-1.25)
-1.77
(-0.76)
-0.28
(-0.12)
4.22
(1.83)
-0.12
(-0.05)
1.60
(1.03)
1.38
(0.59)
-1.05
(-0.45)
5.93*
(2.28)
-5.57*
(-2.42)
-1.20
(-0.75)
-0.26
(-0.17)
-3.58
(-1.54)
-1.14
(-0.64)
-0.62
(-0.27)
-1.71
(-0.70)
3.05
(1.32)
-6.91*
(-3.01)
1.17
(0.51)

0.303
(0.93)
0.411
(1.44)
0.202
(0.70)
-0.046
(-0.17)
0.043
(0.15)
-0.456
(-1.61)
0.474
(1.62)
0.670*
(3.84)
-0.279
(-0.97)
-0.262
(-0.91)
0.192
(0.61)
0.168
(0.60)
0.265
(1.53)
-0.111
(-0.66)
0.335
(1.17)
-0.236
(-1.17)
0.402
(1.41)
-0.190
(-0.62)
-0.155
(-0.54)
-0.276
(-1.00)
0.429
(1.47)
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Chapter 2, Appendix Table 1 (continued)
Voluntary
leaving
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

30.10*
(2.45)

22.77
(1.72)
-4.27
(-0.35)
-10.87
(-0.90)
10.03
(0.72)
-12.39
(-0.94)
-6.93
(-0.55)

Dependent variable
Refusal of
Able and
Misconduct available suitable work
0.744*
3.04
-3.06
(2.61)
(1.33)
(-0.80)
-5.42*
0.334
-0.74
(1.19)
(-2.35)
(-0-19)
0.343
6.40*
3.82
(0.99)
-14.79*
(-3.91)
-2.27
(-0.59)
6.90
(1.80)
-5.57
(-1.42)

(2.78)
0.96
(0.37)
-1.43
(-0.55)
-5.04*
(-2.19)
4.45
(1.91)

(1.24)
-0.069
(-0.22)
-0.052
(-0.16)
0.363
(1.33)
-0.390
(-1.37)

.38
.39
.48
.45
R* statistic
70.72
80.20
166.61
132.50
F statistic
(63, 3609) (61, 3610) (64, 3608) (64, 3608)
Degrees of freedom
NOTE: These equations were estimated with a fixed-effects model. Similar results were ob
tained with a random-effects model.
•Statistically significant at .05 level for a two-tailed test,
a. Pennsylvania is the omitted category hi the set of state binary variables.

3
Process Analysis
Methodology
Determining nonmonetary eligibility in the unemployment
insurance program is a complex undertaking. A wide range
of legislative, regulatory, administrative, and personnel fac
tors can potentially affect the ability of a state to ensure that
UI claimants comply with nonmonetary requirements and
that those who do not are denied benefits.
The regression analysis reported in the previous chapter is
the first step hi explaining the factors that contribute to the
variation hi the rates at which states deny benefits to UI
claimants for four nonmonetary reasons—voluntary quits,
discharge for misconduct, inability to work or unavailability
for work, and refusal of a job offer or referral. However, as
was recognized in the design of this study, the regression
analysis contains certain inevitable shortcomings that limit
the extent to which it can explain the impact of state UI agen
cy operations on observed denial rates.
The major shortcoming of the regression analysis is that
the readily available data on program administration are
limited in their extent, type, and precision. In the analysis,
three dummy variables represent the severity of penalties im
posed for violating nonmonetary eligibility rules, and four
others represent the latitude allowed to claimants in choosing
to seek or accept work or to leave a job. All of these
variables reduce variations among the states to binary
values, which oversimplifies the true variety of state
penalties for the violations and requirements imposed on
41
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claimants. Most seriously, perhaps, the values of the
variables used in the regression analysis are drawn only from
the state laws that pertain to unemployment compensation.
The rules governing UI nonmonetary eligibility are a product
of state laws, elaborative regulations, formal policy and pro
cedural memoranda and handbooks, and informal rules of
thumb used by the UI agencies. States with apparently
similar legislative provisions may in fact be applying quite
different rules because of the substantial divergence in
regulatory provisions and practice. Conversely, states with
apparent differences in legislative language may be observing
actually very similar nonmonetary rules because they have
placed different levels of substantive detail in their legisla
tion. To the extent that this is true, regression analysis
variables that describe state rules do not adequately repre
sent effective policies.
Despite these limitations, the regression analysis suggests
several systematic relationships between the policy variables
that describe the state UI programs and the rates at which
claimants are disqualified for nonmonetary reasons. With
respect to voluntary quits and refusals of work, states that
impose disqualifications for the duration of unemployment,
as opposed to some fixed term, tend to have lower denial
rates. States which restrict their definitions of good cause for
leaving a job to reasons pertaining directly to the employ
ment situation tend to have higher rates of denial for volun
tary leaves relative to states which allow more personal
reasons as a valid justification. However, these regression
results do not suggest the mechanisms by which these dif
ferences hi state policies might affect denial outcomes.
The process analysis component of this study is designed
to investigate state policy and administrative practices hi
greater detail in an attempt to (1) describe more clearly and
precisely the differences among states with respect to policy
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and administration, and (2) discover how the laws, regula
tions, and administrative practices which create the "effec
tive policy" affect patterns of nonmonetary eligibility and
denial rates. This chapter describes the methodology used in
the process analysis.
Again, to conduct the process analysis, project staff
selected six states for intensive site visits, and collected data
hi those states from relevant documents and personal inter
views in state and UI local offices. The purpose of the pro
cess analysis design was to gather information about the full
range of factors that determine the policies actually im
plemented, and to do so by examining the UI system in each
state from a variety of perspectives. The remaining sections
of this chapter describe the process by which the sites were
selected, the data that were to be collected during the site
visits, the data collection approach, and the limitations with
this methodology.
We chose six states for the study, which represented both
the maximum number feasible with the resources available
for the study and the number we felt was necessary as a basis
for drawing any generalization about the implications of
alternative statutes, policies, and procedures. However, the
number does suggest certain limitations with the study. In
particular, the sample is not large enough to enable us to
select a set of states and sites within states that would truly be
representative of the national pattern of nonmonetary
eligibility standards. Thus, the analysis cannot provide
statistically reliable conclusions about monetary eligibility
standards. It does, however, enable us to point out patterns
that may suggest avenues for state policy development.

A. Site Selection
Site selection for the process analysis occurred in three
stages. First, we developed a set of criteria for selecting states
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in consultation with the Department of Labor and carried
out the analysis required to derive a list of recommended
states. Second, the list of recommended states was revised
because the peculiarities of some of the recommended state
programs might have limited our ability to generalize about
UI programs in other states. Third, based on these first two
stages, a final list of states was obtained, criteria were defin
ed for selecting local sites within the states, and ar
rangements were made for selecting the local sites with state
officials.
Obtaining the cooperation of the states and the participa
tion of individual respondents during the site visits required
assurances of anonymity. Part of the information we wanted
to collect in the states pertained to problems in program ad
ministration, departures in administrative practice from
policies prescribed in legislation or regulations, and prob
lems with UI agency personnel, structure, or resources.
Given the sensitivity of these issues and the relative ease with
which the relevant agency respondents could be identified
from even a generic description of their roles, we found it
necessary to guarantee that not only individual respondents
but also the participating states remain unidentified hi this
report. By necessity, the discussion of site selection in this
chapter, and a discussion of the data collected and the con
clusions reached hi later chapters, must be kept somewhat
less specific than would otherwise be the case. Despite this
limitation, we have attempted to be as clear as possible about
how site selection fits in with the research design, and about
the effects of state level policies and implementation deci
sions on important program outcomes.
Site Selection Criteria and Site Recommendations
The first criterion used to select states was the extent to
which actual nonmonetary denial rates differed from rates
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predicted by the regression model described in the previous
chapter. 1 Since the purpose of the process analysis was to at
tempt to explain the state-to-state variation in denial rates
that was left unexplained in the regression analysis, we chose
to focus the process analysis on states hi which actual denial
rates diverged considerably from what the regression model
predicted. To implement this criterion, we first calculated
the regression-based predictions for each of the four denial
rate dependent variables for all states in 1981, the last year
for which we then had state performance data. These predic
tions are based on the regression coefficients estimated for
the full 1964-1981 period (see Section D of chapter 2) and on
state program characteristics and external economic
variables for 1981. We then calculated the difference be
tween the actual denial rate hi 1981 (of each type for each
state) and the predicted rate. For each of the denial rate
variables, states were then ranked according to the size of
these differences, from the most positive difference (i.e., in
which the actual rate exceeded the predicted rate by the
greatest amount) to the most negative difference (i.e., in
which the predicted rate exceeded the actual rate by the
greatest amount). The states that were considered for selec
tion fell within the top or bottom quarters of this rank order
ing for any of the dependent variables, with preference given
to states that fell more consistently within the top or bottom
quarters across all four denial categories.
To arrive at an initial list of states, we applied an addi
tional set of criteria. First, we verified the robustness of the
ranking of states for each type of denial rate by deriving
alternative rankings based on (1) differences between actual
and predicted values for the entire 1964-1981 period and
(2) the actual 1981 denial rates. Second, to ensure some
geographic diversity, we attempted to use DOL region as a
stratifying factor. Third, we considered a number of factors
that might have indicated whether some states were exper-
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fencing extraordinary pressures on the UI system of quite
different magnitudes than experienced by most other states
and, hence, should have been excluded from the sample.
Such factors included the local and state economic climate,
the UI claim load, and the rate of increase in claims filed
over the past several years. Fourth, we examined the basic
experience rating criteria used by the states with respect to
firms, so as not to include states that had very unusual prac
tices. Finally, we placed some priority on including states
with a wide range of denial rates from high to low and a
variety of legislative provisions ranging from what could
loosely be termed "liberal" (less demanding on claimants) to
"stringent" (more demanding requirements and penalties
for claimants).
After reviewing these selection criteria, we selected 20
states for further consideration. These could be characteriz
ed as having large positive or negative differences between
predicted and actual denial rates for both types of separation
issues (quits and misconducts) and for both types of
nonseparation issues (able/available and refusal of suitable
work). For each state, large positive differences occurred for
separation and nonseparation issues, large negative dif
ferences occurred for each, or a combination of both large
positive and negative differences occurred. In addition, we
attempted to pair states that had roughly opposite denial rate
patterns, but that were reasonably similar otherwise.

Revision of Recommended Site List
and Characteristics of Selected States
Officials in the Department of Labor reviewed the initial
list of states, and the list was subsequently revised. Some
states on the original list were deleted because, for instance,
they (1) were too small and were thus unrepresentative of the
typical state experience, (2) had a unique legal provision con-
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cerning work-search activity, (3) used a method for counting
separation-related denials that differed from the method
used hi most other states (which would pose difficulties hi
cross-state comparisons), or (4) had recently amended thenlaws governing key nonmonetary eligibility procedures.
After these deletions, five states were added to the
list—states that had been excluded from the initial list
because they were hi geographic areas already represented.
The final list contained twelve states—six designated as
primary sampling states on the basis of our criteria, and six
designated as a back-up sample. Half of each sample con
sisted of states that showed generally large positive dif
ferences between actual and predicted denial rates, and half
consisted of states that showed generally large negative dif
ferences.
The final step in selecting states was to gain then: coopera
tion. Three of the six primary sample states agreed to
cooperate in the study, as did three of the four secondary
sample states that were contacted. Thus, 60 percent of the
states which were contacted agreed to cooperate, with
refusals concentrated in states with generally low denial rates
(three of the four). The problem of selection bias associated
with the refusals raises some concern about the
generalizability of conclusions reached hi the process
analysis, and adds to cautions already voiced about our abili
ty to generalize from the study findings.
Although the identity of the six states selected must remain
confidential, it is possible to report some of then*
characteristics. The states varied in terms of the divergence
of actual denial rates from predicted denial rates. In two
states, actual denials greatly exceeded the predicted rates for
two types of denials; hi another state, a large positive dif
ference existed for one type of denial, and a large negative
difference existed for another. Two states exhibited large
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negative differences for two types of denials, and one state
exhibited a large negative difference for one type of denial.
Generally, those states in which actual denial rates greatly
exceeded their predicted rates also ranked high among the
states in actual denial rates, and states which exhibited large
negative differences also ranged in the lowest quintiles for all
four types of denial rates.
The selected states also represent a fair degree of
geographic diversity. They include one western state, one
southern state, two midwestern states, and two northeastern
states.

Selection of Local Sites
In addition to collecting documents from and conducting
interviews with persons who are responsible for the UI
system at the state level, the research design called for a
similar effort in two local offices in each state—one in an ur
ban area and one in a rural area. The local offices were
selected in cooperation with state officials once a state's par
ticipation in the study was assured. We sought local offices
that exhibited a pattern of denials for nonmonetary eligibili
ty issues that was similar to the pattern of the state as a
whole. We attempted to screen out offices that, according to
knowledgeable state officials, were exceptionally good or
bad in areas pertaining to nonmonetary eligibility, or that
were undergoing a transition in their operations or had
unusual claims loads (e.g., a high proportion of interstate
claims or seasonal layoffs).

B. Description of Research Data
The process analysis design called for collecting and using
information on four broad sets of factors that, it was
hypothesized, could affect the rates at which claimants were
denied benefits for nonmonetary reasons: the regulatory
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definition of the UI program; the characteristics of the
operational system which implements legislative and
regulatory policy; the characteristics of the personnel who
staff the UI agency; and the external economic and political
factors which could affect agency and individual staff
behavior.
Regulatory Context
The process analysis data collection focused primarily on
the substance, importance, and use of UI regulations. First,
the relationship between statutes and regulations can be im
portant. In states with detailed, specific legislation, it might
be expected that regulations would very closely reflect the
apparent intent of the legislation. However, in other states
where statutes provide an incomplete definition of the UI
program, the substance of the regulations may suggest a
policy direction that in some respects appears to differ from
the legislation, or may provide a clear policy direction which
is absent in the law. An analysis of the net effect of legisla
tion and regulations in defining the strictness of re
quirements imposed on claimants and the severity of
penalties for violating eligibility requirements represents an
important step toward improving the distinctions among
state programs that are incorporated in the regression
analysis.
The importance and use of UI regulations were to be
assessed on the basis of the process analysis data. An ex
amination of the regulations themselves could reveal their
volume and detail, and comparisons between the regulations
and statutes could indicate the extent to which policy defini
tions are arrived at hi regulatory language and through the
underlying agency decision process, as opposed to the
legislative process. The specificity and detail of the regula
tions were also of interest since they determine the extent to
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which the regulatory definition can be used as a basis for
controlling the consistency with which the policy is im
plemented. States with very specific and detailed regulations
could rely on them as procedural guidelines and use them as
training materials, thereby promoting uniform policy im
plementation. States with very brief or general regulations
could be expected to rely more heavily on interpretive
memoranda or bureaucratic rules of thumb and tradition to
define and enforce policy at the local level.

Characteristics of the Operational System
With any given policy on nonmonetary eligibility, it can be
expected that the ability of a UI agency to implement the
policy and enforce associated rules can affect observed
denial rates. A variety of agency characteristics were thus in
cluded hi the data collection plan. First, we wanted to ex
amine the formal organizational structure under which the
UI program operates, including such factors as the links be
tween UI and employment service staffs, the nature of state
and local coordination, methods for conveying policy infor
mation and interpretations from policy staff to line staff and
for monitoring performance, and the manner in which the
organizational structure might contribute to or detract from
managerial control in general. Also of interest were the pro
cedures used at the local level to carry out the functions by
which nonmonetary eligibility policy is executed: how deter
mination issues and potential issues are detected, how infor
mation on claimant behavior is reviewed and assessed, and
how information on questionable situations is used to
prompt a later examination and possible definition of deter
mination issues. These procedures define the roles and
responsibilities not only of claimants and employers but also
of the agency. Together, the organizational structure and
local office procedures define the processes of detection,
fact-finding, and determination which constitute the essen
tial components of enforcement.
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Personnel
The characteristics of agency staff involved in applying UI
policy were also included in the process analysis data collec
tion plan because of then* possible impact on the
thoroughness and consistency with which UI policy is im
plemented. Fkst, we were interested in the preparation of
line staff for their jobs: the educational level of claim inter
viewers and adjudicators, experience in a specific job or in a
variety of relevant jobs they might have held, and the type
and amount of job-specific training they received. We were
also interested hi any information that might indicate the at
titudes of staff towards the policy guidelines that they were
asked to adhere to, as a possible measure of underlying sup
port for policy goals* Finally, we were interested in indica
tions of the consistency or inconsistency with which line staff
understood and interpreted the policies they applied.
External Factors
Although the regression analysis included certain variables
that describe each state's economy and the demographic
characteristics of the unemployed population, we also focus
ed some attention in the process analysis data collection on
the external political and economic factors which might
enhance our understanding of the development and applica
tion of a state's nonmonetary eligibility policies. No
systematic attempt was made to collect quantitative data, but
efforts were made in site interviews to obtain respondents'
interpretations of the manner in which external factors might
be affecting their agency's operations. Of particular interest
were such factors as the unemployment rate at the state and
local levels, the industrial composition of the economy and
the significance of employment patterns, the types of job
skills and experience found among the claimant population,
and the possible impact of political pressure groups (e.g.,
unions or chambers of commerce) on state policy and its ap
plication.
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Process Analysis Data Priorities
The order in which these categories of process data have
been presented also represents in general terms the relative
priorities assigned to them in this study. These priorities
reflect the importance and usefulness of each of the broad
topics in refining the information represented by the
program-related variables in the regression analysis. Details
on UI regulations and the procedures and organizational
methods used to implement them enhance the regression
variables most directly. Conversely, staff characteristics and
external factors may pertain only indirectly to the program
variables in the regression analysis, to the extent that they
may also have some effect on administrative effectiveness or
on the demands placed on the UI system.
The priorities also reflect a judgment about what types of
information are most appropriately collected in extensive site
interviews, and they represent the best use of the limited
resources available for the process analysis component of the
study. In general, we focused primarily on obtaining
respondents' interpretations of policies and procedures,
rather than on obtaining precise objective data which are
best collected by other means. For instance, we devoted little
attention to collecting systematic data on the educational
levels or experience of staff, objective data which described
agency rates of determinations, denials, appeals, or other
processes, or demographic statistics. To the extent that pro
ject resources allowed us to collect such data, they were col
lected for the regression analysis and incorporated in that
part of the project.
C. Data Collection Methods
Data were collected from three sources in each of the six
sites: relevant policy and procedural documents; agency per
sonnel; and UI claimants.
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A critical first step in each site study was to conduct a
detailed examination of state statutes, regulations, and
documents that described agency operations, including
handbooks, organizational charts, and public information
brochures. Statutes and regulations were obtained before the
site visits whenever possible, so that project staff could
develop their understanding of the basic policy framework
and identify issues that would be emphasized in site inter
views.
The most extensive data collection effort was a series of in
terviews conducted with agency officials and staff in each
site. Variations hi program roles created some differences
across states in the number of interviews and the titles of
respondents. However, our general objective in all states was
to interview individuals at the state level who were familiar
with state UI laws and regulations and with overall state pro
gram management. At the local level, we wanted to interview
respondents who were familiar with the operational inter
pretation of state policy, the details of the adjudication pro
cess, local coordination between UI and employment service
staff, and the intake and claims processes.
Site visits were conducted between May and September
1983, and each lasted approximately four days. Site visits
typically included interviews with three or four state office
respondents over the course of two days. The state-level
respondents included individuals who are responsible for the
overall management of the UI benefits and employment ser
vice units, the supervision of the adjudication process, and
the supervision of local office operations. Local office inter
views typically required one full day at each of the two of
fices selected in each state. In the local offices, our primary
objective was to conduct interviews with individuals who
were knowledgeable about the nonmonetary determination
process, employment service operations, and general UI

54

Process Analysis Methodology

claims processing. The selection of respondents depended
largely on the complexity of the supervisory structure in the
local office. In larger offices, our primary respondents were
the chief of the adjudications staff and the employment ser
vice manager. In smaller offices, we interviewed the office
director if that person had a detailed knowledge of the deter
mination process. In all of the local offices, we also inter
viewed other staff who were particularly knowledgeable
about aspects of the determination process or claims process
ing.
In addition to the information obtained from local office
staff, Mathematica Policy Research project staff examined a
small sample of case records which described nonmonetary
determinations in the previous year. This examination im
proved our understanding of how decisions are documented
and how closely individual decisions reflect the policies and
procedures described by program documents and agency
staff.
A third source of data for the process analysis was a small
set of interviews conducted with UI claimants who had gone
through a nonmonetary determination in the previous year.
However, this data collection effort contributed very little to
the process analysis. The design of the project called for con
ducting about 10 claimant interviews by telephone in each
state, a sample size that clearly could not provide any
assurance that the responses would be representative of the
general population of claimants who had experienced deter
minations. Nevertheless, it seemed that such interviews
might yield some insights which would help us interpret
other information obtained for the process analysis. In the
end, however, the interviews were of limited value for a
number of reasons. First, the limited resources available for
claimant data collection precluded a very extensive effort.
Since the address information of sample members was quite
old, the search for current telephone numbers proved dif-
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ficult. A significant portion of the rural sample in some
states had no telephone service. In the end, we completed
fewer interviews than even the small number we had hoped
to complete. Moreover, the specific events we asked the
respondents to comment on (i.e., a specific determination
and/or appeal) had in some cases occurred so far in the past
that the respondents could not provide the detailed informa
tion we had hoped for. If information from claimants were
intended to serve as a central data source of a study, it is
clear that a much larger and more timely data collection ef
fort would be necessary.

D. Strengths and Limitations
with the Process Analysis Methodology
The process analysis approach has proved to be extremely
valuable in enhancing our understanding of the factors that
contribute to variations hi nonmonetary denial rates. The
methodology described in this chapter allowed project staff
to cover a wide range of potentially interesting and impor
tant information, placing emphasis in each site on those fac
tors that seemed most relevant to outcome patterns.
Along with these advantages, of course, are certain limita
tions imposed by the methodology itself. The intensive effort
required in each site limited our study to six states. Reliable
patterns of relationships between regulatory and ad
ministrative factors and denial rates are therefore difficult to
establish. In fact, the relationship between cause and effect is
likely to be peculiar to each state. We can hope to identify a
variety of program features that seem to affect outcomes,
but not to confirm the impact of particular features across
states.
Another problem encountered in applying this
methodology is that, although a wealth of information can
be gathered, only some of it can be organized in ways that
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will yield insights into the research issues of interest. We
have found, for instance, that an examination of state
regulations and the operational characteristics of state agen
cies has contributed most to our understanding of deter
mination outcomes, but that the information we obtained
about external factors and staff characteristics was difficult
to compare across states and to use as a basis for drawing
any causal inferences.
The approach used to collect most of the site information
(i.e., interviews with agency personnel) also has certain
limitations. On certain topics, such as interpreting regula
tions and defining procedures used in local offices, staff
perceptions provide direct evidence on the types of variations
in UI administration that might be expected to influence
denial rates. However, the comments of staff about certain
statistical patterns of claimant behavior or agency operations
must be treated much more cautiously. Such comments do
represent attempts to provide objective quantitative data and
can prompt the investigation of available statistical data, but
without verification they cannot be used as valid evidence for
the process analysis. Thus, given the lack of resources for
detailed agency studies, our analysis placed less emphasis on
certain impressions or speculations offered by respondents.
The requirement that we preserve the anonymity of the
participating states has also imposed something of a limita
tion on the study. Data must be presented with some inten
tional reduction in their specificity.
Despite these limitations, the process analysis has helped
us establish some clear patterns of variation among the states
and to identify the ways in which these variations affect
denial rates. Chapter 4 describes the determination process
and the range of variation observed in the major aspects of
that process. Chapter 5 then presents our interpretations of
the relationships between the characteristics of the deter
mination process and denial rates.
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NOTE
1. The coefficients of the state binary variables in the regression models
measure the differences between the actual and predicted rates.

4
The Determination Process
State Characteristics
A three-step process leads to the denial of UI benefits for
nonmonetary reasons. In the first step, the agency defines
and imposes the nonmonetary eligibility requirements for the
receipt of benefits; these requirements define the difference
between claimants who should be considered eligible if they
file for benefits and those who should be denied benefits. In
the second step, the agency identifies potential determination
issues. To carry out this step, the UI agency must follow pro
cedures to detect situations that must be investigated and ad
judicated. In the third step, the agency assembles informa
tion on identified determination issues, considers the facts,
and formulates a determination decision. The cumulative ef
fect of these three steps determines the observed rates of
nonmonetary denials.
To understand the variations hi denial rates across states,
we must examine each of these stages in the determination
process individually. At one stage, a state may appear to
pose stringent requirements for claimants, yet, at another
stage, its rules or procedures may be quite tolerant of a wide
range of claimant situations and behavior. The six states
chosen for the process analysis clearly illustrate the impor
tance of determination rates as factors in overall denial rates,
as well as their variability. Table 4.1 presents the national
quintile ranking of the six states for the frequency of deter
minations and the overall denial rate. 1 As pointed out in
chapter 2, even in states that exhibit very high rates of
denials as a percentage of determinations, it is the determina
tion rate—the number of determination decisions per 1,000
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claimant contacts—which most clearly determines the
overall denial rate. The six states are numbered 1 to 6 in ap
proximately the order of their overall denial rates. Behind
this simple ranking are different patterns of determination
and denial rates. State 3, for instance, ranks relatively low in
the rate at which determination issues are identified, but very
high in the rate at which identified issues lead to denial. State
1 ranks rather high hi identifying determination issues, but
quite low in the rate at which they become denials. State 4
ranks generally low in identifying determination issues, but
displays quite divergent rates for denials, ranking very high
for the voluntary quit and able/available reasons, but very
low for the misconduct and job refusal reasons. Explaining
these different patterns is an important objective of the pro
cess analysis.
This chapter provides a foundation for explaining these
varied patterns of determination and denial rates by compar
ing the ways in which the three stages of the determination
process are accomplished in the sample states. Section A ex
amines the effective nonmonetary eligibility requirements in
each state, based on the provisions of legislation, regula
tions, and operational rules. Section B describes the varia
tion in methods used by the states to detect determination
issues, and Section C discusses the information we obtained
on the fact-finding and determination decisionmaking pro
cess itself. These three sections provide some basis for
delineating what the states do in each of the three steps of
nonmonetary determination. In the site visits, we also ex
plored a range of agency characteristics that might help ex
plain why they do those things. Section D discusses these fac
tors and the information we gathered which appear to
distinguish one state from another.
This chapter focuses primarily on the differences among
the states in terms of eligibility requirements and their
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methods to detect determination issues. It is along these two
dimensions that we were able to construct the clearest and
most complete comparison of the six states, and along which
differences among them emerged most clearly in the
analysis. We focus less on the fact-finding and decisionmaking process, as well as on agency characteristics that might
affect the overall determination process. On these topics, in
formation derived from the site visits was less indicative of
clear patterns. Although certain characteristics and problems
described by respondents are worth noting, we generally
found that the information was less helpful in explaining the
pattern of determination and denial rates.

A. Eligibility Requirements
In the site visits, Mathematica Policy Research (MPR)
staff examined statutory and regulatory language and ob
tained summaries and interpretations of eligibility re
quirements from interview respondents. Thus, the eligibility
requirements described in this section are the "effective
rules"—the rules as they are applied in practice.
In presenting state characteristics in this chapter, we make
no attempt to convey an overall impression of each state's UI
program or to interpret how program characteristics affect
denial rates. Instead, we simply portray the range of ap
proaches followed for specific aspects of the nonmonetary
determination process. Chapter 5 will reassemble this detail
ed information in summary descriptions of each state, in an
attempt to point out the ways in which the program rules and
operations in each state lead to its pattern of denial rates,
and to draw general conclusions from a broad review of all
six states.

Separation Issues
Rules regarding separation issues are intended to define
the circumstances under which claimants are to be con-
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sidered responsible for their own unemployment, and the ex
tent to which they should be penalized for the actions which
led to then* unemployment. The rules in all states distinguish
between situations in which the claimant voluntarily leaves a
job and situations in which the claimant is discharged from
work. They represent an attempt to define the circumstances
under which claimants who quit did so "without good
cause" and whether they were discharged for misconduct.
Both quitting without good cause and being discharged for
misconduct are grounds for benefit denial.
Voluntary Quit. All six states have eligibility requirements
which allow claimants to receive benefits after quitting a job
if they can demonstrate that their departure was prompted
by the actions or behavior of the employer. Although the
level of regulatory detail and the language used to describe
employment-related reasons vary, the six states seem to
define a common set of employer actions that are acceptable
reasons for quitting—such reasons as an employer's breach
of an employment contract, verbal or sexual abuse or harass
ment, mandatory retirement, violation of health or safety
standards, employer changes in wages or work conditions to
levels generally unacceptable in the occupation, and various
infringements on an employee's labor rights.
However, the states do vary in the extent to which per
sonal reasons for leaving a job are considered "good cause"
for quitting. States 1,2, and 5 use the most liberal definition
of valid personal reasons. These states define "compelling
personal reasons" which would justify a voluntary quit, in
cluding such reasons as excessive commuting distance, hav
ing to care for a household member who is ill, pregnancy,
avoiding a transfer out of the area, and having to accompany
a spouse whose job requires moving. State 6 defines other ac
ceptable personal reasons, including a desire to avoid
"bumping" fellow workers in a layoff situation, health
reasons, accepting other employment, and shortened hours
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of work over a two-week period. Among these states, it
should be noted that the regulations in States 1 and 2 provide
extremely detailed definitions of the circumstances that
should or should not be considered good cause. The level of
specificity in the regulations might be expected to limit the
staff discretion that can be exercised in identifying issues and
making determination decisions.
States 3 and 4 define allowable cause for voluntary quit
more restrictively. State 4 allows no personal reasons at all;
only reasons that are "attributable to the employer" can
justify a voluntary quit and lead to the award of benefits.
The rules of State 3 are also restrictive, in that they call for
the denial of benefits unless the voluntary quit is for "good
cause attributable to the employer." State 3, however,
stipulates that "valid personal circumstances" for a quit, if
demonstrated, can justify a milder penalty.
This description of state rules on acceptable reasons for
voluntary quits illustrates how the detailed examination con
ducted for the process analysis improves upon the data in
corporated in the regression analysis. Based on a simple
classification of state statutes, States 1,2,4, and 6 would be
considered states that restrict the definition of good cause to
reasons connected with the work or attributable to the
employer; States 3 and 5 would be considered states that do
not. However, based on the details of state regulations and
practices, we found that States 1, 2, and 6 also allow
claimants to be awarded benefits on the basis of personal
reasons that do not pertain to problems with either the work
itself or the employer.
Misconduct. In all of the sample states, claimants are
awarded benefits if they are laid off by the employer because
of a lack of work or are terminated for poor performance.
However, if the employer discharges an employee because of
misconduct, the claimant will be considered responsible for
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the loss of the job and will be denied benefits. Although the
states vary hi their language on misconduct, several themes
consistently emerge. The employer must demonstrate several
facts about the employee's behavior and about the
employer's response which led to the discharge. The
employer must show that the employee's action or behavior
indicated a deliberate or negligent disregard for the
employer's interests, and that the behavior had an adverse
effect on the employer. The employer must also show that
the employee was aware of the employer's policies when they
were violated, or could reasonably have been expected to be
conscious of them. Finally, the employer must demonstrate
that it reasonably and consistently applied the rules whose
violation led to the discharge, gave the employee some warn
ing before the discharge, and made an effort to resolve the
problem with the employee before the discharge.
However, in two respects, certain states can be distinguish
ed from the others in their definition of misconduct. The
first is whether the state uses a single definition of miscon
duct, or distinguishes between different degrees of miscon
duct. States 1,4, 5, and 6 use a simple definition of miscon
duct and apply a uniform penalty for all cases of miscon
duct. State 3, however, has defined two levels of misconduct.
"Gross misconduct" consists of illegal acts against the
employer, a series of work rule violations, or actions that in
dicate malice towards the employer. "Misconduct connected
with work" is a vaguer but definitely broader definition of
actions by the employee that do not necessarily constitute
either (1) the clear intent or disregard associated with most
state definitions of misconduct or (2) a demonstration of the
employer's efforts to resolve the problem. In fact, interview
respondents in State 3 suggested that any discharge that was
not caused by lack of work, but which was based on a viola
tion of work-site rules, would normally be classified as
misconduct connected with work. State 2 also defines two
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levels of misconduct. "Normal misconduct" resembles the
definition of misconduct used by most states, but "gross
misconduct" consists of an action by the employee which
would constitute an indictable offense and of which the
employee has been proved guilty either by written admission
or by conviction.
A second, more subtle variation in misconduct definitions
is the degree to which the states establish misconduct on the
basis of the employee's failure to work up to standards set by
the employer or to comply with job requirements. The rules
of all the states are clearly designed to prevent assigning the
misconduct definition to an employee if that person is simply
unable to measure up to the demands of the job. However,
State 1 is noteworthy in that it imposes a slightly more
demanding standard for employees. It need not be
demonstrated that the employee deliberately wronged an
employer. An employee's actions can be considered to repre
sent misconduct if they show an indifference to or a neglect
of duties established by the "employer contract," as oppos
ed to a more abstract definition of the employer's interests
from the state's perspective. Moreover, a claimant can be
discharged for misconduct if his or her present performance
does not match past productivity and thus indicates current
negligence or indifference. Although formal policies in other
states refer to such employee behavior, State 1 was the only
one we visited which seems to deny benefits on such grounds.
Penalties for Separation Issues. In all states, claimants
who have been discharged for misconduct or who quit are
denied benefits, but the penalties associated with the denials
vary. In general, the states use the following separation
denial penalties:
• Disqualification for Duration of Unemployment. If this
provision is included in the penalty, disqualified
claimants would not be eligible for UI benefits until they
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become re-employed and subsequently lose then*
employment for valid reasons.
• Disqualification for Defined Period. If claimants are
not disqualified for the duration of unemployment, they
are disqualified for a specified period, but need not
become re-employed and subsequently unemployed
before receiving benefits.
• Minimum Standards for Re-employment. When a
claimant is disqualified for the duration of unemploy
ment, it is expected that a substantial period of new
employment elapse before a subsequent claim is filed.
Some states define this period in terms of the amount of
money that must be earned in the new employment,
either as an explicit minimum dollar amount or as a
multiple of the weekly benefit amount which the claim
ant would receive if eligible. Other states define the
period in terms of the length of time employed.
• Loss of Wage Credits. Disqualification for the duration
of unemployment delays a claimant's ability to draw
upon wage credits. Benefits based on wage credits are
lost only if because of the delay before requalification a
claimant reaches the end of the benefit year before ex
hausting benefits from the base period. However, some
states impose penalties which also provide for the loss of
wage credits.
The severity of a state's penalties depends to some extent
on the circumstances of individual claimants. The employ
ment history, wage level, and weekly benefit amount of each
claimant would determine whether the claimant would find it
more difficult to requalify for benefits in new employment
under a requirement stated in dollar terms or as a multiple of
the weekly benefit amount. Nevertheless, it is possible to
provide some rough categorization of the six sample states in
terms of the severity of penalties. States 1 and 5 could be
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viewed as having the mildest penalties, disqualifying
claimants on separation issues only for the duration of
unemployment and until they have earned, respectively, five
and six times the weekly benefit amount. State 3 imposes
somewhat more severe penalties. Claimants must earn 10
times then- weekly benefit amount hi new employment if they
have quit employment without good cause or have been
discharged for gross misconduct. However, a reduced penal
ty is defined for "voluntary quits with valid circumstances"
and for "misconduct connected with work." In such cases,
claimants are disqualified for an elapsed period of 5 to 16
weeks, with the exact period determined individually (and
apparently somewhat objectively) for each case. In such
cases, no re-employment requirement is established.
Penalties hi State 2 are still more severe, since all disqualified
claimants must earn 10 times their weekly benefit amount in
new employment before requalifying.
States 4 and 6 could be viewed as imposing the most severe
penalties for separation denials. They require both minimum
earnings and a minimum period of time in new employment
for requalification. State 4 requires claimants to work for
five weeks and to earn 10 times their weekly benefit amount
for requaliflcation. State 6 requires claimants to work for
four weeks and to earn a minimum of $200 in order to be requalified after having been denied benefits for voluntary
quits. Claimants who are denied benefits because of miscon
duct in State 6 are disqualified for three weeks, but also lose
all wage credits accrued from the employer who discharged
them, a provision which could be very severe for an
employee whose base-period wage credits came entirely or
primarily from that employer.
Nonseparation Issues
Unemployment insurance claimants can be denied benefits
for two reasons not pertaining to the circumstances sur-
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rounding their termination from their last employment:
(1) if they are unable to or unavailable for work, or (2) if
they refuse a job offer or a referral to a potential employer
without an acceptable reason. For "able and available"
issues, benefits will be denied for any week in which the
claimant is considered to be unable to or unavailable for
work. Penalties for refusal resemble those imposed for
separation issues.
Able and Available. To be eligible for UI benefits in any
state, the claimant must be able to work from the standpoint
of physical and mental health, and must be available for and
ready to accept work. Claimants must also demonstrate a
real connection to the job market to support the claim that
they are able and available for suitable work; most states re
quire evidence of job search to indicate such exposure to the
job market.
State rules on "able and available" requirements vary
along several dimensions, however. First, states differ in
how they define the types of work that claimants must be
able to perform to be considered "able." Second, states dif
fer in the latitude they allow claimants in deciding what con
stitutes "suitable" work and how this latitude changes as the
spell of unemployment continues. Third, the states set dif
ferent standards about what portion of a week a claimant
may be unavailable for work and still not be denied benefits
for that week. Finally, they differ in how they define the
work-search activity in which claimants must engage to re
main eligible.
To varying degrees, the rules of all six of the sample states
acknowledge that health problems which interfere with work
in the claimant's usual occupation do not necessarily imply
that the claimant is unable to work. States 2 and 5, for in
stance, require simply that the claimant be able to perform
some gainful work that exists in the job market. State 1 re-
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quires that the claimant be able to perform any type of work
for which he or she would be reasonably suited by virtue of
experience and skills, but it clearly does not require the abili
ty to work in the claimant's usual occupation. As an
operating guideline, State 6 requires that claimants be in suf
ficient health to perform 15 percent of the jobs in the
market, although how such a refined standard is applied is
unclear. No information on the definition of ability to work
was obtained for State 4, which may simply reflect the
absence of a precise rule.
State 3 uses the most liberal definition of ability to work.
If claimants who receive benefits become sick or disabled
and are unable to work, they are allowed to continue to
receive benefits until they are offered employment or a job
referral. When they report an illness or disability, the agency
first determines whether a job match can be made through
the employment service. If a suitable job is available, the
claimant must either accept it or be deemed unable to work
and be denied continuing benefits until the health problem is
corrected. If no job match is made, claimants can continue
to receive benefits.
All of the sample states allow claimants to be available on
ly for "suitable" work. However, this policy is commonly
defined only in the regulations, and not in the statutes. Based
on the statutes, only State 5 among the sample states would
be counted as allowing this restriction; all others were treated
in the regression analysis as using a policy that did not give
claimants the option of restricting themselves to "suitable"
work.
State definitions of "suitability" deal most commonly
with jobs that claimants could reasonably expect to obtain,
or which would not impose intolerable burdens on them. For
instance, if a claimant has no qualifications for or experience
with a particular type of work, the states generally do not re-
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quire that the person be available for that type of work, or
view the claimant's stated availability for such work as hav
ing satisfied availability requirements. States allow claimants
to restrict their availability to employment that does not pose
health or safety hazards, and which is located within an ac
ceptable distance from their residence. However, large dif
ferences exist within the six sample states in terms of the
detail and precision with which these rules are developed.
States 1 and 2, hi this area as in others, provide a clearly
greater level of definition than other states.
It appears that all of the six states allow claimants to
restrict then* availability to work that pays wages and re
quires skills comparable to then* usual occupation, but it also
appears that the states relax this restriction as the claimant's
unemployment continues. The clarity and terms of this
policy vary significantly among the six states. Statutes or
regulations hi States 3 and 5 do not define how claimants are
expected to lower their expectations about wages as time
elapses. State 4 simply allows claimants a "reasonable tune"
before they are expected to adjust the scope of their
availability. States 1 and 6 define specific "adjustment
periods" during which claimants may restrict themselves to
jobs at their usual pay—for example, State 6 for six weeks
and State 1 for a period of between four and ten weeks,
depending on the skill level of the claimant's occupation.
However, neither of these states clearly defines how rapidly
claimants are then expected to adjust their wage demands
and by how much. In State 2, however, explicit guidelines on
this subject are included in the regulations, allowing
claimants the first five weeks to search for comparably pay
ing jobs, with three subsequent six-week periods in which
their wage demands should be reduced to, respectively, 75,
70, and 65 percent of their last pay.
The extent to which claimants may limit the hours and
shifts they are willing to work without being considered
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unavailable for work varies somewhat from state to state.
Despite differences in description, however, States 1, 2, 3,
and 5 all basically require claimants to be available to work
the hours which are customary for the occupation in ques
tion. Typically, claimants may exclude night-time hours
unless those are the rule in their occupation, and may limit
themselves to night-time hours only if a substantial labor
market remains open to them with that restriction. State 6
simply requires that, whatever the restrictions claimants
place on hours, they must remain available for 50 percent of
the jobs in the occupations in which they are seeking work.
State 4 appears to have no clearly defined rules on hours
restrictions.
All of the sample states deny benefits for any week hi
which a UI claimant is unavailable for work. Claimants may
be considered unavailable if they are away on vacation, at
tempting to become self-employed, incarcerated, too ill to
work, or otherwise not in a position to accept employment.
It appears to be common practice, and in some instances part
of eligibility regulations, to accept a claimant's unavailabili
ty for part of a week without denying benefits. The states
vary somewhat in how strictly they apply their rules on
partial-week availability. The regulations in State 1 clearly
stipulate that benefits will be denied for the entire week if a
claimant is unavailable for work for more than one day in a
week. States 2 and 5 are less demanding; they simply require
that the claimant be available for work for the "majority of
the week," so that two days of unavailability would be ac
cepted. States 3,4, and 6 have no clear rules on partial-week
availability that we could discover.
To be considered unemployed, an individual must be seek
ing work. All of the states express this requirement with two
rules: claimants must register with the state employment ser
vice, and they must pursue and provide evidence of their own
active work search. For both requirements, the six sample
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states differ considerably hi how stringently they apply them
to claimants.
All six of the sample states require some form of registra
tion with the employment service; but, to varying degrees,
they all recognize that it would be inappropriate to require
all claimants to register. One aim common to all of the states
is to avoid burdening the employment service with register
ing claimants who have been temporarily laid off and who
either expect to be recalled within a reasonably short tune or
will be recalled on a definite date. Not extending registration
requirements to such claimants is also in the interests of
employers which are responsible for the layoffs, because it
effectively prevents the employment service from referring
these claimants to other jobs, and thus protects the
employers' pools of experienced workers available for recall.
The states also commonly exempt from registration re
quirements those claimants who normally find work through
a union-hiring process or who are unemployed because of a
labor dispute in which they are not directly participating.
However, the sample states vary widely in how long an an
ticipated period of layoff will be accepted without imposing
the registration requirement, and how long a period may go
by before excused claimants are required to register. States 1,
2,4, and 6 are relatively stringent on this matter, exempting
claimants from registration if then* unemployment is ex
pected to last up to four or five weeks. States 3 and 5,
however, allow much longer anticipated unemployment (10
and 13 weeks, respectively) before requiring registration.
The substance of the registration process that satisfies
eligibility requirements in the states also varies, and seems to
reflect the level of expectation in the state agency about the
degree to which the employment service will in fact expose
claimants to potential job offers. At one extreme, State 5
simply requires claimants to sign a statement about their
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willingness to accept employment. State 3 requires a minimal
registration process: the majority of unattached claimants2
need only complete a short registration form that is subse
quently entered on employment service files as an "inactive"
registration, so that the claimant is subject to referral only
when voluntary registrants with the employment service do
not provide enough suitable referrals to employers who re
quest them. UI claimants are placed in "active" registration
(which exposes them to the real likelihood of job match) only
if they are hi high-demand occupations or if the local
economy is active enough to require expanding the pool of
available referrals. Although State 6 requires all claimants to
register if they do not expect to be recalled within five weeks,
it maintains a special "short-term" file with the registration
information of all claimants who expect to be recalled within
five months. The employment service will match these
claimants only with jobs of a specified short duration,
which, according to agency respondents, substantially
reduces the likelihood of a job match and referral. The rules
in States 1,2, and 4 constitute the most substantive registra
tion process: claimants are required both to complete forms
that provide information on work skills and availability and
to take an interview with an employment service
interviewer.3
No state agency explicitly assumes that all UI claimants
will become re-employed through the efforts of the employ
ment service, but the six states we examined vary dramatical
ly in the extent to which their eligibility requirements insist
upon an active, independent work search by the claimant.
The states also vary in terms of the regularity with which and
the methods whereby they expect claimants to seek jobs, and
the evidence they expect to document that search. The most
routinized job-search documentation is expected in States 3
and 4, where claimants are to conduct an active job search
and submit the names of two employer contacts made each
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week when they file ongoing claims. In State 4, the contacts
are supposed to be made on two different days of the week.
States 1 and 2 have regulations and practices which define
a more flexible requirement. In State 1, claimants are re
quired to be "actively seeking" work, to provide evidence of
the previous two weeks of search activity at application time,
and again to provide evidence of two weeks of search during
Eligibility Review Process (ERP) interviews at ten-week in
tervals. No standard number of contacts is expected each
week, but, for each case, claims interviewers can determine
what constitutes an appropriate level of search activity,
depending on the type of work sought and the local job
market. In State 2, statutes and regulations simply require a
"diligent search" effort, which can be established for each
individual case. In practice, however, State 2 appears to re
quire that all claimants submit the names of two employer
contacts per week.
States 5 and 6 have the least rigorous job-search re
quirements. State 5 does not appear to have a rule that
establishes an active work-search requirement, so that
availability for work is likely to be tested only if a claimant is
referred to a job interview by the employment service. State
6 has no formal work-search requirement that applies as a
blanket rule. The UI agency can impose a specific search ac
tivity requirement for individual claimants if their labor
market attachment is questionable; however, agency
respondents report that this step is taken only for less than 1
percent of all claimants.
Refusal of Work or Referral All states require claimants
to accept referrals to suitable jobs when offered by the
employment service, and to accept offers of suitable work
from employers whether the offer is generated through an
employment service referral or through an independent work
search. The definition of suitable work is the major source of
variation in refusal policy among the states.
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Definitions of suitability of work for purposes of deter
mining whether a job is refused with good cause generally
correspond to the suitability criteria used to assess claimants'
availability for work. The clearest variation among the sam
ple states exists in the rules on the extent to which and the
speed with which claimants must adjust their job demands
over time. As described earlier, State 2 has the most specific
and stringent policy on this criterion. States 1 and 6 define
specific periods after which some adjustment is necessary.
States 3,4, and 5 have no clearly stated rules at all on the ad
justment period.
States also seem to vary in the type of distinction they
make between refusing to accept a job referral and failing to
respond to agency attempts to provide the referral. Although
benefit denial would normally be justified only by an explicit
refusal by the claimant, an inadequate response to referral
attempts sometimes indicates a situation in which the claim
ant is not actually available for work. The manner in which
states follow up on difficulties in making referrals is discuss
ed below, when we examine the methods for detecting deter
mination issues.
Penalties for refusing job offers or referrals generally cor
respond to those imposed for misconduct and voluntary
quits. States 1 and 5 disqualify claimants for the duration of
employment and until their subsequent employment earnings
equal, respectively, five and six times the weekly benefit
amount. State 2 requires claimants to have postunemployment earnings of 10 times the weekly benefit
amount. State 3 disqualifies claimants either for five to ten
weeks or until re-employment earnings reach 10 times the
weekly benefit amount. Agency respondents in State 3
reported that the penalty depends on "personal cir
cumstances" and the "suitability of the job," but we did not
discover any more explicit decision guidelines. States 4 and 6
disqualify claimants for the duration of unemployment and
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require both a minimum period of re-employment and
minimum earnings. State 4 requires five weeks of work and
10 times the weekly benefit amount, and State 6 requires
four weeks of work and at least $200 in gross earnings before
a claimant can requalify.

B. Detection and Identification
of Determination Issues
Eligibility requirements provide the theoretical basis for
determining which claimants should be awarded or denied
benefits. However, nonmonetary denials occur only when
some reason has been established to question or challenge
the legitimacy of a particular claimant's work separation or
continuing availability and willingness to accept work. The
effectiveness with which UI agencies identify issues that re
quire determination can thus be expected to affect then* abili
ty to deny benefits to claimants who are in fact ineligible.
This section describes the ways in which the six sample states
identify cases that require determination for both separation
and nonseparation issues.
Separation Issues
The site visits uncovered two types of variation among the
sample states which could contribute to differences in the
rates at which separation-related determination issues are
raised. The first pertains to the possible effect that informa
tion provided to individuals during intake has on detecting
determination issues. The second pertains to the manner in
which the UI agencies solicit information on separation
issues from employers and take the initiative themselves in
opening the determination process.
The manner in which UI agencies provide information on
program rules to individuals at intake seems to reflect two
motives. On the one hand, the agencies we examined were
simply complying with their legal obligation to provide
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claimants with information about their rights and respon
sibilities under the unemployment insurance law. On the
other hand, agency respondents consistently stressed that
agency policy was to encourage application, and that the
agency had no motivation and made no effort to screen out
or to discourage the application of individuals who had
potentially questionable claims. Clearly, however, informa
tion provided to individuals who are interested in filing an
initial claim might potentially either discourage them from
applying or affect the information they supply to support
their claim. In turn, either condition could affect the fre
quency with which agencies identify questionable claims and
perform determinations.
The UI agencies in the sample states did in fact vary ac
cording to when and how they provided information on UI
rules and claimants' responsibilities in the sequence of intake
steps. States 1,3, and 5 seem to provide a brochure onrules,
rights, and responsibilities only after the claimant has com
pleted the application forms for UI, has provided informa
tion on the reason for work separation and on his or her
availability for employment, and has made some contact
with the claims taker.4 In State 2, individuals receive a
brochure on program eligibility rules and their respon
sibilities before they provide any application information.
When they are called in to see a claims taker, the claims taker
briefly reviews the program rules and then reads through the
questions on the initial claims form and fills it out for the
claimants as they respond. In State 4, claimants receive an
explanation of the program and their rights and respon
sibilities after meeting with an employment service inter
viewer, but before completing the initial claims form and
talking with a claims taker. Furthermore, if the claims form
indicates a possible separation issue, claimants are asked to
return with a completed fact-finding form a week later when
they file their first weekly claim. In States 2 and 4, it is possi-
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ble that some specific information on program rules might
turn away individuals who doubt their own eligibility. This
situation would be particularly possible in State 4, hi which
the normal sequence of events would give the claimant a
week to decide whether or not to go ahead with the claim. It
should be stressed, however, that none of the agency
respondents felt that a screening effect was occurring to any
significant extent.
A stronger potential for influencing determination fre
quencies lies hi the variation among state methods for ob
taining information from employers on separation reasons
and the extent to which the agency itself will initiate a deter
mination. Since all states ask claimants for then* own state
ment about why they were separated from employment, the
agency itself has some basis for independently deciding
whether an issue exists and requires determination. Some
variation exists among the states in the extent to which they
use this information, the manner hi which they pose ques
tions to employers, and the degree to which the agency insists
that employers return the form on which they are asked to
provide information.
States 1,2, and 3 seem to take a more active role hi obtain
ing employer information and in finding issues than do
States 4, 5, and 6. Before awarding benefits, State 1 sends a
form to the last employer and asks the employer to return the
form with the information on the reason for separation. If
the form is not returned, claims adjudicators will telephone
the employer before the first claim is processed, even if
repeated efforts are necessary. State 2 automatically initiates
the determination process as soon as the claims interviewer
notes an apparent issue on the initial claim form, and pro
vides two separate mechanisms whereby employers can
notify the agency about the separation circumstances.
Employers are provided with a stock of forms which they
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can use at their own initiative to inform the agency when an
employee is terminated, allowing them in a sense to submit a
"prior protest" before the agency solicits information or
even receives a claim from the claimant. In addition, the
agency routinely sends a different form to the last employer
of each new claimant to request separation information, and
this form must be returned before the claim is processed.
State 3 sends information request forms to all of the claim
ant's employers in the four base-period quarters and the
most recent quarter, and follows up the request forms with a
telephone call to the most recent employer if no response is
received by the first weekly claim filing.
States 4,5, and 6 follow procedures which in various ways
seem less likely to uncover real issues or to lead to reported
determinations. In State 4, for instance, a form that requests
separation information is sent to the last employer and is to
be returned within seven days; however, if no response is
received, follow-up procedures are not undertaken, and the
claim is then processed. The frequency of determinations in
State 4 might also tend to be held down by the high percent
age of initial claims that are filed by employers directly for
temporarily laid-off workers (40 to 55 percent, according to
respondents). Such claims are probably less likely to contain
information that would be questioned by agency staff. State
5 sends an information request form to the last employer and
monitors the return of the form, but it treats identified issues
in a way that may depress the reported number of determina
tions. If an apparent issue is identified when the claimant
completes the initial claims form, an interview is conducted
immediately to collect further information. If this interview
demonstrates that no reason for denial exists, the process is
not counted as a determination.
State 6 specifically requires that separation issues be in
itiated only by employers' protests on the forms the agency
sends them. Claims interviewers note only nonseparation
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issues, and do not initiate a determination even if the claim
ant reports having quit or been fired from the last job.
Moreover, a form sent to employers asks whether they
"question the eligibility of the claimant for benefits," and
not simply the reason for the individual's job separation. For
employers who are unfamiliar with unemployment insurance
law and the experience rating system, or for employers who
already pay the maximum tax rate, this approach for obtain
ing information would seem less likely to elicit answers that
might lead to benefit denial.
Nonseparation Issues
Continuing eligibility issues are most likely to be identified
from four sources: (1) an examination of intake forms;
(2) an examination of ongoing claim forms for compliance
with availability, refusal, and work-search requirements;
(3) information obtained in periodic Eligibility Review Pro
cess (ERP) interviews; and (4) the responses of claimants to
job referrals or offers generated by the employment service.
The states vary in the strictness of their claims review pro
cess, the frequency and regularity of ERP interviews, the
likelihood that claimants will be exposed to job referrals,
and the agency's treatment of claimants' responses to refer
rals. We did not obtain noteworthy information on all of
these ways to identify issues for all of the sample states, but a
summary of relevant available information for each state
shows some distinctions among them.
State 1 appears to use the claims review process and ERP
interviews fairly rigorously. Weekly claims forms pose ques
tions designed to flush out issues. Claimants are asked for a
straightforward account of facts without any interpretation.
For example, they are simply asked whether they refused any
work, rather than whether they refused work without good
cause. Similarly, they are asked whether they were available
for work for the entire week, even though one day of
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unavailability would not represent a basis for denial.
Claimants who are required to appear in person are schedul
ed for a particular day in the morning or afternoon. If
claimants report at the wrong time once, it is simply noted in
their file; if it occurs a second tune, a question is raised about
then* availability, and a determination is made. Failing to
respond to a referral call-in card also prompts an investiga
tion of possible availability issues. ERP interviews are con
ducted every 10 weeks after the initial claim, and they focus
on determining the adequacy of job-search efforts and
availability for work. If a question arises about either re
quirement, the claimant may be required to submit continu
ing claims in person.
State 2 also follows certain practices which would seem to
enhance the agency's ability to identify potential issues. The
weekly filing process requires claimants to submit informa
tion on employer contacts. These contacts are listed by the
claimant on a form which is reviewed and then returned to
the claimant for use with subsequent claims. Thus, when this
form is reviewed by agency staff, they have in front of them
a multiple-week list of up to 40 employer contacts, which
may make it easier to spot repetitive employer entries,
suspicious patterns that may suggest fabricated contacts
(e.g., alphabetically listed employers), or other reasons to
question work-search activity. The number of employer con
tacts is checked on each submission. A warning is issued the
first time that the claimant reports too few contacts; the sec
ond time, the determination process is initiated. Moreover,
the agency conducts an ongoing audit of employer contacts,
verifying 1 percent of all contacts reported. Although such a
sample may only marginally affect the probability that
misinformation will be discovered, the knowledge that this
procedure is followed may deter claimants from submitting
false contact information. ERP interviews are conducted
every four to seven weeks for claimants who are not on tern-
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porary lay-off and focus clearly on detecting potential
eligibility issues. For new claimants who are viewed as hav
ing potential able/available issues, an ERP is scheduled a
week after the initial filing. The agency also provides
employers with a stock of forms on which they can initiate a
report of recall or job refusal.
Some of our observations during the State 3 site visit sug
gest that this state may be less effective in identifying
nonseparation issues. As pointed out in Section A, very few
State 3 claimants register with the employment service and
have any real chance of being referred to an employer.
Moreover, state policy requirements for work-search ac
tivities do not seem to be followed consistently. State policy
requires claimants to report two employer contacts per week
in order to continue receiving benefits. However, in neither
of the offices we visited did staff appear to follow this policy
exactly. In the urban office, if contacts were missing from
the claimant's report, the agency seemed to follow up by
providing claimants with information on program re
quirements, but only hi rare cases did it initiate a determina
tion. In the rural office, the perception of policy is that
claimants are not required to make any contacts for the first
10 weeks. The policy which exempts employer-attached
claimants from ES registration and work-search re
quirements for 10 weeks seems to affect the treatment of all
claimants. ERP interviews in State 3 are supposed to be held
every 10 weeks, but the reported average interval between
ERPs is 13 weeks.
State 4 seems to schedule ERPs more effectively than does
State 3, setting a maximum interval of ten weeks, but
scheduling them at four-, six-, or eight-week intervals if any
question arises at intake about the claimant's ability to
demonstrate continuing eligibility. Conversely, State 4 seems
to take a fairly relaxed approach toward monitoring work-
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search activity and dealing with claimants' responses to job
referrals. Claims reviewers reportedly question only the most
"outrageous" information (such as a list of employers which
includes the names of well-known sports figures). One
respondent said that a determination would not be required
even if a claimant appeared to be listing employers
alphabetically from the telephone directory. Employer con
tacts are not verified. The agency also responds mildly to
problems in referring claimants to employers. The common
rule of thumb followed in State 4 is that only when three
referral call-ins have been ignored will an issue be raised,
which is considerably more tolerant than the practices of
States 1 and 2.
With respect to weekly claims, State 5 follows a practice
which would seem to increase the number of issues raised,
but which would not necessarily increase the probability that
they will lead to denials. Able and available issues probably
arise most often from the agency's reporting requirements
and the claimants' failure to comply with them. Claimants
scheduled for in-person filing or an ERP interview are told
to appear on a specific day at a specific hour. If the claimant
appears for claims filing at the wrong time, it is noted in the
file. By the third time it occurs, the claimant is referred to an
adjudicator for determination. If a claimant fails to appear
once for an ERP interview at the proper time, a determina
tion is made. Particularly in the urban office, where a high
percentage of claimants are reportedly on continuing per
sonal filing, this tightly scheduled reporting regimen may ex
pand the number of determinations. However, failure to
report at the right hour may be less indicative of the claim
ant* s unavailability for work than would, for instance, fail
ing to report on a scheduled day.
Conversely, State 5 seems to expose claimants to a
minimal risk of being questioned about refusing work or
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referrals. Weekly claim cards ask claimants whether they had
"refused work without good cause," allowing them to pro
vide their owji interpretation of state policy rather than a
straightforward account of facts. Moreover, very few
claimants are likely to be referred to jobs by the employment
service. Under State 5 policy, claimants are not required to
register with the employment service if they expect to be
recalled to their jobs within 13 weeks (a long period com
pared with other states), but work-load pressures on the
employment service have created practices that are even less
rigorous. In the rural office, the employment service requests
that claimants not be referred for registration if they had any
expectation of recall; in the urban office, the stated policy is
to register everyone after 13 weeks of unemployment but not
to register anyone before that period. The employment ser
vice clearly seems to focus on registering individuals who
volunteer and who appear to be the most interested in ob
taining employment with the agency's help. The result,
however, is that claimants who are most likely to refuse
employment without good cause are the least at risk for
referral.
The likelihood that nonseparation determination issues
will be raised in State 6 is probably affected by the agency's
minimal emphasis on work search and by problems in main
taining a regular schedule of ERP interviews. State 6 does
not require claimants to report any work-search activity on
the weekly claim card; thus, no regular, frequent basis exists
for examining claimants' continuing exposure to the job
market, which is of course one measure of then* attachment
to the labor market and of then* availability for work. In ad
dition, due to staffing cuts, State 6 has had considerable dif
ficulty in achieving its objective of holding ERP interviews
every eight weeks for each claimant. For instance, the urban
office we visited had not held any ERPs in the five months
prior to our visit.
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C Fact-Finding and Dedsionmaking
Once the UI agency identifies a nonmonetary eligibility
issue on the basis of either statements made by the claimant
or information provided by employers, a process of factfinding and interpreting reported facts leads to a decision
about the merits of the claim—a determination. This process
includes two distinct functions: gathering information as a
basis for making these decisions and considering the facts in
light of state laws and regulations.
Although all states in our sample appear to provide
guidance for fact-finding and decisionmaking, the variation
hi the detail and precision of state regulations and pro
cedures commented on in Sections A and B of this chapter
clearly has some potential impact on how determinations are
reached. In our site visits, we did not find specific complaints
about inconsistent or unfounded determination decisions,
but consistency and justification are clearly a concern of the
states.5 All use some type of procedure for reviewing and
performing quality control on determination decisions (see
Section D for a discussion on the approaches adopted for en
suring quality control).
The determination process follows different patterns hi
the six sample states. The fact-finding process also varies in
several ways. First, some states seem to conduct frequent
preliminary, informal inquiries to confirm whether an issue
merits formal determination; other states treat every issue
that has been identified through routine claims review as a
basis for formal determination. States also seem to differ in
the extent to which they encourage employers to participate
in the fact-finding process or actively draw them into it.
Determining eligibility based on the facts, usually called
"adjudication," is also a process which varies somewhat
among the six states. Some variation exists in terms of who
performs adjudications, and the manner in which decisions
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are prepared and notifications are produced is not complete
ly uniform.
State 1, like most other states, makes determinations at the
local office level. What is somewhat unusual, however, is
that nonmonetary determinations, including fact-finding
and adjudication, are a responsibility which rotates among
all of the local office nonclerical claims staff, as opposed to
being assigned only to the senior or most highly qualified
staff. As a corollary to this practice, all claims staff learn to
make determinations through on-the-job observation and
training, which may affect their performance in handling ini
tial claims routinely by giving them a more thorough founda
tion in and frequent exposure to state policy guidelines. On
the other hand, assigning determinations on a rotating basis
may mean that relatively junior staff will perform some
determinations, which may detract from the consistency with
which rules are interpreted and applied. State 1 is also
noteworthy in terms of the degree to which it insists that
employers provide input to the determination process and
the extent to which the state uses that input. If an employer
report is not returned or if a separation issue has been noted
by the claims taker and the claimant's facts contradict the
employer's report, an adjudicator will contact the employer
by telephone. In either situation, no claim will be processed
without information or clarification from the employer.
Moreover, the adjudicator does not require any written
follow-up on information received from the employer by
telephone, which avoids one potential barrier to employer in
put observed in other states.
The fact-finding and determination processes in State 2
also focus on obtaining full information from both the
claimant and the employer whenever relevant, but its pro
cedures place some greater demands on employers. The
agency treats employers as a source of information that can
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potentially raise both separation and nonseparation issues.
The agency provides employers with a stock of forms on
which the employer may initiate reports of quits, discharges,
or refusals; it also solicits information from the employer on
separation issues as they arise for individual cases. An
employer's written protest, submitted on forms from the
agency or sent at its own initiative, must include a detailed
explanation of any issue cited by that employer. Further
more, fact-finding is conducted in scheduled interviews in
the local office to which an employer representative and the
claimant are invited. Decisions are based on written informa
tion received prior to the interview and evidence presented in
it; if the employer does not attend, no effort will be made to
elicit further information. Agency respondents reported that
employers attend about 25 percent of these adjudication in
terviews, and viewed this as a low attendance rate.6
The fact-finding and determination processes in State 2
seem particularly well designed to ensure that sufficient in
formation is collected and that consistency is maintained in
how the process is conducted and what information is pro
vided to the parties at various steps. Employer information is
actively sought, but all information must be submitted in
writing or presented at the formal interview at which the
claimant is present. A clear set of step-by-step guidelines on
what should be covered in a determination interview was set
forth by agency staff. State 2 sends copies of employer
reports to claimants and always informs both the claimant
and the employer in writing about a scheduled fact-finding
interview. Decisions are very closely constrained by the
detailed regulations on all aspects of nonmonetary policy.
Finally, consistency hi justifying decisions is promoted
through a computer system that allows adjudicators to select
among a standard list of regulation codes and then
automatically prints the appropriate explanatory text on
notification decisions sent to the parties.
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The fact-finding and adjudication processes in State 3 ap
pear to screen out some issues that would be resolved in
favor of the claimant before the formal determination stage,
to involve employers in the process to a lesser degree than in
States 1 and 2, and to focus on judging the severity of the
claimant's offense rather than on establishing whether one
occurred. Information from employers triggers only
separation-related determinations, since no mechanism ex
ists to report recall refusals, as in State 2. Some separation
determinations are short-circuited by informal inquiry;
claims adjudicators sometimes call employers prior to any
formal determination interview if the reported facts do not
seem to support then* protests. It appears that such cases can
lead to an informal resolution of an identified issue without
a reported determination process. When an adjudication in
terview is held, it may or may not include the employer.
Employers will generally attend only if a sharp discrepancy
exists between the facts reported by the employer and the
claimant, and respondents in State 3 reported that such cases
occur very rarely. Most interviews include only the claimant
and the adjudicator. Moreover, it should be remembered
that State 3 provides for two levels of penalties for separa
tion and refusal denials. As a result of these factors, it ap
pears that State 3 in effect conducts formal determinations
only when the chances of denial are high. Adjudication biterviews usually focus on the degree of the claimant's offense,
for purposes of establishing the length of the disqualification
period.
In State 4, fact-finding and decisionmaking are two
separate functions. For disqualification issues (quit, miscon
duct, and refusal), fact-finding is performed at the local of
fice, and adjudication is performed at the central state of
fice. For able and available issues, fact-finding and adjudica
tion are performed by local office staff. Not surprisingly, us
ing central office staff for all other adjudication purposes (a
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process which was instituted in order to lower administrative
costs and to increase the consistency of decisionmaking) af
fects the methods used by local staff for fact-finding pur
poses. State 4 does not use scheduled interviews that require
the presence of both the employer and the claimant.
Claimants are expected to provide a completed fact-finding
report, and employers may submit a written protest on
separation issues. Claimants are allowed to see any material
submitted by the employer and to prepare a rebuttal. Both
the employer's and the claimant's reports (including a rebut
tal in some cases) are sent to the central adjudicator. The ad
judicator may call either party if further information is
necessary. The fact-finding process in State 4 differs from
the process in the other states in that it does not contain a
provision for an interview in which both parties participate
at the same time. Moreover, adjudicators never deal with the
parties face to face. Consequently, adjudicators may find it
more difficult to judge the credibility of the parties.
Central adjudication in State 4 may mean that the quality
of evidence available to decisionmakers is not as complete as
what might be available if fact-finding and determinations
were undertaken by the same person. Moreover, central ad
judication may undermine the decision process to the extent
that both parties feel that their positions are not given the
proper attention. The high incidence of appeals hi State 4
supports both contentions. In 1982, first-level appeals were
made on over 22 percent of all determinations, ranking the
state among the top five in the country. Moreover, the deter
minations which tended to be appealed were clearly those
which were adjudicated centrally. Appeals were filed on less
than 5 percent of able and available determinations, ranking
State 4 among the lowest five states according to this
measure.
State 5 maintains a fact-finding and adjudication process
which is heavily affected by federal timeliness standards for
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paying initial claims and by state court decisions which re
quire determination decisions within 72 hours after a claim
ant has filed for the week in question. The state UI agency
responds to these time pressures through procedures that in
clude rapid fact-finding, frequent use of telephone discus
sions to collect information, some screening of issues before
they become formal determinations, and a low emphasis on
formal notifications and advance notice of hearing sessions.
When a separation issue is noted on an initial claims form or
is signaled by an employer report form, or when nonseparation issues arise from job refusals or ERP interviews, claims
adjudicators act quickly to clarify whether a formal deter
mination is necessary. When an initial claim points to a
possible separation issue, an adjudicator conducts a factfinding interview before the claimant leaves the office,
perhaps calling the employer by telephone in the claimant's
presence. If such a fact-finding interview indicates either a
consistent set of facts from the two parties to support benefit
denial or conflicting statements that require a judgment
about credibility, the adjudicator will ask the claimant to file
a claim for the waiting week, since a claim must be filed
before a determination decision can be issued. The employer
would still be required to submit a written report form on the
reason for separation. If necessary, a predetermination hear
ing with both parties would then be held. However, if the
fact-finding interview indicated no reason for benefit denial,
the matter would be dropped. The rapid follow-up pro
cedures on separation issues hi State 5 and the practice of
collecting all the facts before the first weekly claim is filed
may mean that issues which in other states are reported as
determinations are eliminated in State 5.
Time pressures also influence the handling of nonseparation issues in State 5. When issues are discovered while the
claimant is hi the office for a personal filing or an ERP inter
view, the fact-finding interview is held immediately. If an
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issue arises after the claim has been filed for the week in
question, a formal notification is mailed to the claimant, but
the adjudicator also telephones the claimant to schedule an
interview immediately. No waiting time or advance notice is
required. When the fact-finding interview is held, the claim
ant's statements will be taken into evidence, as will any writ
ten statement that may have been submitted by an employer
(e.g., for refusals); in most cases, a decision will then be
issued the same evening.
State 6, although not under the same court-imposed
pressures for rapid determinations as State 5, also follows
procedures which appear likely to resolve some issues before
they reach the formal determination stage, particularly those
that are raised by employers' protests over separation
reasons. The agency seems to place strong emphasis on hav
ing employers present evidence of a strong case before the
determination process is formally undertaken. For instance,
the form which is sent to employers to ask whether they
question the claimant's eligibility for benefits also asks for a
detailed explanation of the reasons for protest, and it warns
that failing to provide such detailed information may
preclude consideration of their protest by the agency.
Despite this urging, agency staff report that they must fre
quently call employers to clarify information, particularly
for misconduct issues. One respondent stated that this
screening process prompts many employers to drop their
protests, although the agency clearly makes no explicit at
tempt to discourage the pursuit of a protest.
State 6 follows a determination schedule that is much
more heavily influenced by due process and advance notice
requirements, and less by time pressures, than is true in State
5. Once it is clear that a real issue exists, a formal notice of a
hearing date is sent to both the employer and the claimant
(or only to the claimant in most nonseparation issues), giving

The Determination Process

93

them between five and seven days' advance warning. Deter
mination decisions are also not issued as quickly as in State
5. The agency's objective is to complete all determinations
by the end of the week in which the hearing is held, and to
comply with federal timeliness standards.

D. Agency Characteristics
Parts of the interviews conducted with central and local
agency staff in the sample states dealt with their organiza
tional characteristics and internal management concerns.
Four topics were covered to at least some extent in most of
the states: (1) the formal structure of the UI agency and its
organizational relationship to the employment service;
(2) the methods used at the state and local office levels to
monitor the performance of claims functions in general and
nonmonetary determinations in particular; (3) the
characteristics of local office staff; and (4) the extent and
type of training provided to local office staff. Although
these discussions at times touched on particular problems
that may have been encountered recently by an office or
state, the information obtained does not indicate any clear,
systematic differences among the states along these dimen
sions. However, several observations or themes that seem
common to most or all of the states emerged.
One clear theme from the interviews is the importance of
experience as a qualification to perform nonmonetary deter
minations. Whether claims adjudicators (variously referred
to as "examiners," "specialists," and "deputies") are pro
moted from claims-taker positions or are hired from outside
the agency, the methods for training them clearly stress onthe-job observation, periods of close supervision and review,
and periods of assignment to a variety of related tasks. Only
a few states appear to operate more formal training sessions.
To the extent that they do use these sessions, they appear
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likely to stress general interviewing techniques when provid
ed for new staff; under budgetary or other pressures, the ses
sions tend to fall into disuse. Formal training for experienced
staff, when provided, is apparently designed to explain new
ly introduced policies or procedures and seems likely to be
given only to lead staff.
The importance of experience for examiners is also
reflected in respondents' comments about the use of tem
porary or intermittent staff. This practice is followed in all
of the states to facilitate adjusting staff levels to the volume
of claims, but appears to varying degrees to create concerns
about whether the more demanding roles in the local offices
are staffed with adequately qualified and experienced staff.
In some of the offices we visited, temporary staff filled the
majority of claims-related positions. Most state and local of
fices focus on using the most experienced staff for the most
demanding determination issues. Intermittent staff, and par
ticularly the less experienced intermittent staff, are typically
assigned to the initial claims line, which requires less judg
ment and knowledge of policy than do determinations.
However, one respondent in State 3 noted that the degree to
which intermittent staff must be used means that determina
tions are also performed by staff who possess less than fully
desirable experience.
The necessity of relying heavily on temporary staff to re
tain flexibility also seems to contribute to staff turnover,
since temporary staff, rather than maintain a long-term com
mitment to the agency, will often use these positions as a
stepping stone for other jobs with more stable work, better
benefits, and clearer career advancement possibilities. Staff
ing a considerable portion of local office positions with in
dividuals who possess intermittent job experience or relative
ly short tenure contributes to concerns about the agency's
ability to identify determination issues.
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Concern about the quality and consistency of determina
tions has led all of the states to undertake some type of
monitoring and quality control. Typically, central office
staff use one or both of two devices: a review of monthly
statistical reports on determinations and reversals, with
follow-up action when particular problems are revealed; and
annual audits or reviews of each office, including an ex
amination of individual determination cases. Only in State 1
did we observe any specific criteria used in central office
monitoring which would trigger an inquiry by management
and remedial intervention with respect to local office opera
tions. Although the program rules in State 1 allow compell
ing personal reasons as justifications for voluntary separa
tion, state officials are concerned about excessive benefit
awards in such situations. Whenever claimants who have
quit voluntarily and have been awarded benefits account for
more than 10 percent of all separation-related determina
tions, state officials will investigate. However, from our in
terviews, it was impossible for us to judge the effectiveness
of these monitoring efforts or their effect on performance.
Similarly, although local office procedures to ensure quality
and consistency typically entailed a review by senior staff of
determinations made by junior staff, we could not find any
examples of particularly strong or weak efforts to control
quality by these means.
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NOTES
1. To derive the quintiles, we ranked all SO states plus the District of Col
umbia for each determination and denial rate. We then divided each
ranking list into five parts for states 1-10,11-20,21-30,31-40, and 41-51.
2. "Unattached" claimants are those who do not expect to be recalled by
the employer which laid them off.
3. It should be noted that a number of states quite clearly had adjusted
the rigor of their registration requirements because of the high level of
unemployment at the tune of our visits and because of the consequent
difficulties faced by the employment service in finding job referrals for
registrants in general and for UI claimants in particular.
4. The states use a variety of job titles to describe the functions perform
ed by staff in the UI offices. The job of taking initial claims forms at in
take is performed by staff who are usually referred to as "claims takers"
or "claims interviewers." Fact-finding, determinations, and Eligibility
Review Process interviews are usually performed by staff who are refer
red to as "examiners," "adjudicators," "claims specialists," or
"deputies."
5. As measured by the Department of Labor's Unemployment Insurance
Quality Appraisal Results, all six sample states maintain high standards
for the quality of nonmonetary determinations. With one exception (the
performance of one state on nonseparation determinations in 1981), all
states have achieved desired levels of quality over the fiscal years
1980-1982.
6. One State 2 respondent suggested that employers do not generally take
part in these interviews because they prefer to avoid the burden of par
ticipating, to take their chances on wuming a denial based on their writ
ten protest, and to appeal the decision if necessary. The respondent sug
gested that employers thus "overuse" the appeals process. In fact, data
for one quarter in 1980 confirm that employer-initiated appeals are
undertaken for about 6 percent of all determinations, ranking this state
among the highest hi the country in terms of the incidence of employerinitiated appeals.

Interpretation
of State Characteristics
and Denial Rates
The research undertaken for this project addresses an im
portant question for UI program managers and
policymakers: what steps can be taken to make the nonmonetary eligibility determination process contribute most
effectively to the integrity of the unemployment insurance
program in the states? More specifically, the patterns observ
ed in the regression and process analysis may suggest how
nonmonetary determinations can help state agencies
(1) minimize the extent to which claimants violate nonmonetary eligibility rules and (2) maximize then* ability to
detect violations when they occur and to reduce or deny
benefits accordingly.
It is important to begin our interpretation of state
characteristics and denial rates with a recognition of these
two aspects of program integrity. Although our analysis
must focus on the rates at which states deny benefits for nonmonetary reasons, high denial rates hi themselves clearly do
not necessarily mean that program management goals have
been achieved most effectively. In a state that effectively
disseminates information about program requirements and
ensures a relatively well-informed public, denial rates might
be low because relatively few ineligible individuals attempt to
receive benefits. However, such an outcome could be viewed
positively from the standpoint of program managers.
Although our analysis in this chapter must use denial rates as
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the primary basis for comparing states, we have also devoted
attention to possible ways in which state practices may be af
fecting denial rates by affecting the stream of applicants for
benefits.
This chapter presents our efforts to glean inferences from
the site visits about the effects of state policies and pro
cedures, administrative methods, and agency characteristics
on both denial rates and, more generally, program integrity.
Section A briefly discusses how we have analyzed the site
visit data. Section B then presents summary characteriza
tions of each state, with comments on what appear to explain
the denial rate patterns in each state. Section C offers some
concluding observations about the effects of program policy
and administration on denial rates, based on patterns across
the six sample states.

A. Analytical Approach
Our process analysis consisted of three logical steps. First,
we attempted to identify the peculiarities of the denial rates
in each state for 1982. By using the exact rates for the fre
quency of determinations, the denials as a percentage of
determinations, and the net denial rates that underlie table
4.1, we assessed how the rate of each state compared with
those of other states and looked for anomalies in the rate
patterns within each state. On the one hand, we were in
terested in whether for particular rates, such as the frequency
of misconduct-related denials, a state ranked high or low
compared with other states. On the other hand, we were also
interested in whether apparent inconsistencies existed within
the overall rates observed for a state. If, for example, a state
generally had very low rates of determination but had a very
high rate for one particular issue, such an anomaly would
provide a basis for considering policy and administrative
characteristics. These inter- and intra-state peculiarities serve
as the "dependent variables" for our process analysis.
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The second step was to undertake a structured and
systematic comparison of the site visit information for the
six states. Tables were constructed for each of the major
stages of the determination process (eligibility rules, detec
tion, and fact-finding and decisionmaking) and for each of
the nonmonetary denial reasons. The site visit reports, which
contained extensive descriptive information, were combed
for relevant entries to these tables. This process identified the
peculiarities that distinguished the policy and administration
of each state from those of the other states, and provided the
"independent variables" for the process analysis.
The third step was to find connections between the policy
and administrative characteristics of the states and their
denial rates. This analysis proved rewarding, in that ap
parent explanations for denial rate patterns in individual
states did emerge. However, before offering our conclusions
about these connections, we should note that the analytic
method and our conclusions should be approached cautious
ly, for three reasons: the reliability of our data, then*
usefulness as a basis for drawing generalizations, and the ex
tent to which we can infer causal relationships from the ap
parent patterns we observed.
To perform the analysis described above, we must give
considerable weight to the comments and perceptions of our
relatively few respondents in each state. Comments about
the ways in which certain types of claimant situations are
handled, or statements such as, "Lots of times we do it that
way," form the basis for our impressions of the less for
malized aspects of state procedures. The very nature of the
process analysis approach necessitates that we use such in
formation only with the understanding that we might be
oversimplifying or even distorting the patterns of practice
that might emerge from a more detailed, structured, and
time-consuming data collection effort.
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Even if we were completely confident that our information
on each state was completely accurate and reliable, con
siderable difficulties would still remain in drawing
generalizations about each state from our conclusions. Many
of the denial rate peculiarities we observed are distinctive to
particular states, and what we found noteworthy about state
policies and practices was often unique to an individual
state. Thus, most of the connections we found between pro
gram characteristics and denial rates were based on an ex
amination of one or perhaps two states, rather than on any
strong patterns across all of the states. Finding a connection
in one state did not indicate that the same relationship ex
isted elsewhere in our sample or in other states.
Most important, it is very difficult to draw inferences
about causality from what we observed. Even though a par
ticular set of rules or practices hi a state appears to con
tribute to the observed denial rates, we realize that many
other variables in program administration may be affecting
the same denial rates but cannot systematically be observed.
Although our conclusions may offer some guidance to states
as they consider program policy and management options,
clearly there should be no expectation that adopting the
practices of another state will necessarily affect denial rates
in the desired way.

B. State-By-State Analyses
For each of the six sampled states, we present a summary
of denial rate patterns and the major features of their
policies, procedures, and agency characteristics, as well as
our conclusions about how the latter affect the former.
Whereas in chapter 4 we focused on presenting the range of
policy and administrative characteristics for particular
aspects of the nonmonetary eligibility process, here we focus
on each state, drawing together all aspects of the process in
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an attempt to explain the denial rate outcomes of the specific
states.
State 1
State 1 ranks very high among all states in terms of the fre
quency with which it identifies determination issues. Its
determination rates rank it in the first quintile for miscon
duct and able/available determinations, and in the second
quintile for voluntary quit and refusal determinations (see
table 4.1), However, State 1 does not deny benefits in an
unusually high percentage of cases for which determinations
are performed, ranking in the fourth quintile hi denials for
misconduct, able/available, and refusal issues, and in the
fifth quintile for voluntary quit denials. Because the net
denial rates are heavily influenced by the high frequency of
determinations, the state ranks in the second quintile for
three denial rates and in the first quintile for one.
The high rates of determination in State 1 appear to be
caused by three major factors: (1) detailed and specific
regulations that impose some relatively stringent eligibility
requirements and define clear standards against which claim
ant situations and behavior can be measured; (2) procedures
for detecting potential determination issues that promote
employer input and encourage agency staff to pursue ques
tionable claimant information; and (3) a local office staff
structure which may enhance the ability to identify issues.
The detail and thoroughness of the regulations in State 1
far exceed what have been developed hi all of the other sam
ple states, with the possible exception of State 2. The regula
tions in State 1 break each eligibility requirement down into
the specific demands it places on claimants, providing ex
planations of underlying intent, case examples, and accom
panying recommended decisions. One might expect that,
because the very detailed regulations would allow precise
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judgments to be made in the issue identification stage, most
claimants who are brought to determination would be denied
benefits. However, that is not the case in State 1, a fact
which probably reflects the state's emphasis on initiating the
determination process whenever a possible issue arises,
rather than only when a clear case for denial exists. Instead,
the detailed regulations appear to require that the facts in the
decision stage be carefully developed and weighed, as
reflected in the moderate rates at which determinations lead
to denials.
Regulations in State 1 also pose some eligibility re
quirements that are relatively stringent, and which may thus
lead to determinations and denials in situations that would
not occur in other states. For instance, the definition of
misconduct includes one example of cause for discharge that
clearly goes beyond what is found in the other state regula
tions: the failure of an employee to perform as productively
as he/she had performed at an earlier time, thus indicating
indifference or negligence. Similarly, the definition of job
refusal hi State 1 includes actions or behavior by the claim
ant which would indicate a deliberate effort to fail the job in
terview. The state's standard for partial-week availability is
also the strictest among the six states: a claimant unavailable
for more than one day in a week is to be denied benefits for
that week. Finally, the requirements hi State 1 for employ
ment service registration are rigorous relative to other states
in our sample: only claimants who expect to be recalled
within 30 days or who normally obtain employment through
a union hiring process are excused from immediate registra
tion, and only for 30 days.
The record of State 1 in terms of identifying a high
number of determination issues seems to be a product largely
of the manner in which claims staff seek out employers' in
put to the initial claims review process, and of the manner in
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which eligibility rules and procedures prompt an investiga
tion of ongoing claims reports. Procedures clearly prohibit
processing initial claims without obtaining separation-reason
information from the last employer, and examiners will
telephone employers persistently until that information is
obtained. If information received over the telephone in
dicates the existence of a determination issue, the agency will
initiate the determination process rather than insist upon a
detailed written explanation, as is true in some other states.
Compared with other states, State 1 thus makes it easier for
employers to voice objections and may in fact raise issues
that employers already paying a maximum tax rate might not
even have bothered initiating themselves.
The ongoing eligibility determination process in State 1 is
designed to promote staff initiative in identifying the ques
tionable availability of claimants. Rather than requiring a
routine report of two or three employer contacts per week,
State 1 demands an initial account of employer contacts
made during the two weeks between application for benefits
and the first benefit-week claim, and again at the 10-week
eligibility reviews. Instead of devoting staff resources every
week to counting employer contacts whose seriousness and
validity are often difficult to assess from a simple claim card,
staff resources are devoted at relatively long intervals (every
ten weeks in most cases) to evaluating for each individual
case whether a sincere and reasonable employment search is
being made. If job-search efforts are questionable, the
claims staff can either require the claimant to file in person
and to present more detailed and frequent search evidence,
or initiate a determination.
The method for questioning claimants on weekly claim
cards and the state's standard for ongoing availability also
encourage pursuing potential issues. Claimants are asked for
straightforward facts on claim cards (e.g., Did you refuse a
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job?) rather than for an interpretation of their actions. At
least one other state in our sample asks whether the claimant
had ''refused a job without good cause." State 1 claimants
are asked whether they were available for the entire week,
even though the actual eligibility standard allows them one
day of unavailability. Other states ask a comparable ques
tion: "Were you available for work every day but one?" The
effect, and probably the intention, in State 1 is to identify
questionable claimant behavior and initiate determinations
on that basis, rather than simply to identify situations in
which a denial is very likely. The fact that only two days of
unavailability will lead to a week's denial of benefits also en
courages claims staff to investigate the reasons for a claim
ant's failing to respond to a single referral attempt or the
reasons that prompted a claimant to show up at the agency
for personal reporting at the wrong time on a second occa
sion. Such investigation raises the incidence of refusal issues
and probably lowers the rate of refusal-related denials, since
such investigations count as determinations but are relatively
unlikely to lead to the conclusion that a claimant is actually
refusing employment. However, they do frequently uncover
situations in which availability standards have been violated,
and may lead to denials on that issue.
The local office staffing approach adopted in State 1 may
also contribute to its high rate of determinations and denials.
Aside from clerical and managerial staff, all claims staff
have the same title and are rotated among all claims tasks,
including initial claims interviewing, fact-finding, and deter
minations. Checking ongoing claim cards is the responsibili
ty of mail room clerical staff, and they initiate determina
tions on any card with a "wrong" answer. Ongoing claim
forms ask only "yes/no" questions about availability and
job refusal issues, but do not ask for information on
employer contacts. The review of claim cards does not re
quire any judgment, and can be performed by clerical staff.
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As a result of this staffing approach, staff with constant ex
posure to state policy and regulations are involved in the in
itial claims process and are free to concentrate their efforts
on pursuing potential separation issues and eligibility reviews
rather than on routinely reviewing claim forms.
State 2
State 2 resembles State 1 hi that it has developed quite
detailed regulations to guide the determination process, but
it also appears noteworthy for the efficiency with which it
uses its staff and its quite advanced use of computer system
support for the determination process. Despite these
characteristics, State 2 holds a middle rank in terms of
denials, placing in the third quintile nationally for voluntary
quit, misconduct, and job refusal denials, and hi the second
quintile for able/available denials. The rate at which it
makes determinations is lower than the rate of State 1,
although higher than the rates of states 3 through 6.
The UI program in State 2 seems to operate under
thorough, careful control. Rules are delineated in great
detail hi the regulations. For instance, State 2 is the only one
of the six we examined which defines explicitly when and by
what percentages claimants must adjust then* wage demands
over the period of unemployment to be considered available
for suitable work. It is also the only state which appears to
undertake any systematic auditing of employer contacts
reported by claimants on weekly claim forms. All determina
tions are conducted according to clear guidelines, which in
clude requirements that all information be submitted in
writing, and that both parties be appropriately notified prior
to a disputed claim. The state provides two alternative forms
on which employers can submit information to protest a
claim: a special form maintained by employers to report
quits, discharges for misconduct, or job recall refusals, and a
form sent by the agency to the employer to request separa-
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tion information when an initial claim is filed. ERP inter
views are conducted more frequently in State 2 than in any of
the other five states; the agency schedules them at four- to
seven-week intervals for claimants who are not jobattached.
From the information we gathered, no clear explanation
emerges as to why the determination and denial rates of State
2 should be considerably lower than those of State 1,
although some of the rules and practices in State 2 are less
stringent than hi State 1. Claimants must be available three
days out of a week to avoid being denied benefits, rather
than four as in State 1. Despite regulatory language which
appears to give claims staff in both states similar latitude in
defining the job-search effort required of each claimant,
State 2 actually uses a fairly routine operational standard of
two contacts per week, without the infrequent but in
dividualized assessment of job-search efforts that appears to
be true in State 1. However, State 2 facilitates the review of
reported contacts by using a multi-week reporting form that
allows claims staff to review the recent history of reported
contacts each week. This helps staff detect fabricated
employer contacts or repetitive entries of employers.
The two types of factors that may explain the differences
between the rate patterns in States 1 and 2 are external fac
tors and factors that represent a potential deterrent effect,
and in neither case can we observe anything to substantiate
our speculation. Any underlying employment and
unemployment patterns may simply create a population of
claimants who are less likely to be ineligible on the basis of
theu: circumstances or less likely to apply for benefits if they
are ineligible. Some possibility exists that the overall impres
sion of efficiency and thoroughness presented by the UI
agency may convince potentially ineligible individuals not to
apply, or convince ongoing claimants to adhere as closely as
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possible to formal requirements to avoid being denied
benefits.
State 3
The pattern of determination and denial rates in State 3 is
particularly striking, given the very high rates at which deter
minations lead to denials. In 1982, the state ranked in the
first quintile for denials as a percentage of determinations
for all four denial reasons. However, determinations are per
formed at much lower frequencies than in other states. State
3 ranks hi the third quintile for separation determinations,
approximately at the middle of the state ranking. For
nonseparation issues, State 3 ranks very low in terms of the
number of determinations made—near the bottom of the
fifth quintile for able/available issues and in the fourth quin
tile for refusal issues. The high rates at which determinations
lead to denials pull the net denial rates up slightly above the
determination rankings, so that State 3 ranks in the first
quintile for denials based on misconduct and hi the second
quintile for denials based on voluntary quits and refusals,
but in the fifth quintile for able/available denials. These
1982 rankings were slightly below the regression-adjusted
rankings for the entire 1964-1981 period reported in chapter
2. The regression-adjusted rankings of State 3 fell within the
first quintile for voluntary quits, misconduct, and job
refusals, and hi the fourth quintile for able/available issues.
The high rates at which determinations lead to denials for
separation issues in State 3 appear to be caused by its twolevel definition of eligibility requirements and the corres
ponding two-level definition of penalties. Claimants can be
denied benefits for misconduct if they are discharged for
almost any other reason than a lack of work, but the penalty
imposed is only five to ten weeks without benefits, rather
than disqualification for the duration of employment if the
discharge were for gross misconduct. Similarly, claimants
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can be denied benefits for a period of five to ten weeks rather
than for the duration of unemployment if they quit without
good cause but can demonstrate valid personal cir
cumstances to justify their actions.
The milder penalty that can be imposed with less evidence
against the claimant appears to affect both the nature of the
determination process and the decisions of adjudicators.
Agency respondents reported that almost any voluntary
separation or discharge would lead to benefit denial, and
that the hearing process, which typically involves only the
claimant and the adjudicator, usually focuses on the severity
of the penalty that would be appropriate.
Although the definition of gross misconduct hi State 3
closely resembles the definition of simple misconduct in the
other states, there is some evidence that the availability of
the lower-level denial penalty may lead to some laxity hi
detecting issues and in undertaking fact-finding. For in
stance, some respondents suggested that many claimants
simply wait 10 weeks after separation before applying for
benefits (i.e., voluntarily "self-serving" their penalties),
knowing that they would be disqualified for 10 weeks at
most under the milder penalty. It may be that in such cir
cumstances the agency places little emphasis on determining
whether it should impose the more severe penalty that re
quires reemployment and substantial earnings. The fact that
the milder penalty is imposed in two-thirds of misconduct
denials suggests either a weak search for misconduct issues
under the more stringent standard of gross misconduct or a
tendency to categorize gross misconduct issues as simple
misconduct. If State 3 were ranked on the basis of its denials
for gross misconduct (for which the definition corresponds
with the description of the claimant's behavior used to define
misconduct in the other five states), it would rank hi the fifth
rather than in the second quintile.
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In terms of the rate at which nonseparation determina
tions lead to denials, the high rates in State 3 appear to be
associated with the low rate at which determinations are
made. Most likely, given a number of relatively weak spots
in the procedures for detecting issues, only the most obvious
issues reach determination, and, hence, the likelihood of
denial is high. Four weaknesses in detection emerged from
our examination: (1) a narrowing of the scope of potential
able and available issues based on eligibility rules; (2) a low
likelihood of referral by the employment service, and thus a
low exposure of claimants to the risks of job refusal or to the
detection of availability issues; (3) inconsistent adherence to
state policy on work-search requirements; and (4) infrequent
administration of ERP interviews.
The scope of continuing eligibility issues that can poten
tially arise in State 3 is somewhat narrowed by legislation
and regulations that allow claimants who become ill or
disabled to continue drawing benefits until they are offered a
job referral or position, at which time they must demonstrate
an ability to work in order to remain eligible. Although such
instances may occur relatively infrequently, they will not
lead to a determination in State 3, whereas they should in
other states.
The likelihood of exposing claimants to job referrals is low
in State 3 because of its loose employment-service registra
tion procedures. Under state policy, initial claimants are ex
cused from the registration requirement if they expect to be
recalled within 10 weeks, a long period relative to the period
hi other states. Moreover, even those who are required to
register are normally placed in an "inactive status." Brief in
formation on their skills and experience is recorded and filed
but is not entered in the active files from which candidates
for referral are usually selected. No attempt is made to
match these claimants to jobs unless "active status" (volun-
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tarily registered) individuals do not provide enough referrals
to meet the demands of employers. This approach to
registration most likely holds down the rates at which both
able and available and refusal issues arise.
Although state policy requires ongoing claimants to
engage in active search if they do not expect to be recalled
within 10 weeks, we detected inconsistent adherence to this
policy. One office, although it required claimants to report
employer contacts, did not appear to enforce this require
ment by holding a determination when insufficient contacts
were reported. The other office, according to a respondent,
did not require claimants to make any employer contacts un
til after 10 weeks of unemployment. These practices reduce
the chances of detecting availability issues.
Finally, the difficulties faced by State 3 in adhering to a
schedule for ERP interviews weaken its ability to detect
issues. Although ERP interviews are supposed to be held
every 10 weeks, the average interval when we conducted our
site visit was 13 weeks. In fact, it was reported that some
claimants are never scheduled for ERP interviews. In the ur
ban office of State 3, about 20 percent of the scheduled ERP
interviews were reported to lead to determinations for failing
to appear; thus, difficulty in scheduling these interviews
clearly reduces the number of issues that can be found.
State 4
The denial rate pattern of State 4 is dominated by its very
low frequency of determinations. For issues pertaining to
voluntary quit, misconduct, and able/available for work,
State 4 ranks at the very bottom of the fifth quintile in deter
minations made, and it ranks in the third quintile for refusalrelated determinations. However, the rates at which deter
minations lead to denials diverge. For determinations on
voluntary quit and able/available issues, State 4 ranks in the
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first quintile for denials as a percentage of determinations.
However, for misconduct and refusal issues, it ranks in the
fourth and fifth quintiles, respectively. Overall denial rates
are correspondingly low—in the fourth quintile for refusal
issues and in the bottom of the fifth quintile for all others.
The pattern of determination and denial rates in State 4 ap
pears to be heavily influenced by three factors: (1) very
restrictive rules on valid reasons for voluntary separation;
(2) the possible deterrent effects of intake procedures and
denial penalties; and (3) a more casual approach than seems
to be true hi some other states for investigating initial claims
and reviewing ongoing claims.
Of the six states we visited, State 4 is the only one which
does not allow personal reasons to justify voluntary separa
tion, requiring that all quits be for reasons that can be at
tributed to the employer. If the potential claimant popula
tion of this state behaved in a manner similar to the cor
responding populations of other states (i.e., quitting for per
sonal reasons and then applying for benefits at the same
rates), we would expect State 4 to show a high rate of denial
relative to other states. In fact, the opposite is true: deter
minations occur very infrequently, and, although they
almost always lead to denial, the net denial rate is very low.
One possible explanation for this pattern is that the potential
claimant population hi this state is to some degree aware of
the narrow definition of good cause for quitting, and, conse
quently, is less likely either to leave jobs voluntarily or to ap
ply for benefits when they do leave voluntarily.
The possibility that information about the UI program
may deter individuals from filing claims is supported by two
other features of the program in State 4. First, unlike any of
the other states we examined, State 4 provides orientation in
formation about program eligibility requirements to ap
plicants before they complete the required claim forms, and
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allows a week-long interval between the initial intake contact
to identify separation issues and the fact-finding stage at
which the agency collects information from the claimant. It
is possible that when claimants learn about the eligibility
rules, and about the possibility that they might not be eligi
ble, they may refrain from following up a week later with a
claim and fact-finding form. However, agency staff did not
believe that this situation occurred with any significant fre
quency. If such situations do in fact arise, however, State 4
would not recognize that a determination was made.
It is also worth noting that State 4 imposes about the most
severe denial penalty for quitting without good cause: dis
qualification for the duration of unemployment and until the
claimant is reemployed for five weeks and earns 10 times the
weekly benefit amount. The regression analysis results show
ed that more severe denial penalties for voluntary leaves are
associated with lower denial rates, an association which our
hypothesis suggests would be caused at least in part by a
lower likelihood of ineligibles' applying for benefits. We
suspect that the difficulty of requalifying for benefits in
State 4 deters some individuals from applying if they believe
they have quit without an acceptable cause. Given the nar
row definition of good cause in State 4, the deterrent effect
of the severe penalty would affect more individuals than
would a comparable penalty in other states.
Procedures for reviewing initial and ongoing claims are
less rigorous in State 4 than in States 1 and 2, and may con
tribute to the low frequency of determinations. Relative to
the other states, intake procedures in State 4 do not impose a
stringent requirement that employer responses on separation
reasons be obtained before benefits are awarded. If the
claimant's application has not raised any separation issues,
and if the employer's response is not received within seven
days, the agency will not initiate a contact with the employer
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and will proceed with processing the claim. Thus, it is possi
ble that some quits without good cause or some discharges
for misconduct will not be detected if the employer is either
indifferent to or ignorant of the possible effects of the
benefit award on its account. The review of ongoing claims
also seems to be undertaken less carefully than in other
states. Although State 4 requires ongoing claimants to list
two employer contacts on two different days of the week,
scrutiny of these reported contacts appears to be minimal,
and reported contacts are not verified. According to agency
respondents, only the most outrageously apparent fabrica
tions of employer contact will prompt a determination.
As we noted in chapter 4, a high proportion of initial
claims in State 4 are filed by employers for temporarily laidoff claimants, and it is worth considering whether this pro
cedure could explain the very low rate of determinations.
When employers submit initial claims on behalf of their
employees, they are probably less likely to be questioned
than if the same employees were required to file their own
claims. Consequently, the agency would probably avoid
making determinations on individuals whose circumstances
of separation do in fact qualify them for benefits. Thus, such
a practice should lead to a lower determination rate and to a
higher rate of denials as a percentage of determinations, but
should not affect the overall denial rates. The fact that the
overall denial rate in State 4 is very low suggests that other
factors, such as those described earlier, are more important.
The extremely low rates of determinations and the very
high rates at which determinations lead to denials in State 4
may also partially be a product of the fact that the state per
forms adjudications centrally for potential disqualifying
issues. As we pointed out in chapter 4, adjudicators in State
4 base their determinations primarily on written material for
warded by local office fact-finders; however, local fact-
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finding in State 4 does not require any hearing which in
volves both the claimant and the employer. Thus, in some
cases, it is possible that central adjudicators make their deci
sions without an adequate knowledge of the facts. The very
high rate at which centrally performed determinations are
appealed in State 4 may indicate the respective parties' sunpie distrust of what seems to be a remote decision process, or
it may indicate that adjudicators' decisions have a tendency
to be at odds with the facts. The latter hypothesis is sup
ported to some extent by the high rates at which both
claimant- and employer-initiated appeals succeed in over
turning the determination decision. In 1982, the rates at
which appeals reversed determination decisions ranked State
4 among the top three states for employer-initiated appeals
and in the top eight for claimant-initiated appeals.
State 5
Overall denial rates hi State 5 are among the lowest in the
country, ranking it hi the fifth quintile for all four nonmonetary eligibility factors examined hi this study.
However, these low denial rates are due to an interesting pat
tern of determination rates and denials as a percentage of
determinations. For quit-related issues, State 5 ranks near
the bottom of the fifth quintile for determinations and hi the
fourth quintile for denials as a percentage of determinations.
For misconduct issues, the state ranks among the lowest for
determinations, but in the highest quintile for the percentage
of determinations that lead to denials. Determinations for
able/available issues are performed very frequently (the state
ranks in the first quintile), but lead to denials less than 15
percent of the tune (which ranks State 5 in the lowest quintile
for denials as a percentage of determinations). Finally,
refusal-related determinations occur very infrequently (at a
fifth-quintile rate) but frequently lead to denials (ranking the
state in the top of the second quintile in terms of this
measure).
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Based on our site visit, it appears that State 5 is generally
poorly equipped to detect potential eligibility issues and to
report actions as determinations. Only the most clear-cut
issues are likely to reach the determination stage; hence,
denial rates as a percentage of determinations could be ex
pected to be quite high. This general observation is based on
(1) the state's process for screening potential issues informal
ly at intake, and (2) the absence of any effective employment
service registration or work-search requirements.
Separation issues that would lead to determinations in
other states appear frequently to be resolved hi State 5 before
the investigation reaches the point at which it is formally
recognized as a determination. Responding to pressures to
adhere to time standards for granting initial payments and
resolving determinations, State 5 conducts initial factfinding discussions with both the claimant and the employer
immediately upon discovering a potential issue at intake.
When these discussions indicate no reason for benefit denial,
no determination is counted in the state's records, since no
claim has yet been submitted for a benefit week. This screen
ing process undoubtedly contributes to the extremely low
frequency with which determinations are made for separa
tion issues.
A number of procedures in State 5 make it unlikely that
ongoing eligibility issues will be detected. First, requirements
for registration with the employment service are very mild
compared with other states, and do not appear to be enforc
ed consistently. Only claimants who do not expect to be
recalled within 13 weeks are supposed to register, and the of
fices we visited did not appear to enforce registration re
quirements hi keeping with policy. One office excused initial
claimants from referral to the employment service if they
had any prospect of recall; the other office referred unat
tached claimants only after 13 weeks of unemployment.
Moreover, the state has no requirement for active work
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search. Claimants can thus satisfy availability requirements
by expressing only a passive interest in working or a will
ingness to work, rather than having to demonstrate that they
are actively engaged in work search. Questions posed on
weekly claim cards allow claimants to interpret then*
behavior rather than to state simple facts (e.g., "Did you
refuse work without good cause!"). Finally, State 5 insists
that information on job refusals come from the employer or
employment service; the agency will not note any refusals
reported voluntarily by claimants, nor will it initiate a deter
mination based on such a report. Given the very low
likelihood that the employment service will refer claimants to
employers, failing to act upon claimants' reports severely
reduces any chances the agency has of detecting those
refusals that do occur.
In light of these general expectations about low determina
tion rates, some explanation is clearly necessary for the
anomalously high incidence of determinations for
able/available issues hi State 5. One possible explanation lies
hi the state's approach to scheduling personal appearances
for claims filing and ERP interviews: appearances are
scheduled for a particular day and hour; the failure to ap
pear at the correct hour is noted on the claims file; and, upon
the third such occurrence, a determination is initiated to
determine whether the claimant is available for work. Rely
ing heavily on personal claims filing would raise the in
cidence of such determinations, and, indeed, heavy personal
filing was reported in the urban office we visited. We suspect
that claimants may have difficulty in complying with this
tightly scheduled approach for personal reporting, even
when their difficulty does not necessarily reflect their
unavailability for work. This interpretation is borne out by
the low rate at which determinations for able/available
issues lead to denials. Thus, although State 5 may have little
chance of detecting inadequate claimant responses to job or
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referral offers, frequent occasions may occur when failing to
comply with reporting procedures leads to counted deter
minations.
When detection procedures are weak, we expect that only
the clearest issues will reach determination, and, hence, that
a high percentage of determinations will lead to denials. This
expectation is true for misconduct and refusal issues in State
5. However, the state ranks very low for quit and
able/available issues. In terms of quit issues, we attribute the
low rate to a fairly liberal definition of personal reasons as
good cause for quitting. In terms of able/available issues,
State 5 also seems relatively liberal in that it allows claimants
somewhat greater latitude hi restricting the scope of their job
search and availability than do the other states. Claimants
are allowed to limit the hours and shifts they will work, and
no recognized rule of thumb exists hi local offices about how
quickly and to what extent claimants should adjust their job
expectations as time elapses. Thus, the standards by which
issues are to be judged when determinations arise do not pro
vide a particularly strong basis for denials.
The low rate at which determinations for able/available
issues lead to denials is probably caused most directly by the
high rate at which determinations are made and the frequen
cy with which they arise from procedural rather than
substantive situations. The rate may also be held down by
the relatively moderate standard for availability set by the
state, which requires the claimant to be available for work
only for the majority of the week. Since two days of
unavailability do not justify a denial, determinations
prompted by claimants' reporting at the wrong time prob
ably rarely lead to denial.
State 6
The denial rate pattern of State 6 resembles the patterns of
State 4 and 5. Overall, denial rates are low—in the fifth quin-
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tile for quit, misconduct, and able/available issues, and in
the bottom of the third quintile for refusal issues. These
denial rates reflect the pattern of determination rates, which
also fall in the fifth quintile for the first two areas, in the bot
tom of the fourth quintile for able/available issues, and in
the bottom of the third quintile for refusals. As does State 5,
this state ranks quite high in terms of the rate at which
misconduct-related determinations lead to denials (in the
first quintile). The rate of denials relative to determinations
is moderate (in the third quintile) for quit and refusal issues,
and very low for able/available issues.
For both separation and nonseparation issues, we iden
tified certain procedures which probably contribute to the
relatively low rates at which determination issues are raised.
At intake, the procedures in State 6 do not take advantage of
information as fully or actively as do procedures in other
states, particularly in States 1 and 2. For example, claims in
terviewers are explicitly not to note separation issues that
might be suggested by claimants' answers to questions on the
intake form; they are to note only those issues that pertain to
the claimants' ability to and availability for work. A separa
tion issue determination occurs only when an employer pro
tests. Moreover, procedures are not the most favorable for
obtaining employer information that could lead to a deter
mination. The form that might elicit an employer protest is
somewhat ambiguous, asking simply whether any reason ex
ists to question the claimant's eligibility, rather than asking
for the reason for separation. The form sent to employers
demands a detailed written explanation of circumstances in
order to support a protest. The burden placed on employers
to lodge a protest is clearly greater in this state than hi States
1 or 2.
Before conducting a formal determination, claims ex
aminers in State 6 often want to confirm the existence of a
reasonable cause for denial by clarifying information provid-
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ed by employers before scheduling a determination hearing.
The necessity for such clarification arises most frequently for
misconduct issues, for which the determination rate in State
6 ranks lowest. State 6 respondents noted that, although
there is no intention to discourage employers from continu
ing with a protest, a significant number of such clarification
discussions between the examiner and the employer lead
simply to dropping the issue. This clarification process thus
contributes to the low determination rate for separation
issues.
The existence of nonseparation issues seems relatively
unlikely hi State 6 because of the minimal work-search re
quirements and the lack of resources for ERP interviews
reported during our site visits. In contrast to States 1, 2, 3,
and 4, State 6 has no blanket work-search requirement which
affects all unattached claimants. Registration with the
employment service fulfills the legal requirements for labormarket exposure. If claims staff question the strength of a
claimant's connection to the labor market, they can require
that claimant to file personally and to document active worksearch efforts; however, fewer than 1 percent of all claimants
are in fact required to do so. For all other claimants, no
regular report of employer contacts is required.
In addition, the thoroughness of ERP interviews in State 6
was severely undermined by staffing cuts. Consequently,
ERP interviews hi one office were being held every eight
weeks, as scheduled, only for claimants whose availability
and labor-market attachment had been ques
tioned—specifically, those in high-demand occupations or
those who are unemployed for a long time. For other
claimants, ERP interviews had slipped to intervals of 12 or
more weeks. In the other office, staffing problems cut back
the frequency of ERP interviews, so that none had been con
ducted for a period of over five months prior to our visit.

120

State Characteristics

Despite these problems, which could be expected to keep
nonseparation issues to a low level, it is worth noting that the
rate for refusal-related determinations in State 6 is higher
than for other issues, as is the rate at which these determina
tions lead to denials. One possible explanation is that State 6
attempts to use the employment service to place UI claimants
to a greater extent than do the other states we examined. At
the time we visited, the agency had set a target that called for
allotting 19 percent of the employment service referrals to
claimants. This policy may lead to a greater number of refer
rals for UI claimants than is true elsewhere and, consequent
ly, to more situations hi which the claimant's response to the
referral is open to challenge. The policies in State 6 seem to
suggest that claimants who are eager for work are expected
to conduct work-search activities independently, and that lit
tle purpose is served by forcing all claimants to provide a
routine list of employer contacts. Conversely, the agency ac
cepts a greater responsibility for using its own resources to
direct claimants toward job opportunities than do the other
states we visited and, hence, expose more claimants to situa
tions hi which they could refuse jobs.

C General Conclusions About the
Nonmonetary Determination Process
Despite the cautions expressed earlier about the difficulty
of drawing clear inferences from observations of a limited
number of states and from qualitative or subjective data, it is
important to provide some assessment of what we have
learned from the regression and process analyses. Our
general conclusions are presented here in full recognition
that they can serve only as guidelines for new policy and
management initiatives, not as prescriptions for success. The
discussion below deals with five topics: (1) the importance of
issue-detection relative to fact-finding and adjudication;
(2) factors that appear to affect success in detecting potential
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eligibility issues; (3) the significance of the severity of
penalties imposed for denials; (4) the importance of clear
policies and procedures; and (5) the organization of the factfinding and adjudication process.
"Finding Issues" vs. "Deciding Issues"
State denial rates may vary to some extent because of dif
ferences in the behavior of potential claimants. Population
characteristics and the public's perception of the UI program
may lead to differences either in the rates at which
unemployed individuals file for benefits or in the rates at
which individuals take actions that lead to their unemploy
ment. However, it appears to us that much of the variation
in denial rates among the six states we examined can be at
tributed to differences in how well the states are able to deny
benefits to individuals who have claimed benefits but who do
not conform to program requirements. This denial process
consists of three stages: (1) the definition of policy which
stipulates eligibility requirements; (2) the policies and pro
cedures which detect potential eligibility issues pertaining to
individual claimants; and (3) the process of fact-finding and
decisionmaking for identified issues.
Given a stated set of eligibility requirements, we quite
strongly conclude that the ability of a state to deny benefits
to the ineligible population will depend primarily on the ef
fectiveness with which it detects determination issues, rather
than on the consistency with which its determinations lead to
denials. States with high determination rates also have high
denial rates; moreover, even when a state denies benefits hi a
very high percentage of determinations, the net denial rate
will be low if the determination rate is also low.
Determination rates dominate net denial rates hi part
because they vary more widely than do denials as a percent
age of determinations. In table 5.1, the standard deviations
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divided by the means of determination and denial rates are
presented for the six sample states and for all fifty-one state
jurisdictions. This useful measure of variability is consistent
ly higher for the rate of determinations than for denials as a
percentage of determinations. The data on which this table is
based provide clear examples of this difference. In the sixstate sample, determination rates for voluntary separations
ranged from about 21 determinations per 1,000 contacts to
over 100, whereas denials as a percentage of determinations
for the same issue ranged only between about 73 percent and
94 percent.
Table 5.1
Variability of Rates of Determination
and Denials/Determinations
(Standard deviations/mean)
____Six-state sample_______51 state jurisdictions___
Denials as
Denials as
Determination
percent of
Determination
percent of
Eligibility Issue
rate
determinations
rate
determinations
Separation issues
Nonseparation issues

.71
.79

.17
.44

.56
.65

.20
.30

Determination rates vary more than the rates at which
determinations lead to denials for several reasons. The pro
cess of fact-finding and adjudication is more administrative
ly confined than the process of identifying determination
issues. Fact-finding and adjudication are conducted by a
smaller staff whose actions and decisions can be scrutinized
and reviewed more closely than is true for the claims takers
and clerical staff whose functions only contribute to issue
detection. The adjudication process is constrained by
legislative and judicial due process and timeliness standards,
and is thus difficult to modify by managerial decision.
Moreover, the adjudication process within a particular state
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has its basic ground rules in state policy, which may be more
or less explicit but is relatively stable. However, the frequen
cy with which issues are detected is affected not only by
eligibility policy, but also by a wide range of administrative
guidelines and procedures that may vary from office to of
fice in their application, and that may be adhered to closely
or loosely depending upon available staff resources, the
pressure of claimant traffic, and the level of agency
managerial control. Consequently, the rates of issue detec
tion we observed vary much more widely than does the abili
ty of states to deny benefits for identified issues.
By implication, policy and managerial initiatives to im
prove the detection of determination issues are considerably
more feasible than those to improve the adjudication process
itself. In fact, using the rate at which determinations lead to
denials as a performance measure would serve little purpose.
Based on our examination of these six states, it appears that
where denials as a percentage of determinations are unusual
ly high, the high rate most likely reflects deficiencies in issue
detection rather than a particularly effective adjudication
process.
Casting the "detection net" more broadly to expand the
catch of issues for determination appears to be associated
with less "efficient" detection, in that a higher percentage of
issues will be resolved by awarding benefits. However, the
purpose of the overall determination process is not to deny
benefits efficiently; it is to ensure that a high percentage of
ineligibles are denied, and that the procedures that are
followed convey to claimants the seriousness of the agency
about enforcing eligibility standards. Increasing denials by a
process which examines more cases, considers them
equitably, and ends up denying benefits for a lower percen
tage of determinations is consistent with those goals.
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However, achieving a higher rate of determinations has
cost implications. Increased staff resources may be necessary
to achieve the higher rate of detection, and increased
resources are very likely to be necessary to process more
cases through adjudication. In the short term, increasing the
number of determinations performed will increase federal
reimbursements for administrative costs. Federal reimburse
ment for administrative costs is based on estimated "MPUs"
(minutes per unit) of staff time required for each function in
claims processing, determination, and other UI activities.
For a given year, once MPUs are estimated from ad
ministrative activity studies and negotiated with the U.S.
Department of Labor, increasing the volume of any par
ticular activity (such as determinations) will lead to a cor
responding increase in total reimbursement. However,
because detecting additional (and possibly more complex)
issues may require a greater average labor effort per deter
mination than do those issues that are currently found, the
increase in federal reimbursement may not adequately cover
the extra state cost. In the longer term, investing ad
ministrative resources in a tighter detection effort and a
greater volume of determinations may raise a state's MPU
and thus increase the rate at which the state's determinations
are reimbursed. However, the increase in federal reimburse
ment might not match the increase in the resources devoted
to tighter detection efforts by the state, since no assurance
exists that state requests based on MPU studies will be ac
cepted as submitted to the funding-decision process. In both
the short and long terms, therefore, resource constraints
must be kept in mind if an effort is to be made to increase the
rate of determinations.
Raising determination rates within resource constraints
necessitates assessing the effectiveness of current detection
methods and considering alternative uses of staff. For exam
ple, among the six states we examined, considerable varia-
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tion exists in the extent to which they rely on the routine
reporting and review of employer contacts as a method for
identifying work-search deficiencies and availability issues,
as opposed to a more tailored scrutiny of how well in
dividuals are demonstrating the type of work-search effort
reasonably suited to their employment history and prospects.
These represent two very different uses of resources for
detecting issues. We will return to this issue of reporting and
review in the next section.
Factors That Affect Determination Rates
Our examination of the six sample states uncovered dif
ferences in the methods by which the UI agencies detect
eligibility issues for determination. This section provides a
summary of which approaches appear to be more effective
than the others.
Before pointing out state detection procedures that seem
effective, we should acknowledge that determination rates
are not a perfect measure of the ability of an agency to iden
tify issues. In at least some cases, a few states, such as sample
States 5 and 6, perform some type of informal investigation
upon detecting a potential issue, and drop some issues before
they reach the point at which they are counted as a deter
mination. Some state procedures tend to create issues which
focus on the ability of claimants to comply with reporting
procedures, but which only rarely lead to benefit denials. For
example, the high rate of able/available determinations in
State 5 seems to be caused by reporting practices rather than
by the detection of substantive issues. Thus, determination
rates may understate or overstate the ability of an agency to
find substantive questions about a claimant's eligibility.
Procedures that lower determination rates by resolving
some issues through informal inquiry prior to determination
could be viewed as an effective managerial tool because they
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hold down the burden and costs imposed on the determina
tion process. However, if dropping issues prior to determina
tion is indicative of a general tendency to avoid recognizing
issues and bringing them to determination, and if it reflects a
low managerial emphasis on finding issues, it instead
becomes part of a larger issue. The states we observed which
did undertake some type of screening, even though it may
not explicitly be recognized as such, generally follow less ac
tive and persistent procedures for detecting issues. States 5
and 6 have instituted relatively weak procedures for obtain
ing employer input on separation issues, and take relatively
little initiative themselves in identifying issues. Moreover,
they do not impose an effective work-search requirement on
most claimants, eliminating one potentially important way
to test the ongoing availability of claimants for work. Thus,
even though the determination rate is not a perfect measure
of issue detection, it must be viewed as an important in
dicator.
To detect separation issues, we would emphasize two prac
tices that seemed to contribute to high determination rates in
our sample of six states. The first practice would be to ini
tiate the determination process based on information from
claimants, employers, or the agency itself, rather than
restricting acceptable sources for identifying particular
issues. State 6, for instance, insists that separation deter
minations be initiated by employer protests and will not ini
tiate a determination on the basis of claimants' statements at
intake. State 5 does not recognize ongoing claimants' reports
of job refusals; it relies entirely on notification by the
employment service that the claimant refused a job to which
he/she was referred or on notification by employers, at thenown initiative, that claimants refused jobs offered to them
through their own search activity. We frequently heard
respondents from other states say that most issues arise from
information presented by claimants. Even if the statements
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of claimants are ignored, some issues will of course be raised
by another party, but it seems likely that at least some issues
will consequently go undetected.
If a state wishes to maximize its ability to find issues, ini
tiating a determination regardless of the source of informa
tion seems particularly important because of the possibility
that some issues may be important to the agency but less im
portant to the employer. For instance, employers which pay
a maximum tax rate may conclude that the burden of pro
testing a claim, documenting it fully, and participating in an
adjudication hearing is unwarranted, since the individual
case will have no direct effect on their tax burden. From the
agency perspective, however, such an issue might be worth
pursuing, since each unmerited award of benefits contributes
to program costs and, in the longer run, places upward
pressure on employers' taxes.
A second guideline for detecting separation issues effec
tively, and one which clearly pertains to the first guideline, is
to insist upon obtaining simple factual information from
employers about the reasons for the job separation. We
observed two practices that deviated from this principle. One
was failing to ensure that employers' responses about separa
tion reasons are received before initial claims are processed.
In states where forms are sent to employers and no follow-up
is performed if the response has not arrived before the first
weekly claim, it appears that the agency implicitly assumes
that the purpose of the form is simply to allow the employer
an opportunity to protest. Where persistent follow-up is
undertaken to obtain an employer's response, procedures in
effect recognize the principle that it is the agency and not the
employer which bears responsibility for protecting the in
tegrity of the eligibility process. When employers' responses
are optional, some real issues may go undetected. The sec
ond practice that departed from this guideline was asking

128

State Characteristics

employers whether or not they had any reason to question a
claimant's eligibility, rather than simply asking for a factual
statement about the circumstances surrounding separation.
The former approach allows employers to decide whether an
issue should be pursued; the latter emphasizes the agency's
role in making that judgment.
Determination rates for nonseparation issues seem to
reflect three general factors that vary from state to state:
(1) the scope of work-search requirements and the methods
used to monitor compliance; (2) the purposefulness and fre
quency with which claimants are questioned about ongoing
eligibility issues; and (3) the consistency with which ongoing
claims are reviewed.
It seems clear that a formal requirement which stipulates
that claimants engage in their own active work search is a
necessary foundation for effectively assessing their exposure
to the labor market as a measure of their availability for
work. Without such a requirement, the UI agency has no
basis for questioning any claimant's availability for work
based on a lack of search effort, and it has no basis for im
plementing procedures to monitor work-search activities.
Ironically, State 5, the only one in our sample with no formal
work-search requirement at all, ranked very high in the fre
quency with which it made able/available determinations,
but the overall denial rate for those issues was so low that we
concluded that procedural rather than substantive issues pro
duced the high rate.
A formal work-search requirement is necessary but not
sufficient to ensure that availability and refusal issues are
identified. The procedural definitions of evidence required
to document adequate work search also seem to affect the
determination rate. Two major options seem available:
(1) to require a minimum number of weekly contacts with
employers and to report them on claim cards; and (2) to

State Characteristics

129

prescribe the types of search efforts that are expected of
claimants in their particular occupations, and to review
periodically how well they are measuring up to such stan
dards. Our process analysis indicates that either approach
can be effective, but only to the extent that it is taken
seriously. Without a serious review of and consistent
response to insufficient employer contacts, routine weekly
reporting of contacts is open to serious abuse and may serve
little detection purpose. 1 In State 4, for example, employer
contacts are regularly reported, but only the most apparent
fabrications of employer names prompt determinations, and
the frequency of determinations on availability issues is at
the bottom of the state ranking. Under the more flexible ap
proach hi which claimants are clearly required to conduct in
dependent work search but to report their activities only at
fairly long intervals during ERPs, some possibility exists that
less eager claimants will not feel compelled to look for work.
In State 1, which uses this approach, it appears that suffi
cient resources are devoted to assessing the adequacy of in
dividual search efforts, because the frequency of availability
determinations ranks high in the second quintile. Either
method can work if carried out thoroughly.
Determination rates and, consequently, denial rates also
seem to depend on the purposefulness and frequency with
which claimants' ongoing eligibility is questioned. Two par
ticular aspects of ongoing eligibility review are important:
the manner in which questions are posed to claimants on
weekly or biweekly claim cards, and the frequency and
substance of ERP interviews. Questions on claim cards
should request simple factual statements from claimants,
rather than allowing them to judge whether their behavior is
within eligibility norms and incorporating that judgment in
their answers. For example, State 5, which asks claimants
whether they refused a job without good cause, ranks in the
fifth quintile for refusal-related determinations. This claim
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card question may not account entirely for that low rate, but
probably contributes to it. Claim card questions can usefully
reflect an overall approach for identifying possible eligibility
issues rather than clear ones. For example, State 1 asks
claimants whether they were available for work during the
entire week, even though one day of unavailability is accept
able. Asking the claimant whether he/she was available
"every day but one" would indicate that availability is not
an absolute standard, and would perhaps encourage some
claimants to shrink their reported periods of unavailability
down to the apparently required size when completing their
claims reports. State 1 ranks in the first quintile for
able/available determinations.
For most claimants in the states we examined, the Eligibili
ty Review Process interview is the only tune after the initial
claim has been filed that the agency has personal contact
with the claimant under routine procedures. The informa
tion uncovered in these interviews can raise issues, as can
merely scheduling them and observing claimants' ability to
appear at the requested time. The states we examined varied
widely in the frequency with which they plan to and are able
to schedule ERPs—from State 2, which holds them every
four to seven weeks with unattached claimants, to State 5,
which in practice conducts ERP interviews only every thir
teen weeks on average. States that schedule more frequent
ERP interviews tend to have higher determination rates for
nonseparation issues.
The rigor and consistency with which ongoing claims
reports are reviewed by UI staff also vary considerably from
state to state, and are probably an important factor in the
ability of states to detect ongoing eligibility issues. In some
states, such as hi State 2, it appears that the "wrong" answer
to a claim card question automatically prompts a determina
tion, and an insufficient number of reported employer con-
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tacts leads to a warning to the claimant on the first occur
rence and a determination on the second. In others, such as
States 3 and 4, adherence to policy is spotty. In State 3,
neither office we visited enforced employer contact re
quirements according to state policy; hi State 4, the process
of reviewing employer contacts was described as cursory.
State 2 ranks in the middle of the fourth quintile for all
nonseparation determinations, considerably above States 3
and 4, which rank, respectively, in the middle and bottom of
the fifth quintile.

Importance of Denial Penalties
The severity of penalties imposed on denied claimants can
potentially affect the integrity of the eligibility determination
process and program finances in two ways. First, more
severe penalties can affect the behavior of claimants and
potential claimants—for example, by deterring individuals
from taking such actions as quitting or refusing a job. Know
ing that benefits will be denied for the duration of unemploy
ment is probably a stronger deterrent than knowing that
benefits will be received after a fixed number of weeks of
denial. More severe penalties may also be more likely to
discourage individuals from applying when they suspect that
their actions will make them ineligible. Both of these effects
were incorporated hi our hypothesis about the effects of dis
qualification for the duration of unemployment on denial
rates for voluntary separation, misconduct, and refusal. The
more individuals are deterred from such actions or
discouraged from filing, the lower the denial rates are ex
pected to be, and the regression analysis seems to support
that hypothesis.
The second way hi which the severity of penalties can af
fect the UI program is by influencing administrative
behavior hi the determination process. For purposes of for
mulating hypotheses for the regression analysis reported in
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chapter 2, we explicitly assumed that the severity of denial
penalties does not affect the likelihood of denial once a
determination is initiated. All of the six states in our process
analysis sample impose disqualification for the duration of
unemployment for quit, misconduct, and refusal; thus, there
is not much variation with which to test the possibility of
such an effect. However, State 3 lends some support to the
idea that the severity of the penalty may in fact affect the
likelihood of denial, although not as a result of any clear
policy directive. The two-level definitions of voluntary quit
and misconduct in State 3 seem to give claims staff the op
tion of imposing milder penalties based on less imposing
evidence against the claimant. In effect, it becomes easier to
justify denial and perhaps easier to deny benefits because the
effects on the claimant are less severe.
Although penalties that deny benefits for a certain number
of weeks may lead to more denial decisions than would dis
qualification for the duration of unemployment, the amount
of new employment required to requalify after a dis
qualification is probably too subtle a variation to affect
either claimant behavior or adjudicators' decisions. In our
six-state sample, requalification requirements ranged from
five weeks to ten weeks of new employment earnings; two
states also required four or five weeks of elapsed time in new
employment. We could not discern any indication that
tougher requalification requirements had any effect on the
tendency either of claimants to apply for benefits or of staff
to deny them.
Although less severe penalties may lead to more denials,
milder penalties may not be a desirable policy, and par
ticularly not as part of a two-level definition of eligibility
rules. On the one hand, it appears to us that defining two
degrees of violation may mean that issues which actually
warrant denial under the more demanding standard may be
less energetically pursued. On the other hand, this arrange-
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ment may mean that both the claimants and the agency will
exhibit a tendency to accept benefit denials under the looser
standard without thoroughly developing the arguments that
would support the award of benefits and no penalty.
Furthermore, less severe penalties, even if they lead to in
creased denial rates, may not restrain overall program costs
more effectively. The regression results and some of our pro
cess analysis observations suggest that more severe penalties
may be associated with lower denial rates because they deter
ineligibles from applying for benefits, and possibly deter
behavior which leads to unemployment. UI benefits can be
held down by this deterrent effect without the administrative
cost of processing applications, perhaps to the same extent as
increased denial rates.
Clear Policies and Standards
The states we visited varied dramatically in the extent to
which they made UI policies and procedures available in a
clear, organized form, or even consistently recognized them
in more informal ways. At one end of the spectrum, States 1
and 2 have very detailed regulations that provide clear
guidance as to the requirements imposed on claimants and
how eligibility requirements are to be interpreted and applied
to a wide variety of claimant circumstances. In sharp con
trast are states such as State 3, in which regulations do not
provide definitions of nonmonetary eligibility requirements
or interpretive guidance, and in which we could find no cur
rently maintained, comprehensive set of procedures to fill
this gap. Not surprisingly, we found that hi states that had
more comprehensive and detailed written policy and pro
cedures, the staffs understanding of state policy was more
accurate and more consistent.
Detailed and specific policies tend to restrict the amount
of discretion that can be exercised by claims staff in con
sidering each claimant's case. To the extent that the clarity of
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defined policy is effectively communicated to line staff, its
effect should be to increase the consistency with which
similar cases are treated in the determination process, which
is a desirable end. One legitimate concern, of course, is that
very detailed, specific regulations may make it impossible for
determination decisions to respond to the subtle differences
in individual claimants' situations which might not be dif
ferentiated in program rules. This problem was in fact
described by some agency respondents in State 2. Although
claims staff recognized that many claimants, particularly in
rural areas, had few employment options open to them and
few target employers which could be contacted, they main
tained that their specific regulations forced them to enforce
work-search requirements rigorously.
However, detailed and specific program guidelines need
not prompt claims staff to undertake unreasonable enforce
ment activities, and probably provide greater protection for
claimants than do nebulous and unwritten rules. For in
stance, the rules in State 2 could describe circumstances in
which new employer contacts every week do not constitute a
reasonable expectation. Even if procedures require claimants
to report a specified number of employer contacts per week,
state policy could also allow adjudicators to consider the oc
cupations of individuals and their specific job markets in
performing determinations prompted by insufficient
reported contacts. In contrast, the lack of clearly written
rules makes it more difficult for adjudicators to justify then*
decisions, and more difficult for claimants to understand the
standards they must meet and to prepare arguments in their
defense. Agency adjudicators then apply unwritten stan
dards which may be understood and interpreted quite dif
ferently by different adjudicators, and leave claimants with
no reasonable basis for predicting the relationship between
their behavior and the adjudication outcome. In such cir
cumstances, high standards of due process may be difficult
to achieve.

State Characteristics

135

Organization of Fact-Finding and Adjudication
Three variable factors were observed in the manner in
which the sample states conduct fact-finding and adjudica
tion. First, states varied in the extent to which they insisted
on conducting all fact-finding within the context of a
recognized determination process, as opposed to allowing
some informal fact-finding and issue resolution before the
process was considered a determination. Second, some varia
tion exists in the extent to which states relied on in-person in
terviews in which the claimant and (where relevant) the
employer were present, as opposed to telephone fact-finding
and separate contacts with the employer and claimant. Final
ly, in one state, fact-finding was performed by one staff per
son in the local office, and the determination decision was
formulated and written up by a different person in the state
office. In all other states in our sample, fact-finding and ad
judication were performed by the same person in the local
office. Our examination of the six states leads us to three
general conclusions about the effects of these variations.
The first conclusion, already expressed hi other contexts
earlier, is that a broad view should be taken of the types of
information that justify inquiry and some form of deter
mination. Identifying more issues, rather than trying to iden
tify only those issues that stand a good chance of leading to
denial, seems more likely to lead to the effective denial of a
high percentage of truly ineligible cases. However, casting
the broad net for potential issues certainly increases the
workload imposed on staff who conduct fact-finding and
determinations.
Thus, the second conclusion is that agencies must obvious
ly deal in some way with the workload burdens imposed by
high frequencies hi the determination process. We can
distinguish between two approaches that we observed. Some
states, by conducting some informal clarification and fact-
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finding before the formal determination process, are able to
eliminate some issues before reaching the point at which a
formal written decision and notification are necessary. This
approach reduces the workload to some extent by avoiding
part of the work required in a formal determination. The
second approach is simply to improve the efficiency of the
determination process. For example, State 2, which has
detailed regulations and a computer system capable of
generating notifications (including standard text selected by
adjudicators), maintains a production rate estimated at over
100 determinations per week by each adjudicator when work
volume demands it. In contrast, State 6, which has a com
pletely manual system, sets a production target of onequarter of the maximum production rate of State 2 and ap
parently has difficulty meeting that target.2 To be sure, the
tendency in State 2 to perform determinations whenever any
issue is raised probably creates a determination workload
which includes more straightforward and quickly resolvable
issues than would be true hi State 6, in which some obvious
issues are eliminated before reaching the determination pro
cess. This difference, however, does not seem likely to ac
count for the substantial differences in overall productivity.
As we observed earlier, issue screening seems very often
associated with other practices that may prevent valid issues
from being identified. Thus, improving the efficiency of the
determination process seems to represent a sounder course
for dealing with resource problems than would efforts to
avoid the formalities of the determination procedure.
Finally, our observations in the six states underscore the
importance of maximizing the information available to the
adjudicator who is responsible for making determination
decisions, for the sake of rendering informed decisions that
promote confidence hi the thoroughness and equitability of
the determination process, and to avoid frequent recourse to
the appeals process. Two states that we examined pointed
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out this issue particularly clearly. State 4, which conducts
most determinations centrally, ranks very high both in the
frequency of appeals and in the frequency with which deter
mination decisions are overturned in appeals. Although cen
tral adjudication was initially adopted to reduce the costs of
determination, it is possible that the same decision has caus
ed an increase in the cost of the appeals process, which hi
1982 had to be undertaken for almost one of every four
determination decisions. In State 2, although determinations
are performed locally, for some reason employers tend not
to participate in the determination hearings, even when they
may have raised the determination issue. Respondents
reported that employers participate in fewer than 25 percent
of determination fact-finding interviews to which they are in
vited. The apparent result, however, is that determination
decisions are more likely to be challenged by employers; for
example, hi 1982, employers in State 2 initiated appeals on
about 6 percent of all determinations, a rate exceeded in only
one or two other states. Moreover, these appeals were
unusually successful, resulting in a reversal about 38 percent
of the time, a success rate which ranks among the three
highest in the country.
Some tension obviously exists between the goals of con
ducting determinations efficiently and maximizing the infor
mation that is developed through fact-finding. Insisting that
employers and claimants be present for all fact-finding inter
views in which both are relevant is not only infeasible but
would also substantially increase the costs of the process—in
many cases unnecessarily. Some states conduct fact-finding
hearings by telephone or perform separate contacts to gather
information from the parties involved. No extreme solutions
are suggested, but two concluding suggestions are offered.
First, determination decisionmaking by staff who are not in
volved in fact-finding, using primarily written summaries of
facts and without personal contact with the parties, may be
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counterproductive. Second, states should encourage relevant
parties to participate in a determination whenever it appears
that then* interests are at stake and that there is some chance
that they have further information or rebuttals to offer.

NOTES
1. The importance of such review is highlighted by the results of the UI
Random Audit pilot test, which showed that the major source of UI
overpayments was lack of adherence to the work test. See Jerry L.
Kingston, Paul L. Burgess, and Robert D. St. Louis, "The Unemploy
ment Insurance Random Audit Program: Some Results and Implica
tions," Unemployment Insurance Service, Employment and Training
Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, November 1985.
2. Study MPUs in these two states reflect these productivity differences.
For FY1983, State 6 had a study MPU of over 115 minutes on intrastate
separation issue determinations, as compared with less than 48 minutes
for State 2. MPUs for nonseparation issues were almost 75 minutes for
State 6 and just under 35 minutes for State 2.
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